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INTRODUCTION
This Introduction is by way of explanation and 
apology. First, let us treat of the explanation.
In the following pages will be found what at 
first sight must appear an odd assortment of topics, 
an assortment not easily reconciled in terns of 
traditional pedagogical classifications. True, 
they have one thing in common; they all deal with 
some aspect of monopoly theory. But they also have 
a contextual unity and perhaps it will help to see 
the matters dealt with here in perspective, if we 
briefly outline the context in which they have arisen.
Ultimatelyt the writer is concerned with the 
effects of monopoly upon economic growth, with 
determining whether monopoly represents the hardening 
of capitalism* s arteries” as suggested by Marxists 
and secular stagnationists, or whether monopoly gives 
capitalism new direction, "planning* and stability as
argued by o t h e r s ,  w h eth er  i t  te n d s  to  n e u t r a l iz e
2
i t s e l f  by th e  d evelop m en t o f  C o u n t e r v a i l in g  pow er", 
o r  w h eth er  i t  i s  m erely  u n im p ortan t one way o r  th e  
o t h e r ,  a s  o f t e n  seem s to  be im p lie d .
T h is  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e , a v e ry  a m b itio u s  ta s k  and 
one i s  v e r y  so o n  s tr u c k  by th e  in ad eq u acy  o f  th e  t o o l s  
a t  hand w ith  w h ich  to  ta c k le  i t .  Fundam ental to  such  
a s tu d y  a r e , o f  c o u r s e , th e  th e o r y  o f  grow th and th e  
th e o r y  o f  m onopoly. U n fo r tu n a te ly , b oth  are  
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  i n  many r e s p e c t s .
As f a r  a s  th e  th e o r y  o f  grow th i s  c o n c er n e d , 
we have n o t  advanced much beyond th e  s ta g e  o f  form al 
m od els w h ich  t e l l  u s  l i t t l e  more th an  t h a t ,  i f  th e  
system  i s  i n  e q u il ib r iu m  to  b e g in  w ith  and e v e r y th in g  
grows p r o p o r t io n a t e ly ,  th e  sy stem  w i l l  c o n tin u e  a lo n g  
a p a th  o f  e q u il ib r iu m  grow th . Two a s p e c t s  o f  grow th  
th e o r y  i n  p a r t i c u la r  are in a d e q u a te . F i r s t ,  s in c e
1 .  C f . ,  f o r  exam p le , a w artim e comment by S ir  Edgar
J o n e s  o f  th e  I n t e r n a t io n a l  T in p la te  C a r te ls  " If  
G reat B r i t a in  and th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  w i l l  tak e  th e  
l e a d  and g e t  th e  p r o d u cers  o f  each  m ain p ro d u ct  
to  p rep a re  schem es f o r  w orld, e x p o r t  r e g u la t io n ,  
th e n  g e n e r a l employm ent can  be in s u r e d . " -  The 
New R e p u b lic . S p e c ia l  Supplem ent o n  " C a r te ls ”, 
March 2 7 , 1 9 4 4 .
2 . J .K .  G a lb r a ith s  Am erican C a p ita l is m . B o s to n , 1 9 5 3 .
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the "natural" growth of a capitalist economy tends to
he cyclical, a much closer integration between the
theory of growth and the theory of the trade cycle
is needed. Ehe idea that we can study a course of
growth independent of the trade cycle, with cyclical
fluctuations looked upon merely as deviations from
a trend, is, It seems to me, fundamentally wrong.
On this question, I believe Marx's position as stated
by Dobb to be the correct one* "Marx clearly
regarded crises, not as incidental departures from
a predetermined equilibrium, not as fickle
wanderings from an established path of development
to whioh there would be a submissive return, but
rather as themselves a dominant form of movement
which forged and shaped the development of capitalist
society. To study crises was ipso facto to study
3
the dynamics of the system ..." *
The second weakness, common to both growth and 
trade cycle theory, is the treatment of autonomous 
Investment. To explain growth in terms of an ad hoc 
addition of a steady rate of Austonomous Investment, 
as has been common recently, hardly adds to our 
knowledge of what causes growth. Clearly, we need
3. Political Eoonomy and Capitalism. London, 1937, p.80
( iv )
to know a lot more about the determinants of 
investment before we can make much headway with 
explaining the process of economic growth*
The theory of monopoly is, of course, more 
highly developed than that of growth* However, 
there are important weaknesses here too* For 
example, we find bewildering differences of 
opinion about the definition of oligopoly* For 
some economists, oligopoly is  exceptional in the 
economy, for another i t  is the rule. Again, 
the theory of the firm is in fragments and what 
was once thought to exemplify monopoly is now
4
said to be indicative of the workings of competition* 
Secondly, if  we are to talk of greater or 
lesser degrees of monopoly, we clearly must have 
at least a conceptual notion of how monopoly is  to 
be measured* A number of such measures have been 
proposed from time to time, but none has commanded 
general acceptance*
Again, as Steindl has pointed out, "one may 
feel also that the whole theory of prices and 
imperfect competition is not linked up sufficiently 
closely with certain other parts of economic theory,
4« e*g. P.W.S* ANLKEWSs Manufacturing Business.
London, 1949*
Thisin particular the theory of investment* w 
latter study must, I feel, ultimately provide the 
bridge between monopoly and growth, if one is to be 
built.
In the following pages we are concerned, then, 
with the second group of problems, viz. those of 
the theory of monopoly. In Part I we try and pick 
up some of the fragments of the theory of the firm.
In Part II we are concerned with the development of 
a measure of the degree of monopoly power and with 
a summary discussion of how the degree of monopoly may 
be expected to change. In Part III, a preliminary 
discussion of the effect of monopoly on investment 
is undertaken.
Finally, a few words of apology seem called for. 
Firstly, many of the matters dealt with in these pages 
are very abstract and, I am afraid, make difficult 
reading, with no immediate bearing on our more 
interesting larger problem. The only Justification 
which may be pleaded is that a thorough examination 
of fundamentals may lead to a simpler structure which 
is theoretically sound and has direct applicability 
in the real world. However, it is not wished to
5. J- Steindl: Maturity and Stagnation in American 
Capitalism, Oxford, 1952, p. 2.
(Vi)
suggest that such a model has been found in these 
pages*.
This brings me to the second head of apology*
It will soon become obvious to the reader that I have 
posed many more questions than I have answered. I can 
only hope that the setting down of some logical 
difficulties and inconsistencies in received doctrine 
will assist in their ultimate remedy.
TOWARDS A SY N T H E SIS
I N  VALUE THEORY
(1)
I. THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFICULTY
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION THEORY
Keynes' General Theory apart, perhaps no
theoretical innovation has been accorded such a prompt
and general acceptance as the theory of monopolistic
(or imperfect) competition.1 Foreshadowed by Sraffa* s
2celebrated paper of 1926, the publication, in 1933, 
of Chamberlin's Theory of Monopolistic Competition 
and Joan Robinson's Economics of Imperfect Competition 
resulted in almost immediate capitulation to the 
general assumption of monopoly in place of the 
competitive assumptions of traditional theory, 
"classical'* and "neo-classical" alike. Two factors 
conspired to cause this«. Firstly, the assumptions of 
Chamberlin and Mrs.. Robinson were patently a better 
description of the real world as it appeared to common
1. "For the historian of economic thought, the most
revolutionary feature of monopolistic competition 
theories will probably be the unprecedented pace at 
which they conquered their audience" - R. Triff in, 
Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium 
Theory. Cambridge, Mass., 1941» p«. 17.
2« P* Sraffas "Che Laws of Returns under Competitive 
Conditions", Economic Journal, XXXVI, 1926, 535.
3* "Classical" in the Marxian sense.
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a / “1'88'1 J
(2)
Observation than those of traditional theory. And
secondly, the economic malaise of the ’thirties - so at
odds with traditional theoretical presumptions — had
engendered a widespread dissatisfaction with that body
of doctrine* Like the General (Theory of three years
later, but to a somewhat lesser extent, the theory of
monopolistic competition met a very urgent need.
Yet, from the outset, the victory was not wholly
undisputed. Side by side with the development of
monopolistic competition theory, a "neo-Lausanne sohool*
of value theorists was building upon the work of Walras
and Pareto in the theory of consumers* behaviour and
the theory of the firm within a framework of general
aequilibrium analysis. Led by Hicks and R.D.G. Allen,
this school proceeded upon the assumption of perfect 
5competition. In some sense, the work of this school 
A as been looked upon as a system rival to that of 
monopolistic competition. This is underlined by the 
fact that, although an attempt has been made to
4. See, in particular, J.R. Hicks and R.D.G. Allen: **A
Reconsideration of the Theory of Value**, Economica 
(New Seides), I, 1934; and J.R. Hicks: Value and
Capital. Oxford (1939)•
5* Cf. "A general, abandonment of the assumption of perfect 
competition, a universal adoption of the assumption 
of monopoly, must have very destructive consequences 
for economio theory*1 - J.R. Hicks, Value and 
Capital, p. 83*
(3)
synthesize monopolistic competition doctrine and the 
theory of general equilibrium,^ no such attempt has been 
made to integrate monopolistic competition theory with 
the theory of consumers1 behaviour. This is the more 
surprising when we recall that Marshall's theory of the 
firm was intimately linked with the theory of consumer 
demand, the one determining the' supply curve and the 
other the demand curve for the ^industry*.
«Although the relationship between the theory of 
consumers* behaviour and the theory of monopolistic 
competition will not be a principal object of study in 
the following pages, it is hoped to show in passing that 
the dichotomy between the two schools of analysis stems 
from the fact that both have chosen to ignore the basic 
problem which, once faced, would serve as a bridge between 
them. The important thing for us at the moment, however, 
is the fact that this parallelism exists.
Furthermore, unlike the General Theory, the initial 
success of monopolistic competition theory was not 
followed by a period of elaboration, refinement, and 
consolidation* Rather, it was very soon to be attacked 
from without, and rift by dissension within; so that
6. R. Triffin, op* cit
(4)
today opinion ranges between qualified acceptance and 
outright rejection.
The main attack from without stemmed from the fact 
that business firms did not appear to behave in the manner 
to be inferred from the theory of monopolistic competition. 
This theory was based on the assumption of profit- 
maximization,; within a framework of a given demand curve 
and a given cost curve. The profit-maximization 
solution implied that entrepreneurs should attempt to 
equate their marginal revenue with their marginal cost.
Yet empirical studies revealed - and this was in line 
with common observation — that, in general, firms had 
but the haziest idea of their elasticity of demand and, 
henoe, their marginal revenue. Moreover, the notion of 
marginal cost was virtually unknown to them, as, indeed, 
any check with cost accounting textbooks will soon reveal.
In the event, there has developed an anti-marginali st 
school of value theorists which has found a good deal of 
support in the name of "realism*. For them, price 
formation is, in one sense or another, based upon average 
or total cost. The headquarters of this school was set 
in Oxford, and the chief protagonists of the anti- 
marginali st approach were Hall and Hitch and P.W.S.
(5)
Andrews; and a weighty volume of literature has
7developed around their writings.
That the adherents to the theory of monopolistic 
competition are sorely divided amongst themselves will 
be known to anyone familiar with the literature; and it 
is not proposed to detail the history of these 
differences at this stage, since they will form a large 
part of the discussion in the succeeding chapters* All 
I wish to do here is to advance the thesis that the 
internal dissensions besetting monopolistic competition 
theory are traceable back to certain fundamental 
difficulties inherent in that theory which have been with 
it from the outset and have not, as yet, been 
satisfactorily resolved.
It will be further argued that these difficulties, 
of a logical nature, are but manifestations of a more 
basic puzzle which is also at the root of the dichotomy 
between monopolistic competition theory and the theory
7. See R.L. Hall and C.J* Hitch, "Price Theory and
Business Behaviour", Oxford Economic Papers No. 2, 
1939; P.W.S* Andrews, Manufacturing Business. 
London, 1949; and C* Saxton, The Economics of Price 
Determination. Oxford, 1942. There is also a 
considerable volume of journal literature, a 
comprehensive survey of which is to be found in 
Laffer, "A Note on Some Marginalist and Other 
Explanations of Pull Cost Price Theory", Economic 
Record, May, 1953, XXIX, p. 51.
( 6 )
o f  consum ers1 b eh av io u r w hich we n o tic e d  above*
M oreover, once t h i s  fundam ental problem  i s  re so lv e d  
th e  ap p a re n t in c o n s is te n c y  between m o n o p o lis tic  
c o m p e titio n  th e o ry  and th e  a n t i - m a r g in a l i s t  p o s i t io n  
l a r g e ly  d is s o lv e s .
I f  th e s e  c o n te n tio n s  a re  t r u e ,  th e n , the  way opens 
tow ards a s y n th e s is  i n  v a lu e  th e o ry , which i s  c e r t a in ly  
s o re ly  needed* To p ro v id e  such a s y n th e s is  i s ,  how ever, 
a much too  am b itio u s  programme to  be u n d e rtak en  here*
I n  w hat fo l lo w s , we s h a l l  be m ain ly  concerned  w ith  
m o n o p o lis tic  co m p e titio n  d o c tr in e  and o u r approach w i l l  
be e s s e n t i a l l y  e x p lo ra to ry .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  we s h a l l  
a tte m p t to  f i n d  a way round th e  b a s ic  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  
m o n o p o lis tic  c o m p e titio n  th e o ry . F o r th e  r e s t ,  we s h a l l  
be c o n te n t to  in d ic a te  th e  p o in ts  a t  which o u r  r e s u l t s  
a re  t a n g e n t i a l  to  th e  h y p o th e ses  o f  o th e r  sch o o ls  o f  
th o u g h t. I n s o f a r  a s  we may f in d  such p o in ts  o f  c o n ta c t  
w hich show th e  way tow ards a s y n th e s is ,  t h i s  w i l l ,  i n  
some se n se , c o n s t i tu t e  a th e o r e t i c a l  v e r i f i c a t i o n  o f 
o u r  c r i t i q u e  o f  m o n o p o lis tic  c o m p e titio n  a n a ly s is .
The b a s ic  problem  w ith  which th e  th e o ry  o f 
m o n o p o lis tic  c o m p e titio n  h a s  had to  g rap p le  s in c e  i t s  
in c e p t io n  co n cern s th e  d e f in i t i o n  o f a "commodity11 o r ,
( 7 )
w hat amounts to  th e  same th in g , th e  d e f i n i t i o n  o r  
d e l in e a t io n  o f  a "market*? How w id e , o r  how narrow , 
sh o u ld  we d e f in e  th e  a rea  o f  a m arket to  be? How good  
do s u b s t i t u t e s  have to  be b e fo r e  th e y  rank a s  th e  same 
o r  s im i la r  com m od ities s e l l i n g  i n  the same m arket?
I n  s h o r t ,  when are com m od ities th e  same, s im i la r ,  o r  
d i f f e r e n t ?  T h is  b a s ic  prob lem , i n  tu r n , p o s e s  two 
s u b s id ia r y  q u e s t io n s *  (1 )  How u n lik e  ( d i f f e r e n t )  do 
com m od ities have to  be b e fo r e  we may d e s c r ib e  t h e i r  
s e l l e r s  a s  "pure m o n o p o lis ts*  o r  * i s o la t e d  s e l l e r s " ;  and 
(2 )  How a l ik e  do p r o d u c ts  have to  be b e fo r e  t h e i r  
p r i c e s  become in te r d e p e n d e n t  -  th e  " o lig o p o ly *  problem ?  
These prob lem s have w o r r ie d  t h e o r i s t s  from th e  b e g in n in g  
and, o f  c o u r s e , a number o f  a l t e r n a t iv e  s o lu t io n s  h ave  
b een  advanced from  tim e to  t im e . But a tte m p ts  to  
fo r m u la te  l o g i c a l  d e f i n i t i o n s  w hich  w i l l  ta k e  c a re  o f  
one a s p e c t  o f  th e  problem  have i n e v i t a b ly  opened up 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  o th e r  d i r e c t io n s .  Much o f  the  
f o l lo w in g  d i s c u s s io n  i n  t h i s  P a r t  w i l l  be d e v o te d  to  
show ing why t h i s  i s  s o .  B e fo re  p r o c e e d in g  to  t h i s ,  
how ever, we m ust s e t  o u t i n  more d e t a i l  th e  i s s u e s
in v o lv e d
(8)
1* "Pure Monopoly* versus "Polypoly*
Prom the very first, Mrs* Robinson recognized the 
difficulty of defining "pure monopoly* - in the 
traditional Marshallian sense - in contradistinction 
to a seller in a group which arises as soon as we adopt 
the general assumption of monopoly* In the Marshallian 
system there was no such problem* Producers either 
sold the same commodity or different commodities* A 
"pure monopolist* was then simply and unambiguously 
defined as the only seller of a given commodity — 
literally a single seller. But in the scheme of 
Chamberlin and Mrs* Robinson this simple dichotomy 
between commodities which are the same and commodities 
which are different no longer obtains* We now have a 
theoretical scheme in which goods are, in general, only 
imperfect substitutes for one another* The difference 
between any two products is now one of degree, not of 
kind.
Mrs* Robinson drew attention to the logical 
dilemma implied in this change of assumptions* On the 
one hand, "every individual producer has the monopoly
pof his own output. * On the other hand, "since every
8*. Joan Robinson; Economics of Imperfect Corn-petition.
London (1933)» p* 5*
(9)
article must have some rivals, and since in the last
resort every article represents a use of money which
is rival to every other, we should be compelled to say
9that no such thing as complete monopoly exists. * 
nThus any attempt at a logical definition of a 
monopolist drives either monopoly or competition 
quite out of the field. * ^
Mrs» Robinson^ "solution* of this dilemma was 
to come down on the side of the first alternative, 
so that "we have only to take the word monopoly in its 
literal sense, a single seller, and the analysis of 
monopoly immediately swallows up the analysis of 
competition.
Paced with the same difficulty, Chamberlin 
adopted a different solution. Mrs. Robinson had 
put the puzzle thus: "It was tempting, under the old
scheme, to arrange actual cases in a series of which 
pure monopoly would be the limit at one end and pure 
competition at the other, but a definition of pure 
monopoly which would correspond to the definition of 
pure competition was extremely hard to find. *It
9* op* ait., p. 4»
10» op. cit., p. 5*
11. op. ci t •>, p » 5 .
12* op* cit., p. 4.
(10)
is easy enough to find the limiting oase at the 
competitive end of the scale. The limiting oase 
occurs when the demand for the product of an individual 
producer is perfectly elastic. But what is the 
limiting case at the other end? ... We know what we 
mean by ’selling in a perfect market*, but what is a 
perfectly imperfect m a r k e t ? C h a m b e r l i n ’s answer 
to this question runs as follows: "if we regard
monopoly as the antithesis of competition, its extreme 
limit is reached only in the case of control of the 
supply of all economic goods, which might be called a
oase of pure monopoly in the sense that all competition
14of substitutes is excluded by definition.” Then,
the middle ground between the theoretical limits of
as so defined
pure competition at the one end and pure monopoly/at 
the other is the domain of "monopolistic competition”, 
the general case representing a blending of competitive 
and monopolistic elements. ”To discard either
15competition or monopoly is to falsify the result ...”
The immediate objection to this "solution” is that 
the "limit” of pure monopoly as so conceived is not
13* op. cit., p. 5*
14• Theory of Monopolistic Competition, p. 63*
16. op. cit., p. 63«
(11)
analogous to the antipodal limit of pure competition.
An aotual real world situation resembling, or more 
correctly approaching, the definition of pure competition 
could occur in practice or, at any rate, could be 
imagined to occur in practice; but, as Kaldor has 
pointed out, the limiting case of "pure monopoly" in 
Chamberlin^ sense - control of the supply of all 
economic goods — "not only does not exist, it is not 
even conceivable, since it would conflict with our
l6basic assumptions about the nature of human wants. "
Certainly, to postulate such a situation would assume
away the very problem which we have to solve - the
problem of relative prices and outputs. In such a
case, the revenue of the monopolist "could neither be
decreased nor increased as a result of price changes
because there would exist no alternative outlet for the
17income of buyers." Hence, the maximum profits 
criterion would establish outputs at the point of 
minimum total cost, i.e. at an infinitesimal level.
In any case, there would be no incentive — i.e. profit 
incentive - to produce more than a fractional output of
16. N. Kaldor: "Professor Chamberlin on Monopolistic
and Imperfect Competition", Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, May, 1938, p. 526.
17. R. Triffin, op. cit., p. 128n.
(12)
one commodity.
Triff in slightly generalizes the Chamberlinian
concept of "pure monopoly" so that it defines the seller
of "a commodity which is neither complementary to, nor
competitive with other goods,, except for the universal
18competition of all goods for the consumer’s dollar,"
But, again, such a firm would be faced with a constant
outlay demand curve which, upon the assumption of
maximization of profits, would result in an infinitesimal
output by that firm*. A similar definition of "pure
monopoly" — called "absolute monopoly" - was earlier
19suggested by Sraffa.
However, Triff in goes on to concede that "it must
be admitted at once that the assumptions needed actually
to realize monopoly in its pure form are quite 
20fantastic," Because of this, the concept, once 
postulated, plays little further part either in the 
soheme of Chamberlin or in that of Triffin. By the 
same token, it solves nothing. We are still left with
the problem of determining where to place the 
boundaries of the "group". If pure competition is 
looked upon as a group of sellers of an indentical 
product, where, short of the quite academic concept of
18. R. Triffin, op. cit., 132.
19* 3?. Sraffa, loc. cit., p. 545.
20. R. Triffin, op» cit., p* 135.
(13)
"pure monopoly* advanced by Chamberlin or Triff in, do 
we consider the "group* to vanish as products become 
more and more differentiated* In his recent writings, 
Chamberlin’s answer seems to be acceptance of the 
course advocated by Triff in — abandonment of the nation 
of the "group** He says:
"The individual firm is either isolated or related
oligopolistically to others. The group has
disappeared from the formulation here given, and
with it the. concept of ’large numbers*, since the
individual seller in this latter instance is again
correctly described as ’isolated*, even in the
*»21special case of pure competition.
Thus, the wheel has come full circle. Leaving aside
"oligopolistic interdependence" - a matter which Mrs-
22Robinson assumed away - Chamberlin now arrives at a 
position indistinguishable from that originally taken up 
by Mrs. Robinson. Oligopolists apart, all sellers
21. E.H. Chamberlin: "Monopolistic Competition Revisited",
Economica, Me? November, 1951, P* 362. My emphasis.
22. Cf. Mrs. Robinson, op. cit., p. 21.: "The demand curve
for the individual firm may be conceived to show 
the full effect upon the sales of that fiim which 
results from any change in the price which it 
charges, whether it causes a change in the prices 
charged by the others or not." My emphasis.
CU)
are " is o la t e d * ,  ev en  i n  th e  c a se  o f  pure c o m p e t it io n ,
w hioh  i s  p r e c i s e l y  M rs. Robinson* s o r ig in a l  p o s i t i o n ,
a p o s i t i o n  w h ich  C ham berlin had ta k en  th e  o p p o r tu n ity
23to  sco rn  a t  an e a r l i e r  d a t e .  The o n ly  d i f f e r e n c e
seem s to  be t h a t  C ham berlin , h a v in g  d e te r a in e d  th a t  
th e  term  "pure monopoly" sh ou ld  n o t  have a p p l ic a t io n  
to  any s i t u a t i o n  o f  t h i s  w o r ld , now d e s c r ib e s  a s  an 
" is o la t e d  s e l l e r *  what M rs. R obinson c a l l s  a "pure 
m o n o p o lis t* . W hat*s i n  a name! C e r ta in ly ,  i f  we 
i n s i s t  upon a s t r i c t l y  l i t e r a l  c r i t e r i o n ,  th e  one 
term  i s  s c a r c e ly  more a p p r o p r ia te  th an  th e  o th e r .
But t h i s  i s  no s o lu t io n  o f  th e  b a s ic  d i f f i c u l t y  
a t  a l l .  Abandonment o f  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  betw een  a 
group o f  f ir m s  s e l l i n g  th e  "same* o r  " s im ila r *  
com m od ities and a "pure m o n o p o lis t*  i s  to  ig n o r e  a 
d i f f e r e n c e  w hich  we are a b le  to  r e c o g n iz e  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  
i f  n o t  y e t  i n  th e o r y . F u r th e r , th e  im portance o f  
th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  r e s i d e s  i n  th e  f a c t ,  a s  K a ld or  h a s  i t ,  
th a t  " in  th e  c a se  o f  p o ly p o ly  th e r e  i s  (and i n  th e  c a se
23* Q u otin g  M rs. R ob inson  to  th e  e f f e c t  th a t  " every
in d iv id u a l  p ro d u cer  h a s  the m onopoly o f  h i s  own 
o u tp u t — th a t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  o b v io u s  -  and i f  a 
la r g e  number o f  them are s e l l i n g  i n  a p e r f e c t  
m arket th e  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  e x i s t s  w hich  we are  
aocustom ed to  d e s c r ib e  a s  p e r f e c t  c o m p e t it io n , * 
C ham berlin  g o e s  on  to  e x p r e s s  h i s  a sto n ish m e n t:  
"The in d iv id u a l  s e l l e r ,  th e n , ev en  un der p e r f e c t  
c o m p e t i t io n , i s  a » m o n o p o lis t* !*  M o n o p o lis t ic  
C o m p e tit io n . S ix th  E d . ,  p .  2 0 8 . E i s  e m p h a s is .
(15)
of monopoly there is not) a group of firms whose prices 
jointly exert a large influence on the film’s sales.
If, in the case of oligopoly, individual firms may 
influence the price-output policies of other firms, in 
the nan-oligopolistio group equally significant 
pressure upon a firmrs price-output policy may be 
exerted by the sum effect of the individual actions of 
the large number of other firms in the group. Indeed, 
in the limiting case of pure competition, this pressure 
is so pervasive that the individual firm can exercise 
no influence over its selling price. The firm must be 
purely passive and adaptive.
It is clear that, if we are to resolve the problem 
of distinguishing between an •isolated seller* or "pure 
monopolist* from a seller in a group, we need to refer 
to eoonomio, not semantic, considerations. In earlier 
theory, a monopolist was a single seller of a commodity 
different in kind from any other commodity. This fact 
enabled the monopolist to exercise control over its price. 
By contrast, a competitive seller, producing only a small 
part of the total output of a given commodity, could 
exercise no significant influence upon price. This was 
the economic significance of the distinction between
24. N. Kaldor: Beview of Triffinfs Monopolistic
Competition and General Equilibrium Theory, 
Economica, November, 1942, p.4//o.
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m onopoly and c o m p e tit io n *  I t  i s ,  th e r e f o r e ,  to  beg  
th e  econom ic q u e s t io n  a l t o g e t h e r  to  p la c e  b oth  th e se  
ty p e s  o f  m arket s i t u a t i o n  i n  th e  same ca teg o ry *  Y et, 
a s  we have s e e n ,  t h i s  i s  p r e c i s e l y  w hat Cham berlin now 
a sk s  u s  to  do* F or him , th e r e  i s  no fun dam enta l 
d i s t i n c t i o n  r e q u ir e d  to  be drawn b etw een  an " is o la t e d  
s e l l e r "  f o r  whose p rod u ct th e re  are  no c lo s e  
s u b s t i t u t e s  and a s e l l e r  i n  a p u r e ly  c o m p e t it iv e  group  
f o r  whose p r o d u ct th e r e  are  many p e r f e c t  s u b s t i t u t e s .
Thus, we f in d  th a t  modern v a lu e  th e o r y  -  a s  
d i s t i n c t  from  r u le  o f  thumb -  h a s  n o t  been  a b le  to  
p r o v id e  u s  w ith  any c r i t e r i o n  by w hich  we may 
d i s t i n g u i s h  w hat one w ou ld  have th ou gh t were 
fu n d am en ta l m arket c a t e g o r i e s ,  nam ely to  d i s t in g u i s h  
b etw een  pure m onopoly and pure c o m p e t it io n . I t  i s  to  
t h i s  problem  th a t  we s h a l l  a d d ress  o u r s e lv e s  i n  
C hapter I I I  o f  t h i s  P a r t ,  where an a l t e r n a t iv e  
s o lu t io n  w i l l  be p u t fo rw a rd .
2* O l i g o p o l i s t i c  In terd ep en d en ce
M eanw hile, we m ust b r i e f l y  c o n s id e r  th e  secon d  
problem  o f  m arket c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  w h ich  a r i s e s  o u t o f  
th e  a ssu m p tio n s o f  m o n o p o lis t ic  c o m p e t it io n  -  the
( 1 7 )
problem  o f "o lig o p o ly * . Here we f in d  ana logous 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  to  th o se  d is c u s s e d  i n  th e  p re v io u s  sec tio n *  
I n  th e  o ld  scheme, an  o l ig o p o l i s t  was one who produced 
a s u f f i c i e n t l y  la rg e  share o f m arket o u tp u t th a t  h i s  
p r ic e -o u tp u t  p o l ic y  co u ld  s ig n i f i c a n t ly  a f f e c t  m arket 
p r i c e .  W ith com m odities d i f f e r e n t  i n  k in d , the  
d e te rm in a tio n  o f the  degree o f " o l ig o p o l i s t i c  
in te rd e p e n d e n c e "  w as, more o r  l e s s ,  m ere ly  a m a tte r  
o f a r i th m e t i c .  However, once we adopt th e  p o s i t io n  
t h a t  s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  betw een com m odities i s  o n ly  a 
m a tte r  o f d e g re e , we run  in to  a new s e t  o f q u e s t io n s .
I n  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  how do we d e f in e  th e  "m arket"?
Where should  we s e t  th e  b o u n d a rie s  o f th e  m arket a rea ?  
What do we mean by "m arket p r ic e " ?  And so on.
I n  s h o r t ,  we a re  now fa c e d  w ith  the  f a c t  t h a t ,  
b e fo re  we may b eg in  to  count th e  number o f p ro d u c e rs , 
we have to  d eterm ine  how a l ik e  must be the  p ro d u c ts  
w hich a re  to  be co u n ted . To d e fin e  an o l ig o p o l i s t i c  
s i t u a t i o n ,  a s  in d eed  a l l  m arket c a te g o r ie s ,  we re q u ir e  
two c r i t e r i a :  (1) a  s u b s t i tu t i o n  c r i t e r i o n ;  and
(2) a numbers c r i t e r i o n .  I n  some se n se , o lig o p o ly  
a r i s e s  where th e re  a re  a  few s e l l e r s  o f  good 
s u b s t i t u t e s .  T his le a v e s  u s  w ith  the  fundam ental
problem  o f d e te rm in in g  how good must be the  s u b s t i t u t e s
(18)
and how few the numbers.
Theory has never really solved this problem,
although it has occasioned considerable discussion
and a variety of solutions of greater or less value.
Most discussion of the problem Is vitiated from the
start because of failure to recognize that two
conditions are necessary to establish the existence of 
25oligopoly. This fact, no doubt, lies behind the
reminder, which R.L. Bishop feeds bound to stress as
late as 1952, that: wIt is significant that
oligopolistic interdependence is avoided both when
there are many relatively close substitutes and when
26there is none.” In other words, oligopoly may be 
absent either because of failure of the numbers 
condition or because of failure of the substitution 
condition* To concentrate attention on either one 
criterion to the exclusion of the other is bound to 
lead to an unsatisfactory result.
It would be premature at this stage to survey the 
variety of opinion which has grown up around the subject,
25* For example, those attempts made to define
oligopoly simply in terms of significantly high 
cross-elasticities of demand.
26. R.L. Bishop: '’Elasticities, Gross-elasticities, and 
Market Relationships", American Economic Review, 
December, 1952, p. 781.
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although later we will be bound to discuss the main 
trends of thought in the field. This we will take up 
in Chapter IV where a detailed discussion of the 
problem of oligopoly will be undertaken* It is 
sufficient here to have indicated the nature of the 
problem.
3. Towards a. Few Approach?
To sum up, then, no-one is particularly happy
about the present state of the theory of market
relationships, least of all Professor Chamberlin who
must be considered to have made the greatest investment
in it* Indeed, Chamberlin has recently told us that
"there is urgent need for examination of the variety
of criteria by which areas intermediate between the
firm and the whole economy may also be me am' ngfully 
27defined. * To this end, "the subject needs to be 
re-written in terms of that extremely useful concept 
which originated, I believe, with Mr* Kaldor of cross­
elasticity of demand, rather than in terms of the 
number of sellers in a market.
27« E.H. Chamberlin* "Monopolistic Competition Revisited1’, 
Economica, November, 1951, p. 362n.
28. loo. alt., p* 355.
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The re-writing of the subject wouldr of course, 
be a very ambitious programme; and the writer hastens 
to disclaim any undertaking to attempt it here.
However, it is hoped in this Part to essay some first 
steps in this direction* Unfortunately, however, a
29wchaos of disagreement* — to use the words of Bishop 
has developed around the concept of cross-elasticity 
of demand, the basic tool which Professor Chamberlin 
prescribes for us* This, of course, merely reflects 
the fundamental contradictions in the theory of 
monopolistic competition itself. Each writer has 
twisted the notion of cross-elasticity to meet the 
requirements of his own pre-conceptions about, or his 
reading of, the theory of monopolistic competition.
Clearly, if cross-elasticities of demand are to 
be used to elucidate the nature of market relationships 
(and the author believes them to be very valuable in 
this respect), then we must have a firm idea of 
precisely what such cross-elasticities signify. 
Otherwise, any superstructure of analysis based upon 
them will be erected on shifting sands* Therefore, 
it is a necessary preliminary to our investigation of 
the basic types of market relationships to examine the 
nature of cross-elasticity of demand.
29* H.L. Bishop, loc. cit., p. 781
(21)
II. THE NATURE OF CROSS-ELASTICITY OF DEMAND1 2
1« a Substitution or Numbers Criterion?
We concluded the previous chapter with the
observation that over recent years a good deal of
confusion and inconsistency has grown up around the
concept of cross-elasticity of demand. This fact must
have forced its attention on, and caused considerable
distress to, all those who have attempted to follow
the literature of value theory during this period*
We are, therefore, all indebted to Professor Bishop
for his valuable and timely article on the subject which
2he published at the end of 1952. In particular, Bishop 
has rendered us two important services. Firstly, he 
has provided an admirable survey of the variety of 
opinion surrounding the concept of cross-elasticity of 
demand and has brought into the open the deep cleavages
1. The argument of this chapter was published under the
title “Elasticities, Gross-Elasticities, and Market 
Relationships: A Comment“, American Economic Review,
June, 1955, pp .2. R.L. Bishop: ""Elasticities, Gross-Elasticities, and
Market Relationships“, American Economic Review,
Dec. 1952, XLII, pp. 779-805.
(22)
which exist. Secondly, he has recalled our attention
to the fundamental fact that Mthe concepts in question
are elasticities and cross-elasticities of demand,*
In this connection he shows how many writers have
attempted to qualify the concept of cross-elasticity
by reference to supply factors, and directs our
attention to Mthe profound anomalies that are implied
4by their half-breed supply-demand elasticities. * 
Unfortunately, however, when Bishop embarks on 
positive prescription, we find that the basic 
confusion remains embedded in his own work*
It is convenient to approach the problem of 
interpreting the meaning of cross-elasticity of 
demand by reference to the work of Triff in, who 
provides us with the first systematic application of 
cross-elasticities to the classification of market
c:relationships. Using the concept of cross-elasticity 
of demand of firm^'with respect to a change in the price 
of the product of another firm j, Triff in distinguishes 
three general categories of market situation:^
4. Loc. cit., p. 781. Bishoprs emphasis.
5. Loc. cit., p. 781.
6. R. Triffin: Monopolistic Competition and General
Equilibrium Theory. (Camb., Mass., 1941).
7. R. Triffin, op. cit., p. 104.
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(1 )  I s o la t e d  S e l l i n g  (c u lm in a t in g  i n  Pure M onopoly)
P ia* i  7
when th e  c o e f f i c i e n t  —~ —  = 0 .
(2 )  H ete ro g e n e o u s  C o m p etitio n  betw een  f ir m s ,  f o r  w h ich
th e  c o e f f i c i e n t  —s------ ta k e s  a f i n i t e  v a lu e .
M pj
(3 )  Homogeneous C o m p etitio n  betw een  f ir m s , f o r  w h ich
p ^ i
th e  c o e f f i c i e n t  J , = oO •
V >P;j
To i l l u s t r a t e  th e  m ethod by w h ich  th e se  d e f i n i t i o n s  
are  d e r iv e d , l e t  u s  c o n s id e r  the argum ent by w h ich  a 
v a lu e  o f  o o  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r  th e  c a se  o f  hom ogeneous 
c o m p e t it io n :
" P ir s t  o f  a l l ,  l e t  u s  tak e  the c a se  where th e  
s l i g h t e s t  c u t  i n  p .. , rem ain in g  unchanged, o r  th e  
s l i g h t e s t  r i s e  i n  p^, p.. rem ain in g  unchanged, r e d u c e s  
to  z ero  th e  s a l e s  (and reven u e) o f  i ,  d r iv in g  a l l  i t s  
cu sto m ers tow ard f ir m  The v a lu e  oO th en  rea ch ed
by th e  c o e f f i c i e n t  g iv e s  u s  an econom ic i n d ic a t io n  
o f  th e  h om ogen eity  o f  th e  goods s o ld  by the two f ir m s .  
In  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  te r m in o lo g y , th e  two f ir m s  w ould
7» T r i f f  i n  p o in t s  o u t th a t  th e  v a lu e s  0 and oO are to  be 
c o n c e iv e d  o n ly  a s  l im i t i n g  c a s e s ;  h e n c e , c o r r e c t ly  
sp e a k in g , th e  c o e f f i c i e n t  w i l l  o n ly  approach th e s e  
v a lu e s .
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be s a i d  to  be s e l l i n g  th e  same com m odity .
D ep en d in g  on  th e  num ber o f  f i r m s  b e tw een  w h ich  such  
a  r e l a t i o n  e x i s t s ,  th e  c a se  w ou ld  be c l a s s i f i e d  a s  
d u o p o ly , o l i g o p o l y ,  p u re  c o m p e t i t io n .  L e t  u s  c a l l
0
th e  g e n e r a l  c a te g o r y  hom ogeneous c o m p e t i t io n . *
At f i r s t  s i g h t ,  i t  may seem s t r a n g e  to  f i n d  d u o p o ly
and  o l ig o p o ly  k e e p in g  company w i th  p u re  c o m p e t i t io n ;
b u t ,  a s  T r i f f i n  r i g h t l y  u r g e s ,  th e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  h a s
i t s  r a t i o n a l e  i n  * the  r i g i d  c o n n e c t io n  b e tw een  th e  p r i c e s
9
o f  e c o n o m ic a l ly  hom ogeneous go o d s . . .  ” C l e a r ly ,  th e n ,  
th e  c o e f f i c i e n t  th u s  d e r iv e d  i s  in te n d e d  to  be a 
c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  s u b s t i t u t i o n ;  i t  i s  d e s ig n e d  to  m easu re  
th e  d e g re e  o f  s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  b e tw een  th e  p r o d u c ts  o f  
f i r m  i  and j .
To f u l l y  d e s c r ib e  m a rk e t s i t u a t i o n s ,  h o w ev er, we 
n e e d  two c r i t e r i a ;  (1 )  a  s u b s t i t u t i o n  c r i t e r i o n ;  and 
(2 )  a  num bers c r i t e r i o n .  So , h a v in g  d e s c r ib e d  th e  
d e g re e  o f  s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  b e tw een  p r o d u c t s  i n  te rm s  o f  
p r i c e  c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t y  o f  dem and, T r i f f i n  p r o v id e s  u s  
w i th  a  se co n d  c o e f f i c i e n t ,  w h a t B ish o p  h a s  c a l l e d  a 
♦ ♦ quan tity  c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t y * ,  by m eans o f  w h ich  th e  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  " o l i g o p o l i s t i c  in te r d e p e n d e n c e ” may be
8 .  T r i f f i n ,  op* c i t . , p ,  1 0 3 .
9 . T r i f f i n ,  o p , c i t . ,  p .  1 4 0 .
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determined* This is his numbers criterion*
Consideration of Triffin's numbers coefficient more 
appropriately belongs to Chapter IV, where we shall be 
concerned with the problem of oligopoly in some detail*
In this chapter, we shall confine our attention to the 
validity of price cross-elasticity as a substitution 
criterion* In particular, we shall show that, subject 
to a qualification in respect of the direction of the 
price change, Triffin's use of price cross-elasticity as 
his substitution criterion is unexceptionable* However, 
in the next chapter attention will be directed to certain 
implications of this which Triffin failed to notice*
In his use of price cross-elasticity, Triffin, with 
most writers, proceeds on the assumption that cross­
elasticity of demand will be the same whichever the 
direction of the price change* However, I believe that 
most readers will accept, without quotation of chapter 
and verse, that invariably discussion has proceeded, either 
explicitly or tacitly, in terms of a price-cut* For the 
rest, it seems to have been automatically assumed that the 
same characteristics would attach to a rise in price* 
However, a price-cut involves the reduction of one price 
in relation to all others, whereas a price-rise implies 
the reduction of all other prices in relation to one*
Where substitution in all directions is not continuous
(26)
(see the latter part of footnote Zf below), the asymmetry 
between a price-cut and a price-rise will not generally 
hold, a matter which will be fully discussed in Chapter III 
which follows*
Therefore, for the purpose of the present discussion, 
we define price cross-elasticity in terms of a cut in 
price, i*e* as the ratio of the percentage loss of output 
by any firm ;} to the initiating percentage reduction in 
price by another firm i, all other prices being assumed 
unchanged* Then, « P i ^ j ^ ^ i *  wiiere Pj[
price of firm i and is the output of firm j, and where 
bpi is considered in the negative sense* This cross­
elasticity is, then, the same as Triffin’s first (substitu­
tion) coefficient, except that it specifically excludes the 
case of a rise in p^* It is also the coefficient which 
most people have in mind when they speak of cross-elasticity 
of demand without qualification*
It should be noticed that this definition of cross­
elasticity of demand makes no reference to the supply 
restrictions which Bishop rightly deplores* Moreover, it 
is clear that this cross-elasticity, freed from supply 
qualifications, is a coefficient of substitution* Indeed, 
this was precisely the purpose of its original introduction 
by Kaldor*10 The aim was to provide a more satisfactory
10* ”Mrs* Robinson’s ’Economics of Imperfect Competition”’, 
Economica (N.S.), Aug* 1934, I, pp.335-41; and '’Market Imperfection and Excess Capacity”, Economica (N.S.), 
Feb. 1935, II, PP*33-50.
(27)
c r ite r io n  o f  s u b s t itu ta b il i t y  than th a t o f  p h y sica l des­
c r ip tio n  o f the products. I t  was to  meet the d i f f i c u l t y ,  
as T r if f  in  p uts i t ,  th a t "the com petition  may be keener
between Ford and Rogers P eet than between Ford and R o lls -  
11Royce." And c e r ta in ly  t h is  conception o f c r o s s - e la s t ic i t y  
has p e r s is te d  in  the textbook s, at le a s t  in  cer ta in  chapters  
of them. Thus, fo r  example, S t ig le r  t e l l s  us: "The c r o ss­
e l a s t i c i t i e s  provide a convenient index o f the readiness
1 2with which consumers su b s titu te  one commodity fo r  another."
Y et, alm ost from the s ta r t  attem pts were made to  make 
p r ice  c r o s s - e la s t ic i t y  serve as a numbers c r ite r io n .
Moreover, P ro fessor  Chamberlin h as, at one stage at l e a s t ,  
le n t  h is  au th ority  to  th is  p o s it io n . As P rofessor Bishop 
p o in ts  out: "Chamberlin, by con trast w ith T r if f in ,  th inks
th a t c r o s s - e la s t ic i t y  with resp ect to  p r ic e , E ^  or E.^, 
d is t in g u ish e s  merely (1) n o n -o lig o p o lis t ic  or ‘iso la ted *  
s e l l in g  from (2 ) o l ig o p o l i s t ic  or ‘non-iso lated*  s e l l in g ,  
according as t h is  c o e f f ic ie n t  i s  (1 ) zero or (2 ) greater  
than zero ." 1'5 "To Chamberlin, th is  type o f  c r o s s - e la s t ic i t y  
s ig n if ic a n t ly  d if fe r e n t  from zero i s  an u n fa ilin g  s ig n  o f  
o l ig o p o ly . . ." 1^ Other w riters  have sided  with T r if f in  on
11. R. T r i f f in ,  o p . c i t . . p .8 8 .
12. G.J. S t ig le r ,  Theory o f P rice  (New York, 1947)* P*09*
13* Loc. c i t . . p.705*
14* Loc. c i t . . P.7Ö5«
the one hand, or with Chamberlin on the other, or have 
ranged - rather like cross-elasticities - over all points 
in between*
But perhaps the extent of the confusion can best be
illustrated by reference to the writings of Mr* Kaldor*
In his "Market Imperfection and Excess Capacity" of 1935,
he says on the subject of market classification: "’monopoly*
and ’perfect competition* appear as the two limiting cases,
where the ’cross-elasticities* are zero or infinite,
respectively; and there can be little doubt that the large
majority of industrial producers in the real world are faced
16with imperfect markets in this sense*" Clearly, Kaldor 
here uses cross-elasticity of demand as a substitution 
criterion; and it is precisely this conception of price 
cross-elasticity which has come down to Triffin* However, 
some years later, in reviewing Triffin*s Monopolistic 
Competition and General Equilibrium Theory. Kaldor has this 
to say: "His principle for classifying market situations
(the ’nature of external interdependence’) is the nature of 
the cross-elasticities of demand (the elasticity of sales 
of one firm with respect to the change in price by some 
other firm)* Under pure competition, these cross-
(28)
15* Bishop gives a concise, but comprehensive, summary of the 
divergent and conflicting views of the principal writers 
on the subject* Loc* cit*. especially p*705 n*
16* Economica (N*S*), Feb* 1935* II* p*35 n*
elasticities must be either infinite or zero (according as
the 1 other firm* is situated in the same industry or some
other industry); under pure monopoly, they must all be
zero; under imperfect competition they must have a positive
finite value - in conditions of 'polypoly* they are small,
under oligopoly they are large# So far I am fully in 
17agreement.• •M 1
A brief examination of this statement shows that,
practically throughout, Kaldor is treating cross-elasticity
of demand as a substitution criterion, with exactly the same
sense as in his earlier writings on the subject# Yet so
pervasive has become the association of cross-elasticity
with numbers that, towards the end, he suddenly switches
over to use cross-elasticity as a criterion of numbers: "in
conditions of *polypoly* they are small, under oligopoly
*1 Athey are large#" Notice, moreover, the implications of 
this# For pure competition cross-elasticities are infinite, 
for oligopoly they are high; for pure monopoly they are 
zero; for polypoly they are small# Thus, it seems, the
(29)
17* Economic a (N.S.), Nov# 1942, IX, p#4l0#
18. Actually, Kaldor is here reading into Triffin his own pre-conceptions, because Triffin does not use price 
cross-elasticity, but a quite different coefficient, to 
distinguish between his "circular" and "atomistic11 cate­
gories. This, by the way, is a further illustration of 
the strength of the pre-conception that price cross­
elasticity is a function of numbers.
greater the “oligopolistic interdependence", the nearer is
the approach to pure competition; contrawise, the slightest
imperfection in an otherwise purely competitive market
results, not in polypoly as one might have expected, but in
oligopoly, unless one is prepared to believe, as indeed
some writers have inferred, that the introduction of the
slightest degree of imperfection into the market causes
19cross-elasticity to skip suddenly from oo to zero*
Kaldor here is trying to make price cross-elasticity 
serve as a substitution criterion and a numbers criterion* 
But, as we have pointed out above, the classification^ of 
markets is a two-dimensional affair* It requires two 
independent criteria to define a given situation* One 
coefficient can no more define a market relationship than 
one co-ordinate can define a point in a plane* Gross- 
elasticity of demand, then, must be either a coefficient of 
substitution or a coefficient of numbers* It cannot be 
both* This follows immediately from the fact, which I take
(30)
19* Cf* "Even if we*.«interpret the coefficient as having a 
value of infinity for pure competition, its value skips discontinuously to zero with the slightest departure 
in terms of heterogeneity; it can only be made to 
proceed through a stage of finite values by operating on 
the scale of numbers*" - Chamberlin quoted by Bishop, 
loc* cit* * p*787* Bishop goes on to add: "In an
earlier draft of this paper, I must confess that I represented Eii as infinite under pure competition but 
necessarily small under differentiated competition*"
(31)
it no-one would deny, that we can have an infinite rate of 
substitution associated with small numbers, a situation of 
pure oligopoly, or an infinitesimal rate of substitution 
associated with large numbers, a situation we are accustomed 
to call, somewhat paradoxically, Mpure monopoly”•
Although cross-elasticity may not be a measure of both 
substitutability and numbers, it may, of course, not be a 
unique measure of either* And it is just this conclusion 
at which Professor Bishop arrives* He says: "The truth
of the matter, of course, is that the value of the 
depends on both the scale of numbers and the scale of 
product homogeneity-heterogeneity; and consequently it is 
not a sure clue to either separately*" While this dis­
plays a commendable spirit of compromise, the conclusion 
is not correct* Indeed, if it were correct, the concept 
of cross-elasticity of demand, not being a unique measure 
of anything, would have little purpose to serve and might 
be rejected out of hand*
Professor Bishop does, however, make it serve in his
system of market classification; but he is only able to
do this by considering its value in relation to the value
of own-elasticity of demand* Thus, he postulates as his
"numbers equivalent" the relationship n^ — 1 * - —Ü  •
Edi
20* Loc* cit*« p*787* Bishop’s italics*
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This works out superficially - insofar as it does give us 
a numerical criterion of numbers, weighted for asymmetries - 
only because Bishop makes an equal and opposite error in his 
interpretation of the significance of own-elasticity of 
demand# Nevertheless, the confusion involved necessarily
prevents his carrying the problem of market classification 
very far forward# Since the matter is of fundamental 
importance to our latter analyst s, we must now turn to con­
sider the exact nature of the relationship between cross­
elasticity and own-elasticity of demand#
2# Cross-Elasticity and Own-Elasticit.v of Demand#
The cross-elasticity of demand E ^  is a measure of the 
rate at which j customers will move to product i in response 
to a reduction in the price i# Prom the indifference 
function of each individual j customer, we may deduce the 
rate at which each such customer will substitute product 
i for ;)• By summation, in the manner of the Marshallian 
demand schedule, we may construct a cross-demand schedule 
(q^ plotted against p^) for the product 3 with respect to the 
price of product i# This will give us the rate at which 3
21customers as a whole will substitute product i for product
21 • Cross-elasticity of demand for an individual consumer, 
which we may denote by E, is given by =* kia - k^., 
where k^ is the fraction of income spent on i, cr is J* 
the elasticity of substitution between i and *)> and is 
the income elasticity of demand for product j# (See** 
J#R# Hicks and R#D.G# Allen, "A Reconsideration of the 
Theory of Value", Economica (N.S#), May 1934, I, 
pp.201-2#) Then, if we neglect the income effect as we
( 33 )
B u t, w hereas c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand i s  a fu n c t io n  
o f  th e  r a te  a t  which consum ers w i l l  s u b s t i t u t e  th e  one 
commodity f o r  a n o th e r , o w n - e la s t i c i t y  o f  demand d epend s, 
n o t o n ly  on th e  r a te  o f  s u b s t i t u t io n  betw een  in d iv id u a l  
p r o d u c ts , b u t a ls o  upon th e  number o f  s u b s t i t u t e s  a v a i la b le .  
A fte r  a l l ,  a s B ish op  h im s e lf  s t r e s s e s ,  o w n - e la s t i c i t y  o f  
demand i s  a m easure o f  **total s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y * 1,  i . e .  th e  
s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  b etw een  th e  Mowntt p rodu ct and th e  c o l l e c ­
t i v i t y  o f  p r o d u cts  w hich make up i t s  c o m p e tit iv e  f i e l d .  I t
2 1 . (C on t’d)
are e n t i t l e d  to  do when o n ly  a f r a c t io n  o f  income i s  sp en t  
on any one commodity, in d iv id u a l  c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t y  o f  
demand i s  a sim p le  fu n c t io n  o f  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  s u b s t i t u t io n ,  
cr. Firm c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t y  i s  th e  w eigh ted  average o f  
th e s e  in d iv id u a l  c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t i e s .
A c tu a l ly , t h i s  i s  n ot th e  whole s to r y ,  b ecau se  i n  con­
d i t io n s  o f  pure m o n o p o lis t ic  c o m p e tit io n , i f  I  may c o in  
an e x p r e s s io n , th e  p r o c e s s  o f  s u b s t i t u t io n  w i l l  n ot gen e­
r a l l y  be c o n tin u o u s , e . g .  a s i n  th e  c a se  o f  s u b s t i t u t io n  
o f  one brand o f  to o th p a s te  f o r  a n o th er . R ath er , in  t h i s  
s i t u a t i o n ,  th e r e  would b e  a c r i t i c a l  p r ic e  r a t io  a t  which  
t o t a l  e x p e n d itu re  on th e  one prod u ct (a b s t r a c t in g  from  
income e f f e c t s )  would be s h i f t e d  to  th e  o th e r . In  term s 
o f  in d if f e r e n c e  c u r v e s , t h i s  c a se  would be r ep r e se n te d  by  
a curve o f  i n f i n i t e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  s u b s t i t u t io n ,  b u t w ith  
a s lo p e  (m arg in a l r a te  o f  s u b s t i t u t io n ? )  d i f f e r e n t  from  
u n it y .  H ere, r e s o r t  must be had to  in d ir e c t  m ethods to  
t r a n s la t e  consumer p r e fe r e n c e s  in to  c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t i e s .  
I n c id e n t a l ly ,  i t  w i l l  be  n o t ic e d  th a t  th e s e  c r o s s - e l a s t i ­
c i t i e s  ( f i n i t e )  are more a p p ro p r ia te  in d ic e s  o f  s u b s t i ­
t u t a b i l i t y  th a n  th e  e l a s t i c i t i e s  o f  s u b s t i t u t io n  which are  
i n f i n i t e .  However, t h i s  i s  a d ig r e s s io n .  (The m atter  
w i l l  be d is c u s s e d  i n  d e t a i l  i n  C hapter I I I . )  My purpose  
h ere i s  o n ly  to  show th a t  c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t y  i s  d i r e c t ly  
r e la t e d  to  th e  th eo ry  o f  consumer c h o ic e  w h ich , o f  c o u r se ,  
i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a stu d y  o f  s u b s t i t u t io n .  A fte r  a l l ,  th e  
con cep t o f  c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t y  was born  i n  th e  London Sch oo l 
w hich , a t  th e  same t im e , was a l s o  n u rtu r in g  th e  n eo -  
P a r e t ia n  a n a ly s i s .
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is surely obvious that any change in the variety or number 
of products within this competitive field will affect the 
value of own-elasticity of demand.
Let us pursue this question of the relationship between 
cross-elasticity and own-elasticity of demand further. For 
this purpose, we need to make a slight change in our 
definition of elasticity and cross-elasticity» Usually, 
elasticities are expressed as a ratio between a percentage 
price change and a percentage output change* However, 
under differentiated competition, units of output, as between 
firms, are not strictly commensurable# Therefore, instead 
of output, we now insert sales. i#e# output in value terms; 
and to signify the change we substitute in our elasticities 
Qi for q^. We further suppose that the total value of 
sales lost by any firm j in response to a unilateral price- 
cut by i will accrue as additional sales to i# (This 
assumption is equivalent to neglecting the income effect of 
the price change.) Then, on this basis, own-elasticity of 
demand may be readily expressed in terms of the array of 
cross-elasticities:
-E.li * ^ Eji + fj®*! + •. • + , +QiEni + Qif?E'oi + §
(1 )
where the denote cross-elasticities of the first order
(35)
of importance and the E'  ^denote those of second-order 
22significance.
For convenience, we assume: (1) that the first-order
cross-elasticities are all equal, i.e. the * E^, and. 
that the second-order cross-elasticities are all zero; and 
(2) that all products are substitutes, i.e. none are com­
plementary, so that we may take the arithmetical value of 
elasticities without ambiguity, and so speak of larger or 
smaller elasticities without regard to sign» Then, on these 
assumptions, we may rewrite (1) in the simpler form:
Bii - J ------ (2)
ip - Non-i Output w **ii “ Output of i *31 (3)
Now, if the concept of numbers means anything in relation 
to a group, it expresses a relationship between firm output 
and total output. If numbers are large, the firm’s share
22. Cf. Stigler, on. cit.. p.235: "The group may be definedas all firms whose cross-elasticities are greater than 
some constant. This constant can best be chosen in any particular problem by ranking the cross-elasticities and 
considering a group to end where a considerable gap appears 
in the array of cross-elasticities." Interestingly 
enough, most economists would accept this procedure. But 
many do not seem to realize that in accepting this tech­
nique, based as it is on the notion of a gap in the chain 
of substitutes, they are accepting cross-elasticity as a 
valid substitution criterion.
(36)
in group output is small; and conversely if numbers are 
few* Then it is easy to see from (3) that any change in 
firm i's share of group output will, other things remaining 
the same, involve a corresponding change in own-elasticity 
of demand, E^* Take, for example, a decrease in numbers, 
i*e# an increase in i*s share of the market* This must 
necessarily involve a decreased elasticity of demand for 
firm i, since, ex hypothesis the size of the market from 
which sales may be attracted has contracted in relation to 
i's own output* Although own-elasticity of demand depends 
on numbers in this fashion, cross-elasticity does not* This 
is so because the sales lost by any firm j in response to 
a price-cut by another firm i are related to the output of 
firm 3* Hence, so long as the proportions between 3 
customers of various degrees of sensitivity are unchanged, 
any increase (or decrease) in j's share of the market will 
affect the numerator and denominator of the cross-elasticity 
ratio in the same proportion*
The reader will not have failed to notice that our 
equation (3) expresses the same relationship as Bishop's 
so-called ”numbers equivalent” which he writes -E^ » (n^-1 )E^ 
Also, it will be clear that the essential difference between 
Bishop's interpretation of this relationship and that given 
here is that, whereas Bishop treats cross-elasticity of 
demand as the dependent variable when n^ changes, for us it 
is own-elasticity which is dependent* Indeed, Bishop's
(37)
argument always proceeds on the basis: Given own-elasticity
of demand, then cross-elasticity will be large or small 
according as numbers are small or large* But, it is fair 
to ask, by whom or what is own-elasticity of demand given - 
apart from by the textbooks - except in relation to the 
closeness and the number of the individual products available 
as substitutes, the ”total substitutability” as Bishop 
describes it* It is cross-elasticity which measures the 
closeness of the substitutes and is therefore the natural 
substitution criterion* Own-elasticity is then determined 
by the order of the cross-elasticities and the number of 
them*
This argument is best demonstrated by considering the 
case of homogeneous competition* In this case, cross­
elasticity of demand will be the same whether there are two 
firms (pure duopoly) or 2,001 firms (pure competition), since
cross-elasticity in both situations will be equal to the
23reciprocal of the percentage price-cut* But own-elasticity 
of demand for the pure competitor will be much higher than 
for the pure duopolist* Although, of course, both 
elasticities may be made as large as we like, if we make 
the price-cut small enough, elasticity of demand under pure 
competition will always be much the higher for any given 
price-cut, however small* Indeed, if the firms in each
23* Since for homogeneous competition dQ^/Q^ will always be
equal to unity* J J
group were symmetrical, own-elasticity in the pure competition
Oi lcase would he just 2,000 times that in the duopoly case*
It follows as a corollary that, with any given price-cut, we 
can always make own-elasticity of demand, but not cross­
elasticity, as large as we like by making our firm's share 
of total output small enough, i*e* by making numbers large 
enough*
At the other end of the scale of substitutability, our 
interpretation of cross-elasticity is also the natural one*
By contrast, Bishop's conception of the relationship between 
cross-elasticity and own-elasticity leads to paradoxical 
results when applied to “pure monopoly“* In this case, own- 
elasticity of demand will be finite, while cross-elasticities 
will be very small or zero* Hence, their ratio - Bishop's 
“numbers equivalent“ - will be very large indeed* And this 
Bishop frankly confesses, for he says that in this case the 
numbers equivalent “must be more or less uniformly high with 
respect to all other firms, without exception*“ At best, 
this can hardly be said to be a happy choice of terms*
Triffin, on the other hand, would describe this situation 
as one in which the cross-elasticities of demand (measuring
(38)
24* It will be remembered that we have excluded supply con­
ditions from our definition of cross-elasticity* Hence, 
a price-cut by a purely competitive firm must be con­
sidered, conceptually, to capture the whole market*
23* Op* cit* « p* Ö00*
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the substitutability of products) are more or less uniformly 
small» Surely this Is a more apposite description# This 
becomes obvious as soon as we put the question: Is pure
monopoly non-oligopolistic because of the absence of close 
substitutes (failure of the substitution condition) or 
because of large numbers (failure of the numbers condition)?
It should be stressed that nothing in the foregoing
argument depends on Mrs* Robinson*s notion of products Mcoming
closer together** or of new firms **coming in between** old
firms, a conception which has been the subject of debate from 
26time to time# Mrs# Robinson, it will be recalled, argued 
that:
•••if the new firms were set up, so to speak, in between 
the old firms (either geographically or in respect of special qualities which appeal in various degrees to different customers)#••the difference, from the point of 
view of buyers, between any one firm and the next would 
thus be reduced, the customers of each firm would become 
more indifferent, and the elasticity of demand would be 
increased#2'
oftThis is a valid argument# But it is important to recog­
nize that there are two effects involved here: not only an
26# In particular, during the 1938 debate between Chamberlin 
and Kaldor in the Quarterly Journal of Economics#
27# Joan Robinson, Economics of Imperfect Competition (Lond, 
1953)» p#101• My italics#
28# I.e., given Mrs. Robinson*s condition: **If the new firms
were set up in between the old firms#** The fact that an 
increase in the numbers of firms may involve merely an 
increase in area and not in density - a point made much of 
by Chamberlin - is irrelevant to the particular argument 
in question#
(40)
increase in numbers per se (the numbers effect), but also 
a change in the distance between individual products, as 
is indeed stated in the italicized phrase (the substitution 
effect)*
The conceptual distinction between the substitution and 
numbers effects becomes clear when we consider that the 
notion of products “coming closer together** in no way depends 
on increasing numbers* It could equally well come about, 
for example, as a result of an all-around reduction in 
transport costs or of a technically inspired move towards 
greater standardization of existing products* In these 
cases, numbers would remain unchanged; but cross-elasticities, 
and hence own-elasticity, of demand would increase* On the 
other hand, an increase in numbers need not logically imply 
any change in the degree of substitutability between indivi­
dual products, as for example when the entry of new firms 
does not alter the “distance** between any two products, as 
indeed will always be the case with homogeneous competition* 
However, in the real world of differentiated products, 
a change in numbers will almost certainly involve some re- 
arrangement of consumers* preferences; and hence some
29* Strictly speaking, an increase (say) in the number of
firms will not of itself alter consumers* preferences £S 
between the old products* Rather it will establish be­
tween the old firms and the new firms, and between the new 
firms themselves, a new set of cross—elasticities, which 
may be larger or smaller than existing cross—elasticities* 
(In Mrs* Robinson*s example they will, of course, be 
larger*) Nevertheless, the change in numbers will imply 
some redistribution of consumers between firms and this 
will, in general, affect the pre-existing cross- 
elasticities also*
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change in  c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t i e s  o f  demand. T h is  e f f e c t  w il l  
u s u a lly  he i n  th e  same d i r e c t io n  a s , h u t rem ain co n cep tu a lly  
d i s t i n c t  from , th e  numbers e f f e c t .  The im p o rtan t f a c t  i s  
th a t  c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t i e s  change, no t i n  v i r tu e  o f th e  change 
in  numbers as such , h u t because o f th e  change in  s u b s t i t u t ­
a b i l i t y  which w i l l  u s u a lly  be a s s o c ia te d  w ith  a change in  
th e  p ro d u c t- s t r u c tu r e  o f a group.
I t  i s  from co n fu sio n  o f th e s e  two e f f e c t s ,  i t  seems to  
me, th a t  has a r i s e n  th e  wth i r d  fo rc e ” view, as re p re se n te d  
by B ishop, f o r  example, th a t  c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t y  i s  a fu n c tio n  
b o th  o f p ro d u c t s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  and numbers. The c le a r  
im p lic a tio n  o f  t h i s  view i s  th a t  th e  e f f e c t  o f  a change in  
numbers upon c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t y  cannot be t h e o r e t i c a l ly  d e te r ­
m ined, b u t i s  an em p irica l q u e s tio n  only  to  be answered by 
re fe re n c e  to  th e  f a c t s  o f any g iv en  s i t u a t io n .  But t h i s  
approach i s  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  m is le a d in g . I n  so f a r  as  a 
change in  th e  number o f f irm s (p ro d u c ts )  changes th e  oppor­
t u n i t i e s  f o r  s u b s t i tu t i o n  and th e  p a t te r n  o f consumer 
a ttac h m en ts , i t  changes th e  p a t t e r n  o f  c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t i e s .  
But th e  im p o rtan t p o in t  i s  t h a t  i t  changes c r o s s - e la s ­
t i c i t i e s  v ia  changes i n  s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  o r ,  i f  you l i k e ,  
v ia  changes i n  th e  complex o f consumers* p re fe re n c e s  which 
th e o ry  has alm ost u n iv e r s a l ly  ta k e n  as d a ta .  However, 
th e r e  i s  no e s s e n t i a l  co n n ec tio n  betw een such changes and 
changes i n  numbers i n  th e  sense  used th roughout t h i s  p aper 
and by B ishop. T h is  l a t t e r  co n cep tio n  o f numbers r e l a t e s
(42)
to the ratio of firm to group output, and changes in this 
ratio may clearly occur independently of any change in 
consumers* scales of preference*^
3* The Origin of the Confusion of Cross-Elasticity with Numbers« 
Since the matter is of fundamental importance for formal 
analysis, perhaps it is well to attempt to pinpoint the 
source of the long-standing confusion of cross-elasticity 
with numbers* In the old scheme — when commodities were 
different in kind, not merely in degree - numbers were 
determined as a simple arithmetic relationship between the 
capacity of any one firm and the total market supply of the 
commodity in question* Thus, if a firm’s capacity were 
small compared with total output, the situation would be one 
of pure competition, because any additional supply it could 
add to the market would, when Mspread over1* that market, 
affect other suppliers only to a negligible degree* On 
the other hand, if a firm’s potential capacity were large 
in relation to total supply, oligopolistic implications 
would arise*
30* Perhaps the distinction is best made clear by an illus-
tration* Imagine that a sectional increase in i customers 
incomes results in a doubling of purchases from firm i, 
the outputs of all other firms in the group and the whole 
complex of consumer preferences remaining unchanged* Own- 
elasticity of firm i will approximately halve* By con­
trast, the cross—elasticities will not be affected, except 
in so far as the alteration in income shifts the margin at 
which substitution takes place* Since, when we speak of 
substitutability, we mean substitutability at the margin, there is clearly a sense in which we may take cross­elasticity, but cannot take own—elasticity, as data given 
by the total map of consumers* preferences*
(43)
This conception was adapted by Chamberlin to the
general case of monopolistic competition* Thus, in a
formulation which he still finds "unobjectionable'*,*^ he
defined the "large group" as follows:
Specifically, we assume for the present that any 
adjustment of price or of "product" by a single pro­
ducer spreads its influence over so many of his com­
petitors that the impact felt by any one is negligible 
and does not lead to any readjustment of his own situation*^
It is but a short step from here to those "half-breed supply-
demand cross-elasticities" which Bishop denounces, a step,
incidentally, that Chamberlin himself seems to have taken
33in his more recent work.  ^ It would take me too far from 
the present purpose to discuss here the validity of 
Chamberlin* s formula as a numbers criterion* But I do 
wish to dispute its relevance to the concept of cross­
elasticity of demand*
31# A comment on Bishop’s article, American Economic Review. 
December 1953» XLIII, p*913*
32* Theory of Monopolistic Competition« 3rd* ed* (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1938).
33* For example, "Measuring the Degree of Monopoly and Com­
petition", a contribution to Monopoly and Competition and 
Their Regulation. E*H* Chamberlin, Ed* (London, 1954)# 
esp. Pt. 4» pp.262-67* More recently, however, he has retreated from this position and reverts to his original 
definition of isolation which I have quoted in the text 
above* He now says, "It should be noted that zero cross­
elasticities, though sufficient, are not necessary to 
isolation in this sense; and also that in the vexed case 
of pure competition, however one may rule as to the value 
of the cross-elasticity coefficient, a single seller is isolated in the sense described*** (Comment on Bishop * s 
article, op* cit*. p*913*) In short, he now admits there 
is no necessary relation between his large-small numbers 
criterion and cross-elasticity of demand*
(4J+)
L et us c o n s id e r  C ham berlin1s form ula i n  term s o f  a 
p r ic e -c u t*  Now i t  i s  c le a r  th a t  we must invoke some s o r t  
o f supply  r e s t r i c t i o n s  i f  we a re  to  make any sen se  a t  a l l  
o f h is  co n cep tio n  o f th e  e f f e c t  o f a p r ic e - c u t  b e in g  "sp read  
over” a g iven  number o f  r iv a l  firm s* T his i s  so b ecau se , 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y ,  we can make th e  increm ent o f  s a le s  to  th e  
p r ic e - c u t t in g  f irm , and th e re fo re  th e  amount to  be ta k e n  
from r i v a l s ,  as la rg e  (sm a ll)  as  we l i k e  i f  we make th e  
p r ic e - c u t  la rg e  (sm a ll)  enough* T his fo llo w s im m ediately  
from th e  f a c t  t h a t ,  ex h y p o th e s l* th e  r e la t io n s h ip  betw een 
a p r ic e  change and a q u a n t i ty  change under c o n d itio n s  o f 
m o n o p o lis tic  co m p e titio n  i s  always a f i n i t e  one* T h e re fo re , 
th e  increm ent o f s a le s  accru in g  to  a p r ic e - c u t t in g  f irm , 
and hence th e  amount tak en  from each r i v a l ,  cannot be d e te r ­
m ined, u n le s s  appeal i s  had to  some c o n s id e ra tio n  o f  s u p p ly * ^  
Now i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  argue th a t  th e  amount by which a 
" la rg e  group" s e l l e r  may in c re a s e  s a le s  i s  l im ite d  by supply  
fa c to rs *  B ut, th e  sm a lle r  i s  a f i rm ’s p o te n t ia l  c a p a c ity , 
th e  sm a lle r  need be th e  p r ic e - c u t  to  take  up t h i s  c a p a c ity ; 
and s in c e  c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t y  o f demand i s  th e  r a t i o  o f  th e  
q u a n t i ty  change to  th e  p r ic e  change, i t s  value w i l l  n o t be 
a f f e c te d  by any c o n s id e ra tio n s  o f  supply*
R a th e r, in  c o n d itio n s  o f m o n o p o lis tic  co m p e titio n , i f  
any f irm  i  c u ts  p r i c e ,  i t  w il l  n u l l  s a le s  from f irm  ;) a t  th e
34* Bishop i s  overgenerous in  say ing  th a t  a ttem p ts  to  q u a l ify  
c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t i e s  w ith  supply  r e s t r i c t i o n s  have been con­
f in e d  to  homogeneous com petition* On* c i t * . p*78l*
(45)
rate given by the cross-elasticity of demand E.^; and the 
value of depends on the rate at which J customers will 
exchange product i for product j. Also, firm i will pull 
sales from firm k at the rate E^; and so on* Now it 
cannot be emphasized too strongly that, income effects 
apart, the movement of buyers from j to i is quite indepen­
dent of the movement of buyers from k to i, from 1 to i, and 
so on* Otherwise, why does not the volume of sales gained 
from a price-cut 11 spread over" all other firms? Or why 
does the spread fall more heavily upon one firm than upon 
another? We cannot deduce the answer to these questions 
from own-elasticity of demand# In other words, own-elasticity 
of demand fails as a substitution criterion* But we do 
know that, for any given price-cut, the better the substitute, 
the heavier will be the sales loss* And it is precisely 
this of which cross-elasticity of demand is a measure*
It is perfectly true, of course, that, with given rates 
of substitution, the greater the number of competitors, “the 
less the price reduction necessary to secure any desired 
increase in the sales of A.•*And.••the less the effect of 
any given increase in the sales of A on the sales of rival 
products* • However, since the effect of (say) greater
numbers is (1) to reduce the price-cut required to achieve
35. G.J. Stigler, op. cit». p*235*
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any predetermined result; and (2) to reduce the amount 
which it is necessary to take from any individual competitor, 
the cross-elasticities of demand are unaffected, because the 
numerator (percentage sales loss) and the denominator 
(percentage price-cut) are changed in the same proportion* 
Hence, cross-elasticity of demand is independent of numbers* 
Since the idea of cross-elasticity as a measure of 
substitutability seems simple and straightforward enough, 
or at least so it has appeared to a good many writers, it 
may well be asked why its general adoption has been so 
strenuously resisted* The answer, I believe, is to be found 
in the implications which stem from its acceptance*
The argument advanced in this paper is essentially the 
same as that put forward by Kaldor in the 1938 controversy 
with Chamberlin* During that debate, it will be recalled, 
Kaldor regarded as ”crucial” the proposition that ”a shift 
of the /demand7 curve to the left will increase the elasticity
7 £of demand at the equilibrium level of output.• And since
such a shift to the left is associated with an increase in 
the number of firms, the ”curves become more and more elastic 
with an increase in numbers*• Chamberlin rejected this
proposition and reiterated his opposition to the idea that
36* N. Kaldor, ’’Professor Chamberlin on Monopolistic and Im­
perfect Competition”, Quarterly Journal of Economics.
May 1938, LII, p*3l8.
37* Loc* cit.
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“differentiation of the product (in my sense) may he exorcised
X Qby the process of merely increasing the number of firms* rt
Chamberlin was perfectly correct in asserting the latter, 
as he was wrong in rejecting the former, for it is clear that, 
no matter how small may become the output of a firm as the 
result of increasing numbers, there may still be a proportion, 
and even a constant proportion, of customers who will be 
prepared to continue paying something more for the product 
of that particular firm than for any of its substitutes*
Product differentiation remains; and upwards elasticity of 
demand, i*e* elasticity in respect of a price-rise, does not 
necessarily increase as output contracts in relation to group 
output* Indeed, as output contracts the firm may be left 
with only a hard core of its most loyal customers* Elasticity 
to a price-raise may actually decrease*
Thus, we arrive at the position where, as a firm!s output 
contracts in relation to group output, its downward elasticity, 
Ed, increases (vide Kaldor), while its upward elasticity, Eu, 
may be constant or even decreasing (vide Chamberlin)* And 
both points of view are correct* The seeming contradiction, 
which has persisted from the 1938 debate to Bishop’s work in 
1952, is only a contradiction so long as we cling to the pre­
conception, which has no real basis except in the economist’s
38. Reply to Kaldor, Quarterly Journal of Economics, May
1938, LII, p.531.
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penchant for simple stable equilibria, that E should 
approximate to Eu, i*e* that the demand curve under differen­
tiated competition, should necessarily be smooth* This is 
a matter we will meet again in the chapter which follows*
(49)
HI. THE LARGE GROUP: THE TRANSITION FROM THE
COMPETITIVE GROUP TO PURE MONOPOLY*
1. The Group and the Concept of Numbers
In the previous chapter, we concluded that Triff in* 1 2s
use of cross-elasticity of demand as a substitution
criterion is, subject to the qualification stated there,
unexceptionable. At this point, we must depart from
Triff in, for in this chapter we shall be concerned with
the group and with numbers* Triff in, on the other
hand, does not discuss the group at all, except insofar
as was necessary to reject it* "In the general pure
theory of value", he says, "the group and the industry
are useless concepts. "Moreover, when this concept
is abandoned, the criterion of numbers is left in 
2mid-air. "
Our purpose in this chapter is, then, to rescue the 
concept of numbers from mid-air* The reason why this 
is necessary has been outlined briefly in Chapter I. 
Without some concept of the group, and the associated
* This Chapter is an expansion and development of an 
argument previously published under the title, "A 
Kinked Demand Curve for Monopolistic Competition", 
Economic Record. May, 1955.
1. R* Triff in, op*. cit., p. 89*
2. R* Triffin, op. cit., p* 100.
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n o t io n  o f  n u m b e rs , we h av e  no a n a l y t i c a l  way o f  
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  '♦pure m onopo ly" o r  " i s o l a t e d  s e l l i n g "  
fro m  s e l l e r s  i n  a  g ro u p  a n d , u l t i m a t e l y ,  from  th e  
p u re  g ro u p  ty p e  w h ic h  we c a l l  p u re  c o m p e t i t io n .  The 
d i f f e r e n c e  i n  th e  d e g re e  o f  c o n t r o l  o v e r  p r i c e  -  t h e  
s i g n i f i c a n t  econom ic  d i s t i n c t i o n  -  w h ic h  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  
pure, c o m p e t i t io n  fro m  "p u re  m onopoly" c a n  o n ly  be 
e x p la in e d  i n  te rm s  o f  g ro u p s  and  n u m b ers .
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i t  i s  n o t  w ish e d  to  deny  t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  a  good d e a l  o f  s u b s ta n c e  i n  c r i t i c i s m s ,  i n c l u d i n g  
T r i f f i n ' s ,  w h ich  h av e  b e en  l e v e l l e d  a g a i n s t  t r a d i t i o n a l  
d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  th e  g roup*  I n  e a r l i e r  t h e o r i e s ,  th e  
g ro u p  i s  i m p l i c i t l y  d e l i n e a t e d  i n  th e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a  
"com m od ity " . A g ro u p  i s  m e re ly  a  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  f i r m s  
s e l l i n g  th e  same ( o r  a  s i m i l a r )  com m odity . Num bers 
a r e  d e te rm in e d  by  a  s im p le  p r o c e s s  o f  c o u n t in g  th e  
f i r m s  f a l l i n g  w i t h i n  th e  g ro u p . O nce, h o w e v er, we 
r e c o g n iz e  th e  e s s e n t i a l  h e t e r o g e n e i t y  o f  c o m m o d itie s , 
t h i s  schem a f a l l s  to  th e  g ro u n d . At f i r s t  s i g h t  t h i s  
may n o t  in d e e d  be o b v io u s .  Why, i t  may be a s k e d ,  i s  
i t  n o t  p o s s i b l e ,  i f  we w ish  to  c o n s id e r  g ro u p s  o f  f i r m s  
and  to  d e s c r ib e  them  i n  num ber t e r n s ,  to  d e f in e  th e  
g ro u p  a s  a  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  f i r m s  l in k e d  by s i g n i f i c a n t  
c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t i e s ?  C r o s s - e l a s t i c i t y  b e in g  a  c r i t e r i o n
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o f  s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  b e tw e e n  p r o d u c t s ,  we w ould  i n  t h i s  
way d e m a rc a te  a  g ro u p  o f  more o r  l e s s  good s u b s t i t u t e s *  
C o u ld  we n o t  th e n  d e t e m i n e  th e  num ber o f  f i r m s  by  
s im p le  c o u n t in g ,  w e ig h t in g  f i m s  a c c o rd in g  to  o u tp u t  
i f  i t  i s  d e s i r e d  to  ta k e  i n t o  a c c o u n t th e  r e l a t i v e  
im p o r ta n c e  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  f i r m s ?
T h is  n o t i o n  o f  b o u n d in g  th e  g ro u p  a t  th e  p o i n t  
w here  a  gap  i n  th e  c h a in  o f  s u b s t i t u t e s  a p p e a r s h a s ,  
o f  c o u r s e ,  o f t e n  b e e n  p ro p o s e d ;  a n d , a s  a  r u l e  o f  
thumb i n  f a i r l y  c l e a r - c u t  c a s e s ,  t h i s  m ethod  s e r v e s  
w e l l  e n o u g h . I n d e e d ,  we u s e d  i t  i n  C h a p te r  I I  f o r  
th e  p u rp o se  o f  i l l u s t r a t i n g  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw e e n  
c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t y  and o w n - e l a s t i c i t y  o f  dem and. B u t 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y  i t  w i l l  n o t  d o , f o r  t h r e e  m ain  r e a s o n s .  
The f i r s t  and  o b v io u s  one i s  t h a t  i n  many c a s e s  t h e r e  
may be no c l e a r  and  u n am biguous b re a k  i n  th e  c h a in  
o f  s u b s t i t u t i o n .  S e c o n d ly , i n  th e  g ro u p  o f  th e  
M a r s h a l l i a n  t r a d i t i o n ,  t h e r e  r e s i d e s  a  f a c t o r  ( a  
p r o p e r t y  a t t a c h i n g  to  th e  "com m odity*) w h ich  i s  common 
to  a l l  f i m s  i n  th e  g ro u p . T h is  common f a c t o r  i s
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derived from the substitutability in use of the products 
3in question. But cross-elasticities of demand cannot 
define a group in this fashion. They cannot determine 
the existence of a common factor resident in a number 
of commodities, because they represent a relation which 
exists between two products taken in isolation. Thus, 
product A may be significantly related to product B, 
which in turn may be related to product C; but there 
may be no relationship at all between the products A 
and C.
It may be objected that this could easily be 
resolved by considering the cross-elasticity between 
A and C. But, even if this were significantly large, 
it could quite well reflect an altogether different 
demand characteristic from that existing between B and C.
A quite distinct sub-set of customers could be 
involved. In other words, C may be In a group 
relationship with A because of a quite different
3. Of*, for examples "For some purposes it may be best 
to regard Chinese and Indian teas, or even 
Souchong and Pekoe teas, as different commodities; 
and to have a separate demand sohedule for each 
of them. While for other purposes it may be best 
to group together commodities as distinct as beef 
or mutton, or even as tea and coffee, and to have 
a single list to represent the demand for the two 
combined .. . * - Marshall, Principles. 8th Ed. p.lOOn.
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substitution-in-use characteristic^ from these 
operative in its relationship with B. C may well be, 
as it were, selling in two distinct "markets" 
simultaneously* Perhaps this point can be made clear 
with an illustration* Let us revert to Triffin's 
striking, if somewhat hyperbolical, example which we 
quoted in the previous chapter, viz* that "the 
competition may be keener between Ford and Rogers Peet 
(a tailoring firm] than between Ford and Rolls-Royce."^
It is clear that any substitutability between Ford and 
Rogers Peet will represent a quite different substitution 
in use - Conspicuous consumption", perhaps - from that 
which would be involved in substitution between Ford 
and Rolls-Royce - transport, presumably. Almost 
certainly the customers who would move in the one 
direction in response to a price-change would be quite 
different from those who would move in the other 
direction. We have, as it were, a situation of 
triangular chain relationship of consumer preferences.
The classical conception of the group, in which every 
firm within the group is related to every other firm 
and all firms are selling, or potentially selling, to 
the same group of customers, must be distinguished from
4* R. Triffin, op. cit., p. 88
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c h a i n - r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  w h ich  m ay, o f  c o u r s e ,  he c i r c u l a r ,
5
g iv in g  so m e th in g  o f  th e  a p p e a ra n c e  o f  a g roup*
The t h i r d  r e a s o n  why c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t i e s  a r e ,  by 
th e m s e lv e s ,  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  in a d e q u a te  to  d e f in e  th e  
g ro u p  i s  th e  p ro b le m  o f  d e c id in g  w h a t v a lu e  o f  such  
o r o s s - e l a s t i c i t i e s  s h o u ld  be c o n s id e r e d  s i g n i f i c a n t .
To sa y  t h a t  an y  v a lu e  d i f f e r e n t  fro m  z e ro  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  
i s  to  r u l e  o u t  a t  once th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  ( a s  a  r e a l  w o r ld  
c a s e ,  a t  any  r a t e )  o f  "p u re  m o n o p o ly " , a s  K a ld o r  h a s  
d e m o n s tr a te d .^  On th e  o t h e r  h a n d , to  f i x  upon  some 
s p e c i f i c  p o s i t i v e  v a lu e  a s  b e in g  s i g n i f i c a n t  w ou ld  be 
p u r e ly  a r b i t r a r y .  A t t h i s  p o i n t ,  o u r  r e a l  w o rld  
c a s e s  w o u ld  jump s u d d e n ly  fro m  f i r m s  c o n s id e r e d  a s  
c o m p e t i t iv e  w i t h i n  a  " la r g e  g ro u p "  c o n te x t  to  f i r m s  
e a c h  o f  w h ich  i s  c o n c e iv e d  a s  a  " s in g l e  s e l l e r " .
A g a in , on  t h i s  b a s i s ,  th e  b o u n d a ry  o f  any  
p a r t i c u l a r  g ro u p  a n d  th e  num ber o f  f i r m s  to  be in c lu d e d  
i n  i t  w o u ld  be q u i t e  a r b i t r a r y .  We w ould  be d ra w in g  
a  l i n e  w here  none e x i s t s  i n  th e  co n tin u u m  o f  r e a l i t y .  
F u n d a m e n ta l ly ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  o u r  d i f f i c u l t y  a r i s e s  fro m
5* The f u l l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  a rgum en t 
w i l l ,  i t  i s  h o p e d , become c l e a r  l a t e r  i n  t h i s  
c h a p t e r .
6 .  N. K a ld o rs  " P r o f e s s o r  C h a m b e rlin  on  M o n o p o l is t ic  and  
I m p e r f e c t  C o m p e t i t io n " ,  l o c .  c i t . , p . 526 , a s  
q u o te d  i n  C h a p te r  I ,  p .  1 1 .
'X\ l'.y/yE~3n v
M-IAW
* UBfta
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th e  f a c t  t h a t ,  s t r i c t l y  s p e a k in g ,  we c a n  o n ly  c o u n t
l i k e  t h i n g s .  T h is  i s ,  in d e e d ,  th e  b a s ic  p re m ise  o f
T r i f f i n * s  t h e s i s .  H ow ever, T r i f f i n * s  way o u t  -
c 7abandonm en t o f  th e  g ro u p  and th e  c o n e p t  o f  num bers -  
i s  no s o l u t i o n .  I t  t u r n s  away fro m  one d i f f i c u l t y  to  
ru n  a t  once  i n t o  a n o th e r  o r ,  more c o r r e c t l y ,  a  d i f f e r e n t  
f a c e t  o f  th e  same fu n d a m e n ta l  p u z z l e .  Our im m e d ia te  
t a s k ,  t h e n ,  i s  to  e x p lo r e  an  a l t e r n a t i v e  way a ro u n d  th e  
d i f f i c u l t y .  I n  so d o in g  we w i l l  be f o r c e d  to  f a c e  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  th e  th e o r y  o f  p r i c e  f o r m a t io n  g o in g  
much bey o n d  th e  p ro b lem  o f  m ere c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .
2 .  The Two C o n c e p tio n s  o f  Num bers
E a r l i e r ,  we h ave  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  m a rk e t r e l a t i o n ­
s h i p s  m u st be d e s c r ib e d  i n  te rm s  o f  two v a r i a b l e s ,  v i z .
7 .  I n  f a c t ,  T r i f f  i n  d id  n o t ,  and  c o u ld  n o t ,  w h o lly
a b an d o n  th e  i d e a  o f  n u m b ers , a s  he h a d  to  f a c e  th e  
p ro b le m  o f  o l i g o p o l y .  I n  t h i s  c o n n e c t io n ,  he  
p o s t u l a t e d  a  c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  " c i r c u l a r i t y w to  
i s o l a t e  th e  o l ig o p o ly  c a s e .  B u t t h i s  c o e f f i c i e n t  
i s  p u r e l y  d e f i n i t i o n a l .  A t no s ta g e  d o e s  T r i f f i n  
p o s t u l a t e  th e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  demand o r  s u p p ly  w h ich  
d e t e m i n e  th e  v a lu e  ta k e n  by h i s  c i r c u l a r i t y  
c o e f f i c i e n t .  I t  i s  o n l y ^ t h i s  o m is s io n  t h a t  he  i s  
a b le  to  a v o id  b r in g in g  num bers i n t o  h i s  schem e, a s  
s m a ll  n u m b ers , i n  some s e n s e ,  a r e  one o f  th e  
c o n d i t i o n s  o f  s u p p ly  n e c e s s a r y  to  a  s i t u a t i o n  o f  
o l i g o p o l y .  (F o r  f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h i s  m a t t e r ,  
se e  C h a p te r  IV  f o l l o w i n g . )
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(1) substitutability, and (2) numbers. The theoretical 
consequence of this is that we can derive two distinct 
conceptions of numbers, according as we hold the one or 
other variable constant while allowing the second to 
change.
Let us take the case of 1,000 firms selling 
homogeneous products, a situation we are accustomed to 
call "pure competition". Now gradually allow the 
substitutability of products (i.e. cross-elasticities) 
to fall. While substitutability is finite but still 
high, we have 1,000 sellers of imperfect substitutes, a 
situation of "polypoly" in traditional teiminology.
Allow substitutability to fall further so that cross­
elasticities approach zero. We then have 1,000 "isolated 
sellers" in Triffinrs terminology. At some stage as 
substitutability decreases, we must arrive at a point 
where — in traditional terms - the "group" ceases to 
exist. Put in another way, we may say that we will 
approach a position where the intra-group cross- 
elasticities are not significantly higher than cross- 
elasticities with some firms which were originally 
outside the group. There is now, if you like, no 
marked gap in the chain of substitutes. It follows that, 
as intra-group cross-elasticities become smaller and
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s m a lle r ,  more and more f irm s  w i l l  be en c o u n te red  w ith  
w hich c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t i e s  a re  o f  th e  same o rd e r  a s  th o se  
now o p e ra t iv e  betw een o u r o r ig in a l  f i r m s .  I f  we look  
upon "pure monopoly" a s  some s o r t  o f  l i m i t  a s  c r o s s -  
e l a s t i c i t i e s  approach z e ro , th e n  th e  number o f  f irm s  
o f  th e  same o rd e r  o f  in te rd e p en d e n ce  ( i . e .  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  
in te rd e p e n d e n c e )  becomes v e ry  la rg e  in d e e d .
T h is , th e n , i s  one co n c ep tio n  o f  num bers. I t  i s ,  
in d e e d , th e  c o n c ep tio n  o f numbers r e p re s e n te d  by 
Bishop* s "numbers e q u iv a le n t"  w hich , we saw i n  the
i
p re v io u s  c h a p te r ,  he w r i te s  n ^ -  1 = -  ^77  > a n d >
th e r e f o r e ,  as we app roach  "pure monopoly" ( E ^  f i n i t e ,
E . i n f in i t e s im a l )  n  becomes v e ry  l a r g e .  The change 
i n  numbers from  "pure c o m p e titio n "  to  "pure monopoly" 
i n  te rm s o f t h i s  co n c ep tio n  may be f o r m a l i s t i c a l l y  
re p re s e n te d  a s  in  F ig u re  1.
FIGURE 1
The Group
"Pure Monopoly
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We arrive at the other, and more familiar, 
conception of numbers when, beginning as before with 
1,000 sellers of homogeneous products, we now hold 
substitutability constant, while varying numbers. Then, 
if we proceed to "knock out" firms - say by amalgamating 
them in pairs - sooner or later we will be left with 
only a few firms which we call "pure oligopoly" and 
finally with just one, "pure monopoly". Formalistically, 
this conception of numbers can be represented as in 
Figure 2.
FIGUHE 2
The Group
"Pure Monopoly"
Clearly, it is this conception of numbers which is 
appropriate to the older value theory of the tradition 
of Marshall and the Lausanne School and followers, for 
whom commodities are either the Eame or are different.
The difficulty with both these conceptions of 
number,, once we adopt the relativist position of 
monopolistic competition when commodities are merely
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different in degree, is that each can, in these 
conditions, only reflect a partial aspect of the 
complexity of the real world, since here we will find 
variation in substitution and numbers simultaneously.
In other words, we may expect to find every manner of 
combination^ between the scale of numbers and the scale 
of substitutability. What we want, if we are to 
describe the transition from the group to the isolated 
seller, is some form of numbers index which will be 
able to embrace simultaneously variations in 
substitutability and in numbers (in the arithmetic sense).
As an approach to establishing an appropriate 
index, it will be helpful to look again at the two 
conceptions of numbers which we have outlined» It is 
helpful to reconsider these as density concepts. Any 
group-number scheme can, of course, be looked at in this 
way. Numbers must relate to an area; and it is the 
"group” which defines the area.
In terms of the second conception of numbers, our 
1,000 sellers of homogeneous products may be described 
as 1,000 sellers located at a point. With pure 
oligopoly we have a few sellers at a point, with pure 
monopoly one and only one. Each point would then 
represent a unique "market”. The trouble, however, is 
that as soon as we allow the slightest degree of product
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d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  to  a p p e a r  s e l l e r s  w i l l  c e a s e  to  be 
c o n c e n t r a t e d  a t  a  p o in t*  E ach  s e l l e r  w i l l  now h av e  
a  u n iq u e  p o i n t ,  a l th o u g h  su ch  p o i n t s  may l i e  v e r y  
c lo s e  t o g e t h e r .  I f  we s t i c k  to  th e  o ld  c o n c e p t io n  
o f  d e n s i t y  ( o r  n u m b e rs ) , su c h  s e l l e r s  o f  s l i g h t l y  
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  p r o d u o ts  w o u ld  e a c h  h a v e  to  be d e s c r ib e d  
a s  i s o l a t e d  s e l l e r s *  o r  Hp u re  m o n o p o l i s t s * .  T h is  
i s  th e  e s s e n c e  o f  T r i f f i n * s  p o s i t i o n ,  one w h ic h  we 
h a v e  s e e n  P r o f e s s o r  C h a m b e rlin  h a s  l a t t e r l y  ta k e n  u p .
The a l t e r n a t i v e  c o n c e p t io n  o f  d e n s i t y  i s  to  
c o u n t  s e l l e r s  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  a n  a r e a .  H ow ever, once 
we s w itc h  to  su ch  a  n o t io n  o f  d e n s i t y ,  we a re  b ack  
w i th  o u r  o ld  p ro b le m  o f  d e f i n i n g  th e  a r e a  w h ic h  i s  
r e l e v a n t ,  i n  s h o r t ,  o f  d e f i n i n g  th e  * g ro u p * . So f a r ,  
e v e r y  c r i t e r i o n  p ro p o se d  f o r  d e - l i m i t i n g  such  an  a r e a  
h a s  d e p e n d e d , e i t h e r  d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y ,  on  th e  
i d e a  o f  a  gap  i n  th e  c h a in  o f  s u b s t i t u t e s  -  on t h e r e  
b e in g  a  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  f i r m s  w i t h i n  an  a r e a  w i th  a  
d e n s i t y  g r e a t e r  th a n  t h a t  o f  s u r ro u n d in g  a r e a s .  B u t 
a s  we a p p ro a c h  *pure  m on o p o ly * , o r  a s  p r o d u c t s  become 
l e s s  and  l e s s  s u b s t i t u t a b l e ,  i t  becom es h a r d e r  and  
h a r d e r  to  d e - l i m i t  an y  a r e a  o f  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  f i r m s .  
The a r e a  w i l l  g e t  l a r g e r  and  l a r g e r ,  and  w i th  i t  th e  
num bers w i t h i n  i t .  T h is  i s  th e  c o n c e p t io n  o f  d e n s i t y  
in v o lv e d  i n  B ish o p * s  num bers fo im u la *
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Neither of these conceptions of density, we have 
seen, is adequate in a world of differentiated 
products. And the reason goes directly back to the 
dilemma which Mrs. Bobinson pointed out to us at the 
outset. Insofar as each seller has a monopoly of 
its own output, it may be represented as a single 
seller at a point. Insofar as every product competes, 
as an alternative use of money, with every other 
product, the firm selling it may be considered as a 
member of a "group*. In short, every firm may be 
considered, at one and the same time, as both an 
individual seller and as a member of a collectivity. 
Indeed, both aspects of a firm's existence must be 
taken into account. To take one or the other of 
these aspects to the exclusion of the other, is to 
take only a partial view of a firm’s relationship 
with its environment. Necessarily, the result will 
be to plug a gap on one side only to open another on 
the other side. What we require, then, is a concept 
of density which embodies both aspects of a firm’s 
being.
3. An Alternative Conception of Density
The conception of density (or numbers) to be
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p ro p o s e d  a s  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  to  th o s e  we h av e  ex am in ed
i s  c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  to  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  i d e a  o f
n u m b ers , i n  t h a t  I t  w i l l  d e f in e  num bers i n  r e l a t i o n
to  a  p o in t*  T h is  a v o id s  any a r b i t r a r y  d e m a rc a t io n
o f  a r e a s  a s  such*. How th e n  do we t r e a t  th e  p ro b le m
r a i s e d  by  th e  "g ro u p *  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  c o m p e t i t io n ,
w here  f i r m s  a re  c o n c e n t r a te d  i n t o  a  sm a ll  a r e a ,  y e t
w here  no two f i r m s  a r e  c o n c e n t r a te d  a t  th e  one p o in t?
We s h a l l  ta k e  a c c o u n t  o f  t h i s  by  d e s c r i b i n g  th e
s i t u a t i o n  a s  i f  su ch  f i r m s  w ere  c o n c e n t r a te d  a t  a  
0
s i n g l e  p o in t*  I n  w h a t f o l l o w s ,  we s h a l l  p ro p o s e  a  
r e d u c t i o n  fo rm u la  w h ic h  w i l l  g iv e  u s  a  d e n s i t y  "num ber" 
r e p r e s e n t i n g  an  in d e x  o f  th e  e f f e c t i v e  "g ro u p  f o r c e "  
o p e r a t i n g  upon  any  g iv e n  f i r m .  I n  th e  c a s e  o f  
hom ogeneous c o m p e t i t io n ,  w here  f i r m s  a re  i n  f a c t  
c o n c e n t r a t e d  a t  a  p a r t i c u l a r  p o i n t ,  t h i s  d e n s i t y  
num ber w i l l  be e q u a l  to  th e  a r i t h m e t i c  num ber o f  f i r m s  
so c o n c e n tr a te d *  I n  th e  c a se  o f  "p u re  m o n o p o ly " , i t  
w i l l  be e q u a l  to  u n i t y .  Such an  in d e x  w i l l  a l lo w  u s
8* T h ere  a re  num erous a n a lo g o u s  c o n c e p tu a l  p r o c e d u r e s  
i n  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o ry *  F o r  e x am p le , i n  p u re  
m e c h a n ic s ,  th e  m ass o f  a  body  i s  t r e a t e d  a s  i f  
i t  w ere  a l l  c o n c e n t r a te d  a t  th e  c e n t r e  o f  g r a v i t y .
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to describe the transition from pure competition to pure 
monopoly as a continuous function*
As an approach to establishing such a formula, let 
us recall the reason why, as we have argued, cross­
elasticity of demand as defined in Chapter II is 
inadequate to describe the "group". This was so, we said, 
because cross-elasticity of demand represents a 
relationship between two firms considered in isolation*
It was, therefore, unable to tell us anything about 
group characteristics. Let us consider this a 3dttie 
further*
When any firm i cuts price, then a stimulus is 
applied to buyers of the product j to shift expenditure 
away from j towards product i* Income effects apart, 
there is for each such customer one - and only one - 
avenue of substitution opened up as a result of the 
price-cut. However, consider the position if firm i 
raises price. There is now applied a stimulus to the
customers of i to move some or all their expenditure 
in the direction of all other products or any one of them, 
sinoe the price of i now compares less favourably with 
every other price. Whereas, in the former case, the
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j customers, at Least insofar as their expenditure on 
product 3 is ooncemed, have only to consider their 
relative preferences as between the two products i and , 
in the latter case, i customers must consider the whole 
system of preferences as between i and all other 
products- If we were to ring around the two firms i 
and j, separating them from all other products, this 
would in no way affect the value of the cross-elasticity 
defined by a price-cut- But it is otherwise in 
the case of the cross-elastioity (which we will denote 
e^) defined in respect of a price-rise, for by isolating 
the two firms we would be cutting off avenues of 
substitution which would otherwise be opened.
Let us return to consider the case of homogeneous 
competition- If price is cut by any firm i, then, 
conceptually i will gain the total output of the related 
firm j, however small the price-cut- If the price-cut
is made small enough, the coefficient approaches OO • 
This happens, as Triff in has shown us, whether the
situation is one of duopoly, oligopoly, or pure
b
competition, so long a&d i and j are perfect substitutes. 
Now consider the value of e when the price of i is 
raised, all other prices being unchanged. Now firm i 
will lose its total output, but this will only accrue 
wholly to j in the oase of pure duopoly. In the case
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of oligopoly, i*s loss will be distributed at random 
over the few rival firms, in the oase of pure 
competition it will be distributed over a large 
number of competitive firms* The cross-elasticity 
defined by a rise in price has, in short, a numbers 
element, and it is no doubt the reason, or one reason, 
why the confusion of cross-elasticity with numbers 
which we discussed in Chapter II has proved so 
intractable* As mentioned previously it has been 
the almost invariable practice to identify the two*
An exception, however, is to be found in the
9well-known article of Hall and Hitch* In that 
paper, the authors explicitly distinguish the cross­
elasticity defined by a rise in price, our e._, as 
the one relevant to the determination of numbers. 
Moreover, "there are two factors which ... tend to 
make these cross-elasticities small. One is the 
smallness of the proportion of consumers (or 
potential consumers) for whom the elasticity of 
substitution is high ... The second factor is the 
range and evenness of Scatter* of the affected 
consumers among the products of other firms.
9. R.L. Hall and C.J. Hitch; "Price Theory and Business 
Behaviour", Oxford Economic Papers, No. 2 (1939).
10. Hall and Hitch, loc. cit., p. 16.
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It is important to notice that this cross-elasticity, 
e^, is relative to the substitution cross-elasticity,
for it is, in part, determined by the 
substitutability of the products i and j. Thus, as 
Hall and Hitoh tell us, the value of e ^  varies 
directly as the substitutability between products 
and inversely with the number of similarly related 
firms. Therefore, if we divide e ^  by the 
substitution cross-elasticity E^, we may eliminate 
the substitutability component, leaving only the 
numbers element* However, since the relationship 
between e ^  and numbers is an inverse one, we must 
take the reciprocal ratio as our criterion of numbers. 
Then we have N = E ^ / e ^  as an index of numbers or, if 
you like, density.
Now the significant thing about this coefficient 
is that it will reflect changing numbers in both the 
senses discussed in Section 2 above. It will take 
account of movement along either scale separately and 
hence, if both are operative, jointly. Beginning 
as before with our 1,000 firms selling homogeneous 
products, we find that the value of N will approach
(67)
9991 if outputs are symmetrical. Thus, if i cuts 
price, it will gain the whole of j 1 s output. (It will 
be remembered that we have rejected any supply conditions 
upon cross-elasticity.) On the other hand, if i raises 
price it will lose its total output and this will be 
distributed at random between 999 other firms. Firm j 
can only expect to gain l/999th of i rs output, as against 
the 100 per cent of j * s output i would get as a result 
of cutting its price. It is worth noticing also that 
our coefficient correctly reflects asymmetry between 
films1 outputs. Thus, in our example,/we were to double 
the output of i, leaving the other 999 firms as before, 
the coefficient would be halved. A price-cut by i 
would still involve j in 100 per cent loss of sales, 
leaving the numerator unchanged. However, j could now 
expect to get twice the extra sales from a rise in i fs 
prioe, as i has now twice the sales to lose. The 
denominator is therefore doubled and the numbers 
coefficient halved, reflecting the increased importance 
of i in the market.
Let us now wknock out" some of our 1,000 firms in 
the manner described earlier in connection with the
Ji11. It need hardly be pointed out that cross-elasticity e will always reflect numbers exclusive of firm i.
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second co n c ep tio n  o f  numbers w hich we d esc rib ed }  N w i l l
9
f a l l  p a r i  p a s s u . When we a re  l e f t  w ith  o n ly  two f i rm s ,  
pure duopo ly , o u r  c o e f f i c i e n t  w i l l  be eq u a l to  u n i ty .
Thus, a s  we o p e ra te  on the  sc a le  o f numbers w ith  
s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  h e ld  c o n s ta n t ,  N moves i n  co rrespondence  
w ith  th e  a r i th m e tic  number o f f i rm s .
A gain , i f  we o p e ra te  on the  sc a le  o f  s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  
w ith  th e  a r i th m e tic  number o f f irm s  h e ld  c o n s ta n t ,  i n  
accordance w ith  th e  f i r s t  co n c ep tio n  o f num bers, th e  
c o e f f i c i e n t  N w i l l  approach  u n i ty  a s  we l e t  
s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  g e t  v e ry  sm a ll, th a t  i s  a s  we approach  
”pure m onopoly” o r  " is o la te d  s e l l i n g ”* T his i s  so 
b ecau se , f o r  th o se  custom ers s u b s t i tu t i n g  m a rg in a lly  
between th e  p ro d u c ts  o f two i s o l a t e d  s e l l e r s  i  and j ,  
th e re  i s  no d i f f e r e n c e ,  so f a r  as the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f 
t h e i r  ex p e n d itu re  betw een i  and j i s  concerned , betw een 
a c u t i n  the  p r ic e  p^ (which g iv e s  u s  E ._ ) and a r i s e  
i n  p^ (w hich g iv e s  u s  e ^ ) .  The concep t o f  m a rg in a l 
s u b s t i t u t i o n  i s  h e re  used  to  d is t in g u is h  th e  s i t u a t i o n  
from one in v o lv in g  i n t e g r a l  s u b s t i tu t i o n  w hich would 
u s u a l ly  be ex p ec ted  to  o ccu r betw een good s u b s t i t u t e s  
i n  u se , w h eth er p e r f e c t  o r  n o t .  I n  th e  one case  th e  
consum er w i l l  be buying the  two p ro d u c ts  s im u lta n e o u s ly  -  
which i n  some sense to  be d is c u s se d  l a t e r  makes them 
”d i f f e r e n t ” com m odities — w hereas i n  the  o th e r
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consumption wilL normally be mutually exclusive, the 
commodity actually being used depending upon 
relative prices. The distinction is, I believe, 
logically important and will be developed at greater 
length in Section 5 below.
The fact that N — * 1 in both the case of duopoly
and "pure monopoly" highlights one of the basic
properties of our numbers coefficient. Triffin has
rightly stressed the need to cast the theory of the
firm in terms of "external interdependence". But
if we are going to describe the interdependence of
firms, we need to begin, not with the one-firm "atom"
12of Professor Chamberlin, but rather - if we may 
persist with his somewhat shaky metaphor - with a 
"molecule" of two firms. And it is precisely upon 
this that our conception of numbers or density is 
based. This two-firm starting point is additionally 
valuable, since it also provides us with the basic 
link of chain relationship. There is one further 
point worth noticing. Adoption of such an approach 
makes the theory of the "external interdependence" of 
the firm symmetrical with recent developments in the
12. "Monopolistic Competition Revisited", Economica, 
N.S., XVIII, Nov. 1951.
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theory of demand where, instead of beginning with a 
consumer’s utility function in respect of one 
commodity, we begin with his substitution (indifference) 
function between two commodities»
We have, then, two basic "molecules", each of 
which constitutes a two-firm relationship. In the 
duopoly case, the firms are selling the same or a 
"similar* commodity. In the case of "pure monopoly", 
they are selling "different" commodities. It remains, 
then, to distinguish between them, as it does to 
distinguish the oligopolistic group from the non- 
oligopolistic. Both these ends are achieved, of course, 
once we determine a criterion of "oligopolistic 
interdependence" by which we may isolate the existence 
of oligopoly. This, however, Is our task in the next 
chapter, and it would take us much too far from the 
present theme to develop the matter at this juncture.
For the time being, then, we anticipate the appropriate 
criterion and assume that we have isolated the oligopoly 
case.
When oligopolistic interdependence is eliminated, 
the coefficient N enables us to trace the continuous 
transition from pure competition to "pure monopoly",
It becomes a measure of the g;roup force exerted by the 
collectivity of related firms upon any given firm. This
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group pressure upon the firm comes about as the 
result of the asymmetrical relation of the firm which 
only supplies a fraction of total output* It arises 
from the submersion of the actions of the one firm 
by the actions of the many* The degree of such 
pressure, measured by N, varies continuously as the 
asymmetry of the traditional group disappears, so that 
with duopoly, chain relationship, or "pure monopoly", 
when N is equal to unity, the firm in question is no 
longer considered to be a member of a group» Only
in the case of "pure monopoly”, however, is the fim^e 
price-output policy, in some sense, "independentn•
Since the terms "pure monopoly", "single seller" 
and "isolated seller" imply, or have acquired the 
implication of, a degree of isolation from the general 
economic matrix which, in fact, no fizm can enjoy in 
practice, and to emphasize the special sense of our 
definition, it is proposed to call a firm in this 
category an independent seller, a description the 
appropriateness of which it is hoped will become 
apparent later. An independent seller is defined, then, 
by an N which approaches unity, on the one hand, and 
the absence of any oligopolistic effect, to be
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determined la te r , on the other. Any departure of 
N from unity bringe into play some "group effect" 
which reaches a maximum in  the large-number 
homogeneous group which we call pure competition, when 
N w ill be equal to the arithmetic number of firms in 
competition with the firm under consideration.
4. The Reflex Kinked Demand Curve»
In th is section, i t  is  hoped to show that the 
description of the transition from pure competition 
to independent selling which we hare elaborated above 
constitutes some idling more than mere academic 
refinement. For, where N is  significantly large, 
a numbers factor appears which, i t  w ill be argued, 
must fundamentally affect the pricing behaviour of the 
firms concerned.
Let us momentarily assume, merely for purposes 
of algebraic simplification, that a l l  firms which are 
related have outputs of the same size. Then i t  is  
easy to see from our definitions of the two cross- 
e la s tic itie s , E . and e , thats
(a) the ordinary e lastic ity  of demand of firm i
* i ,e .  reflex to the origin. This description follows 
the usage of Emfroymson, "A Note on Kinked Demand 
Curves," «American Economic Beview. Toi* XXXIII. 
March, 1943.
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i n  r e s p e c t  o f  a  o u t  i n  p r i c e ,  d e n o te d  E ^ ,  i s  
e q u a l  to  Z .X ^ ,  w here  th e  sum i s  ta k e n  o v e r  
a l l  f i r m s  j  w h ic h  a re  r e l a t e d  to  i .  ^
(h )  th e  o r d in a r y  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand o f  f i r m  i  i n  
r e s p e c t  o f  a  r i s e  i n  p r i c e ,  d e n o te d  e ^ ,  i s  
e q u a l  to  Z e ^ .
Now th e  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  th e  demand (a v e ra g e  
re v e n u e )  c u rv e  f a c i n g  f i r m  i  be sm ooth may be 
e x p re s s e d  i n  te rm s  o f  th e  d e r i v a t i v e  fu n c t io n *  
A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  and  f o r  o u r  p u rp o s e s  m ore c o n v e n ie n t ly ,  
i t  may be e x p r e s s e d  i n  te rm s  o f  th e  d e r i v a t i v e  o f  th e  
t o t a l  re v e n u e  f u n c t i o n ,  i . e .  i n  te rm s  o f  th e  m a rg in a l  
re v e n u e  cu rv e*  T hus, th e  demand c u rv e  w i l l  be sm oo th ,
Eü  - 1i f  th e  r a t i o  — «-------  , a s  we a p p ro a c h  any  p o i n t  P fro mÄii11 e . . -  1
b e lo w , a p p ro a c h e s  th e  v a lu e  o f  th e  r a t i o  —^ -------  , a s
we a p p ro a c h  P fro m  a b o v e . T h is  c o n d i t i o n  w i l l  be 
s a t i s f i e d ,  th e n ,  i f  e i t h e r  ( i )  b o th  an d  e _  a r e  
v e ry  l a r g e ,  i . e .  a s  we a p p ro a c h  hom ogeneous
1 3 . C r o s s - e l a s t i c i t i e s  c a n , o f  c o u r s e ,  o n ly  be summed 
i n  t h i s  s im p le  f a s h i o n  i n  v i r t u e  o f  o u r
te m p o ra ry  a s s u m p tio n  t h a t  th e  q_
■3 *
W ith
a s y m m e tr ic a l  o u t p u t s ,  a  w e ig h te d  sum a f t e r  th e  
m anner o f  e q u a t io n  (1 )  o f  C h a p te r  I I  ( p .  )
i s  r e q u i r e d .
-o
competition; or (ii) — ► eü #
From the previous discussion it will readily be
seen that this latter condition will hold only if, for
a given small dp^, — ► e , or, in other words, if
N — 1. In short, a smooth demand curve will occur
only in the case of independent selling» By contrast,
in the general case of heterogeneous competition a
group relationship, a kinked demand curve as in
14Figure 3 ©me rge s♦
FIGURE 3
Out f>ut
14* Perhaps it is the nature of this curve which 
explains one of the large paradoxes of the 
monopolistic competition debate» On the one 
hand, Kaldor has told us that monopolistic and 
imperfect competition amount to the same thing, 
since there is no monopoly in either. On the 
other hand, it would seem, if I understand him 
correctly, that Andrews* complaint is that there 
is no .competition in either.
(75)
Clearly, this result derives from the 
asymmetrical relationship of the individual firm 
vis-a-vis the oollectivity which we oall the "group". 
It is, indeed, a generalization of the proposition 
that: if a firm in a large group cuts price, it will
attract marginal or sensitive customers from a large 
number of rival firms; if, on the other hand, the 
firm raises price, it will lose its own marginal 
customers only. That is to say, the downwards 
elasticity facing (say) firm i is a function of the 
reactions and preferences of the non-i customers, 
whereas the upwards elasticity is a function of the 
reactions of the i customers. Since the i customers 
are few compared with the non-i customers, there is 
no reason at all why we should expect these two 
distinct functions to define a smooth demand curve. 
Quite the contrary!
We may now abandon the assumption of 
symmetrical outputs and express our numbers or 
density coefficient in terms of own-elasticity of 
demand. If we let 2/  be the numbers coefficient so 
defined, then = E ^ / e ^ .  An(i> kenee > we may now 
re-define an independent seller as a seller faced with
(76)
a smooth demand curve such that z'— ► 1 and not subject
to oligopolistic pressure, which we rule out
according to the criteria to be developed in Chapter IY.
It may be noticed that this definition excludes the
"smooth* (horizontal) curve of the firm under pure 
15competition* For, under pure competition, although
both and e ^  may be made to approach oo , if we 
make 3p^ small enough, E ^  will always be large 
compared with e^; and the ratio ei:j_ still 
correctly describes the number of sellers involved* 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the 
conclusion of this section is not novel; for it is 
implied in Marshall* s notion of "marginal mobility*. 
Marshall, who was not unaware of the imperfections to 
be found in real markets, believed that, so long as 
there were a few sharp housewives, a few sensitive 
buyers attached to each of a large number of firms, a 
competitive result, at least upon the assumption of
15* One of the least satisfactory features of
Chamberlin*s more recent position, which we 
discussed in Chapter I, is his treatment of the 
pure competition case* Thus, "the individual 
seller in this latter instanoe (large numbers) is 
again correctly described as *isolated*, even in 
the special case of -pure competition. * 
Monopolistic Competition Hevisited, loc. cit., 
p* 362. My italics.
(77)
free entry and no collusion, would follow from the
competitive bidding for the custom of these sensitive
buyers. This would happen, Marshall believed, even if
the majority of customers were very immobile, i.e. if
l6the demand-elasticities upwards were small.
Also, after having been driven by certain
persistent logical contradictions in the theory of
monopolistic competition to the conclusions of this 
17section, ray attention has been drawn to more explicit
statements of the consequences of marginal mobility
18by a . J. Nichol and Alfred Nicols. These writers
have placed particular stress on the existence 
throughout most imperfect markets of unattached buyers 
for whose custom sellers may be expected to compete.
It is easy to verify that the presence in any significant 
number of suoh unattached buyers will result in a 
discontinuity in the demand curve facing the individual 
firm. If these buyers are literally "unattached** - in
16. I am originally indebted to Maurice Dobb for this
point. See Political Economy and Capitalism (1937), 
p. 196n.
17. First stated in my paper on **A Kinked Demand Curve
for Monopolistic Competition**, Economic Record,
May, 1953, 19-34.
18. Cf. A.J. Nichol: "The Influence of Marginal Buyers
on Monopolistic Competition**, Q.J.E., Nov. 1934, 
XLIX, 121—35; and Alfred Nicols: "The Rehabil­
itation of Pure Competition*1, Q.J.E., Nov. 1947, 
LXII, 31/63.
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th e  senge t h a t  an  i n f i n i t e s i m a l  p r i c e - c u t  w i l l  be
s u f f i c i e n t  to  move them  -  th e  demand c u rv e  w o u ld
in c lu d e  a  h o r i z o n t a l  segm en t im m e d ia te ly  below  th e
p r e v a i l i n g  p r i c e .  On t h i s  b a s i s ,  N ic h o l  and  l a t e r
N ic o ls  h ave  a t te m p te d  to  l e a d  a  m ovem ent to w a rd s
" th e  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  o f  p u re  c o m p e t i t i o n ’1. The
p r e s e n t  w r i t e r ,  h o w e v e r, p r e f e r s  to  s t a t e  th e
s i t u a t i o n  i n  th e  more g e n e r a l  fo rm  o f  a  k in k e d  demand
c u rv e ,  b e c a u se  th e  g e n e r a l  c a s e  d o e s  n o t  d ep en d  on
19b u y e rs  b e in g  l i t e r a l l y  u n a t t a c h e d .  F o r  e v e n  w h ere  
b u y e rs  a r e  w i l l i n g  to  p a y  a  f i n i t e  prem ium  f o r  th e  
e n jo y m e n t o f  one com m odity r a t h e r  th a n  a n o t h e r ,  th e s e  
b u y e rs  w i l l  become " m a rg in a l*  o r  " i n d i f f e r e n t *  w i th  
th e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  c e r t a i n  p r i c e  r a t i o s ,  i . e .  w hen 
th e  p r i c e - c u t  i s  j u s t  s u f f i c i e n t  to  w ip e  o u t  th e  
prem ium  in v o lv e d .  S in c e  i n  th e  r e a l  w o r ld  p r i c e  
c h a n g e s  m u st a lw a y s  be f i n i t e  and  s in c e  i t  i s  c l e a r l y  
more a p p r o p r i a t e  to  c o n s id e r  f i n i t e  c h a n g e s  w hen 
c o n c e rn e d  w i th  m o n o p o l i s t i c  c o m p e t i t io n ,  i t  seem s 
p r e f e r a b l e  to  d e s c r ib e  any  d i s c o n t i n u i t y  i n  th e  demand
19* N ic o ls  a p p ro a c h e s  th e  more g e n e r a l  p o s i t i o n  i n  h i s  
l a t e r  p a p e r :  "The D ev elo p m en t o f  M o n o p o l is t ic  
C o m p e t i t io n  and th e  M onopoly P ro b le m " , R eview  o f  
E co n o m ics and  S t a t i s t i c s ,  May, 1 9 4 9 , XXXI, 1 1 8 -2 3 . 
Some d i s c u s s i o n  o f  N i c o l s ’ p o s i t i o n  i s  c o n ta in e d  
i n  A p p en d ix  A to  t h i s  c h a p t e r .
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curve in terms of the effect of a series of small 
finite price changes in both directions. Further 
insight into the nature of the situation, so described, 
may be obtained by returning to the fundamental question 
raised by monopolistic competition theory: What is a
commodity?
5- What Is a Commodity?
Once it is agreed that, in the case of homogeneous 
competition, the ratio E .^/e^ . is equal to the arithmetic 
number of sellers in competition with firm i, and that, 
in the case of independent selling, E ^ / e ^  is equal 
to unity, it becomes clear that, in the continuum of 
reality, the ratio may take any of a continuous series 
of values between these limits. The idea that, with 
the slightest differentiation of products, the ratio 
Jumps suddenly to unity - a fundamental assumption of 
monopolistic competition theory - is repugnant to 
commonsense. Rather, it may be expected, the ratio 
will be the greater, the nearer the approach to pure 
competition; it will be the less, the closer the 
approach to independent selling.
(80)
We must now explore the nature of the "middle 
ground* between our two limits in more detail. 
Preliminary to this end, let us first look more 
closely at our limiting cases»
In some sense, homogeneous competition occurs 
between firms selling the same commodity; independent 
selling occurs when a firm is selling a commodity 
different from any other commodity. The final 
judgment as to whether or not commodities are the same 
or different rests, of course, with the consumer.
Let us, therefore, look at our two limiting cases in 
terms of the theory of consumer preferences as 
developed by the neo—Lausanne school led by Hicks 
and H*L.G. Allen, This analysis distinguishes three 
types of relationship existing between any two 
products X and Y» The indifference curves 
representing these three cases are set out in Figure 4*
(81)
Curve oo* represents the case where 
substitutability between the commodities is zero. 
Consumption is independent of the relative prices 
of the two commodities concerned. This type of 
relationship will, of course, exist between a good 
many pairs of commodities in the real world.
However, it cannot obtain between any one commodity, 
say X, and all other commodities. Otherwise, the 
seller of X would be a *pure monopolistn a la Triff in 
whose demand-curve would be of unit elasticity, 
with profit-maximization achieved with an 
infinitesimal output. From the point of view of 
the firm, then, this relationship is irrelevant.
Firm Y may just as well belong to the economy of 
Mars as far as firm X is concerned. We shall 
therefore oonfine our attention to the situations 
described by aa' and bb*.
Curve aa! represents the case where commodities 
are identical (in the eyes of the consumer). It is 
a straight line - elasticity of substitution equal 
to oo - with a slope of 45°. Substitution in this 
case may be described as integral and instantaneous.
( 8 2 )
In  o th e r  w ord s, th e  s l i g h t e s t  d e v ia t io n  o f  the p r i c e ­
l i n e  from  a s lo p e  o f  45° w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  the c o n c e n tr a t io n  
o f  t o t a l  consum er e x p e n d itu r e  a t  one end o f  the curve  
o r  th e  o th e r ,  a c c o r d in g  a s  w hich  p r ic e  i s  th e  low er*
Curve bb* r e p r e s e n t s  th e  c a se  where s u b s t i t u t io n  
betw een  com m od ities i s  m arg in a l o r  continuous*. A 
change in  th e  r a t io  o f  p r i c e s  i n  t h i s  c a se  r e s u l t s  i n  
an in crem en t i n  th e  consum ption  o f  the commodity whose 
p r ic e  h a s f a l l e n  ( r e l a t i v e l y )  and a decrem ent i n  the  
con su m ption  o f  th e  commodity whose p r ic e  h as r i s e n .
The im p o rta n t th in g  to  n o t ic e  i s  th a t  b o th  com m od ities  
are consumed s im u lta n e o u s iy « T h is im p l ie s  th a t  the
two com m od ities have d i f f e r e n t  u s e - v a lu e s ,  so t h a t ,  in  
some s e n s e , th e y  are d i f f e r e n t  com m od ities.
Of c o u r s e , th e  in d i f f e r e n c e  curve a n a ly s is  was 
born i n  the p e r io d  o f  the g e n e r a l assu m p tion  o f  p e r f e c t  
c o m p e t it io n . H ic k s  and A lle n  and t h e i r  f o l lo w e r s  have  
c o n tin u e d  i n  t h i s  t r a d i t io n  and have r e fu s e d  to  adopt 
th e  C ham berlin-H obinson  in t r o d u c t io n  o f  g e n e r a l  
m o n o p o lis t ic  a ssu m p tio n s . And the cru x  o f  the p e r f e c t  
c o m p e t it io n  m odel i s  th a t  com m od ities are e i t h e r  the  
same o r  d i f f e r e n t .  Curve aa* r e p r e s e n t s  th e  c a se  where 
th e y  are the same; curve bb' th e  c a se  where th e y  are
(83)
different. These two categories were exhaustive in 
traditional theory, general equilibrium and particular 
equilibrium theory alike.
It may be objected that such different* 
commodities are only relatively different, since the 
rate of substitution between pairs of goods may be 
expected to differ from one pair to another. But in 
this respect the distinction is no different from 
that made, without question, in many other branches of 
theory. For example, the rate of substitution between 
"different* factors of production will not generally 
be the same. It is hardly likely that capital will 
substitute with labour at the same rate as with land, 
and so on. The logical basis for describing them 
as different factors lies in the fact that, in varying 
proportions, they are used simultaneously or, if you 
like, in combination.
We may now verify the proposition, made in 
20Section 3 above, that where any firm i is related to
other firms only in the manner of bbr, i.e. where
substitution of i's product is continuous (or zero)
in every direction, the ratio N = E ^ / e ^  will be equal 
. 21to unity. In Chapter II, we saw that, ignoring
• *20. p 21. p. 32n
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income effects, cross-elasticity of demand in respect 
of the individual consumer, E^, is given by = k o^* , 
where k^ is the fraction of expenditure spent on i and 
o- is the elasticity of substitution between i and 
Then cross-elasticity for the firm is given by the 
weighted sum of these individual cross-elasticities.
Thus -
Eji = Z. ki.n°"n ^
where q. . is the outlay on J of the n"*'*1 customerj ♦U
and Qj is total consumer outlay on product j, i.e*
Q. — 2.q. . Sinoe with an indifference curve ofj J. n
the type bb’ the elasticity of substitution will be 
approximately the same for movement in either direction 
from any point P, it follows that cross-elasticity 
of demand, given by (1), will also be approximately 
the same in respect of movement in either direction. 
Hence, in the limit, will approach e^.
Let us now turn to consider differentiated or, 
in some sense, similar products. The products X and Y
are differentiated when consumers are prepared to pay
(8 5 )
so m e th in g  e x t r a  f o r  th e  p ro d u c t  X i n  p re fe re n c e  to  th e  
p ro d u c t  Y, o r  v ic e  v e rs a .  I n  s h o r t ,  i n  th e  p u re  ca se , 
when a l l  o f  a s e r ie s  o f  s im i l a r  p ro d u c ts  are  
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  i n  th e  m in d s  o f  consum ers , p re fe re n c e s  
a re  o rd e re d  o r  ra n k e d , so t h a t  a c e r t a in  p re fe re n c e  
r a t i o  e x is t s  be tw een  any tw o o f  th e  p r o d u c ts .  T hus, 
a consum er may have th e  f o l lo w in g  s c a le  o f  p re fe re n c e s ?
p r o d u c t  A  100
B 96
C 90
D 88
B 86
F 81
G 80
The p re fe re n c e  r a t i o  be tw een  A and C i s  th e n  1 0 s9*
I n  o th e r  w o rd s , i f  th e  p r ic e  o f  a  i s  1 0 /— and th e  p r ic e  
o f  G i s  1 0 / - ,  t h i s  consum er w i l l  buy A * I f  th e  p r ic e  
o f  C i s  c u t  to  9 /6 ,  th e  consum er w i l l  s t i l l  buy A .
I f  th e  p r ic e  f a l l s  to  9 / - ,  th e  consum er w i l l  be on 
th e  m a rg in  o f  in d i f f e r e n c e  be tw een  A and C, Once 
th e  p r ic e  o f  C f a l l s  be low  9 / - ,  th e  p r ic e  o f  A 
re m a in in g  a t  1 0 /—, t h i s  consum er w o u ld  s w itc h  h i s  
t o t a l  e x p e n d itu r e ,  a b s t r a c t in g  fro m  incom e e f f e c t s ,  to  
p r o d u c t  C. I n  te rm s  o f  in d i f f e r e n c e  c u rv e s , t h i s  case
( 8 6 )
w o u ld  be re p re s e n te d  as  i n  F ig u re  5* The c u rv e  
w o u ld  be a s t r a ig h t  l i n e  a lo n g  th e  l i n e  o f  
i n d i f f e r e n c e , i . e .  w i t h  a s lo p e  o f  1 0 /9 *
F ig u re  5
P ro d u c t C
H e re , we may d e s c r ib e  th e  s i t u a t i o n  as one in v o lv in g  
f i n i t e l y —la g g e d  i n t e g r a l  s u b s t i t u t i o n ,  as  d i s t i n c t  
fro m  th e  in s ta n ta n e o u s  in t e g r a l  s u b s t i t u t io n  o f  
hom ogeneous c o m p e t i t io n .  I t  i s  i n  th e se  te rm s , th e n , 
t h a t  we d e s c r ib e  th e  "m id d le  g ro u n d "  o f  h e te ro g e n e o u s  
o r  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  c o m p e t i t io n  i n  w h ic h  th e  p ro d u c ts  
a re  n e i t h e r  th e  same n o r  d i f f e r e n t .
We have now p ro p o s e d  an  an sw e r to  th e  b a s ic  
q u e s t io n s  W hat i s  a com m odity?  C om m od itie s  a re
(8 7 )
th e  same when th e y  a re  r e la t e d  i n  th e  m anner o f  a a ' 
(hom ogeneous c o m p e t i t io n ) ;  th e y  a re  s im i la r  when 
r e la t e d  a s  i n  d d f (h e te ro g e n e o u s  c o m p e t i t io n ) ;  th e y  
a re  d i f f e r e n t  when r e la te d  as i n  b b f ( in d e p e n d e n t 
s e l l i n g ) .  A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  we may d e s c r ib e  th e  
c a te g o r ie s  as f o l l o w s : —
(1 )  Homogeneous c o m p e t i t io n  -  when s u b s t i t u t io n  i s
i n t e g r a l  and in s ta n ta n e o u s .
(2 )  H e te ro g e n e o u s  c o m p e t i t io n  -  w hen s u b s t i t u t io n  i s
i n t e g r a l  b u t  f i n i t e l y - l a g g e d .
(3 )  In d e p e n d e n t s e l l i n g  -  w hen s u b s t i t u t i o n  i s
c o n t in u o u s  ( o r  z e ro )  i n  e v e ry  d i r e c t io n .
These a r e ,  o f  c o u rs e , " p u r e " c a te g o r ie s ;  i n  th e
r e a l  w o r ld  th e y  w i l l  b le n d  i n t o  each o th e r .  Thus,
be tw een  (1 )  and  (2 )  we w i l l  g e t  h y b r id  cäse s  w here  f o r
some consum ers c o m m o d it ie s  a re  p e r f e c t  s u b s t i t u t e s  (a s
i n  a a ’ )» w h i le  f o r  o th e r s  th e y  w i l l  be im p e r fe c t
s u b s t i t u t e s  (a s  i n  d d f ) *  Homogeneous c o m p e t i t io n  i n
*
w h ic h  a l l  r e la t e d  p ro d u c ts  a re  p e r f e c t  s u b s t i t u te s  f o r  
a l l  consum ers i s  c l e a r l y  a l i m i t i n g  ca se * L ik e w is e ,  
we may e x p e c t to  g e t  h y b r id  ty p e s  be tw een  h e te ro g e n e o u s  
c o m p e t i t io n  and in d e p e n d e n t s e l l i n g .  I t  i s  n o t  h a rd
( 88)
to  im a g in e  s i t u a t i o n s  i n  w h ic h , u n d e r  th e  im p e tu s  o f  
c h a n g in g  p r i c e  r a t i o s ,  some co n su m ers  w i l l  s u b s t i t u t e  
i n t e g r a l l y  b e tw ee n  p r o d u c t s  such  a s  t e a  an d  c o f f e e ,  
b u t t e r  and  m a r g a r in e ,  S c o tc h  and  A u s t r a l i a n  w h is k y , 
w h e re a s  o t h e r  c o n su m ers  w ould  r e a c t  by b u y in g  a  l i t t l e  
l e s s  o f  th e  one and  a  l i t t l e  more o f  th e  o t h e r ,  i . e .  
s u b s t i t u t e  m a r g in a l ly .  T hus, p u re  in d e p e n d e n t  s e l l i n g  
a l s o  a p p e a r s  a s  a  l i m i t i n g  c a s e .  H ow ever, u n l ik e  th e  
l i m i t i n g  c a s e  o f  "pu re  m o n o p o ly ” a s  p o s t u l a t e d  by  
C h a m b e rlin  o r  T r i f f i n ,  o u r  lo w e r  l i m i t i n g  c a se  -  
in d e p e n d e n t  s e l l i n g  -  i s  c o n c e iv a b le  a s  an  a c t u a l  
m a rk e t s i t u a t i o n . N ot o n ly  i s  i t  c o n c e iv a b le ,  i t  i s  
l i k e l y .
We h ave  shown t h a t  f o r  sy m m e tr ic a l  hom ogeneous
c o m p e t i t io n  o u r  num bers c o e f f i c i e n t ,  7/ , w i l l  be e q u a l
to  th e  a r i t h m e t i c  num ber o f  f i r m s  i n  c o m p e t i t io n  w i th
th e  f i r m  u n d e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  We h ave  a ls o  shown t h a t
f o r  in d e p e n d e n t  s e l l i n g  £ /  w i l l  be e q u a l  to  u n i t y .  I t
re m a in s  to  show , i n  th e  c a s e  o f  h e te ro g e n e o u s  o r
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  c o m p e t i t io n  w here  a  g ro u p  o f  f i r m s  i s
in v o lv e d ,  t h a t  1 <  y  n ,  w here  n  i s  th e  a r i t h m e t i c
num ber o f  f i r m s  r e l a t e d  to  th e  f i r m  b e in g  c o n s id e r e d ,  
n e a r e r
I t  w i l l  b e / u n i t y ,  th e  n e a r e r  th e  a p p ro a c h  to  in d e p e n d e n t  
s e l l i n g ;  i t  w i l l  be c l o s e r  to  n ,  th e  c l o s e r  th e  
a p p ro a c h  to  hom ogeneous c o m p e t i t io n .
(89)
Consider the pure case of heterogeneous competition, 
as defined by dd*, associated with large numbers.
From the disoussion above, it will be seen that two 
fundamental characteristics distinguish it from the 
case of pure independent sellings-
(1) Consumption of "similar* commodities is mutually
exclusive. This involves the division of 
consumers into two distinct categories: those
buying from any firm i, on the one hand, and 
those buying from the large number of producers 
of similar products on the other. By definition, 
the number of i customers will be small 
compared with the non-i. In other words, 
firm i may potentially attract many more 
customers than it can lose. Usually, the "law 
of large numbers" is invoked to justify the 
ordinary economio assumptions of continuity; 
but no matter how many individual consumers may 
be assumed to be purchasing the particular 
range of "similar" products in question, this 
cannot affect the basic asymmetry resident in 
the "large group" case.
(2) Under the stimulus of finite price changes,
consumers become "indifferent" between "simi1ar"
(90)
commodities. As the price-line passes
through the line of indifference, the consumer 
concerned is involved in integral substitution 
in the one direction or the other.
These two factors, taken together, make it 
inevitable that the demand-curve for a firm related 
in this way to a group of other firms be discontinuous. 
The situation is asymmetrical and discrete; and we 
cannot apply to it the logic of the symmetrieally 
continuous. for the demand-curve to be smooth under 
such circumstances, customers would have to leave i, 
in the face of a rise in i's price, at n times the 
rate at which customers would leave j, if i cut price, 
where n is the ratio of non-i to i customers or, if 
the sales of each firm are the same, where n is the 
number of firms. Such a situation cannot be 
envisaged in terms of any realistic assumptions we
22can make about the nature of consumers1 preferences.
Alternatively, the condition for a continuous 
demand function for the individual firm i in this 
context may be stated as follows: the curve will be
smooth only if any firm i will attract the same number
22. See Appendix MA M to this chapter.
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of customers from another related firm z (i.e. related 
in the manner of ddf), whether firm i cuts price alone, 
on the one hand, or multi late rally with firms j , k, ... y
on the other. The unreality of such a condition is
immediately obvious.
Consider the situation in which firm i, which is 
related to films j, k, ... z, unilaterally cuts price 
by, say, 10 per cent, so that all other prices are 
unchanged. Let us consider the effect of such a price-
cut on the movement of customers from z to i. Those
customers who will be induced to move may be divided 
into three exclusive categories:
(1) Those for whom product i is a unique second
preference and for whom the operative price-cut 
is sufficient to. invoke their second preference 
but no others. In other words, they would not 
be induced to move by an equivalent price-cut 
by any of the other firms j, k, ... y.
(2) Those for whom product i is an equal second
preference with one or more other product j, k ... 
y and who would move indifferently to such 
equal second preferences in the face of a 
10 per cent price-cut.
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, (3) Those for whom the given price-out is
sufficient to invoke lower preferences than
ththe second, say the r , and for whom 
product i is ranked as the r ^  preference 
or higher.
Now it is clear that only in case (1) will the[
movement of customers from z to i he independent of 
whether other firms j, k, ... y cut price 
simultaneously with i, and it is equally clear that 
this case can hardly be the general one for all 
customers. In cases (2) and (3), firm i must share 
some of the customers it could attract from z by 
unilateral price-cutting with firms j , k, ... y, if 
those firms also cut price by an equivalent amount.
Let us call the customers in category (1) f,i-specificw 
customers. (They are specific in the sense that, 
for the given price-cut, they will move to i and i 
alone.) Let us also suppose that the proportion of 
such customers is k, so that the percentage in 
categories (2) and (3) is 1-k.
How consider the situation when firms i and $ 
cut price together. The movement of customers from 
z to i cannot now be described by the cross-elasticity 
since this has been defined on the assumption that
all prices other than i's are held constant. A new
cross-elasticity, E^, must be defined to describe
the situation now being considered* will differ
from E . on account of the behaviour of customers in zi
categories (2) and (3)* All these customers will 
not go to i, if J also cuts price. If we assume that 
consumers’ preferences are randomized, i.e. if we 
assume that any order of consumers’ preferences is 
equally likely, then —
(a) For those customers in category (2) who are
indifferent, as second preferences, between 
i and j, it will be equally likely that they 
will move to j as to i, so that each firm 
may expect to get one-half of such customers.
(b) In respect of those customers in category (3),
it will be equally likely that customers 
rank j higher than i as it is that they rank 
i higher than j, so that again both firms 
may expect to get one-half of such customers. 
Since there will be no effect upon the movement of 
i—specific customers, it is easy to see that when 
i and j cut price together that —
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S im ila r ly ,  i f  f ir m s  i ,  j ,  and k c u t p r ic e  to g e th e r  —
kE . + i ~ E  . , z i  3 z i  ’
w h ile  i f  a l l  the n f ir m s  r e la t e d  to  z cu t p r ic e  
e q u iv a le n t ly  and s im u lta n e o u s ly  —
En . = kE . + ^ ^ E  .z i  z i  n z i
( n - l ) k  + 1 v
Now the c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t y  E  ^ r e p r e s e n t s  the movement 
o f  cu sto m ers from  z to  i , when a l l  r e la t e d  f ir m s  c u t  
p r ic e  to g e t h e r .  I t  i s  e q u iv a le n t ,  th e r e fo r e ,  to  the  
c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t y  d e f in e d  by a u n i la t e r a l  r i s e  i n  the  
p r ic e  o f  z ,  i . e .  to e i z . Then, on the s im p lify in g  
symmetry a ssu m p tion  th a t  E ^  = E^z or  e^. = a^ , we may 
now e x p r e s s  the numbers c o e f f i c i e n t  d ev e lo p ed  e a r l i e r  
i n  t h i s  c h a p te r  in  th e  form  —
z i
n
z i
( n - l j k  + 1 *
For hom ogeneous c o m p e t it io n , k i s  eq u a l to  0 and, 
t h e r e f o r e ,  N = n; th a t  i s  to  sa y , our numbers 
c o e f f i c i e n t  ta k e s  the a r i t h m e t ic a l  v a lu e  o f  the number 
o f  f ir m s  r e la t e d  to  the f ir m  under c o n s id e r a t io n , a 
r e s u l t  w h ich  we e s t a b l i s h e d  e a r l i e r . On the o th e r  hand,
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i f  k  a p p ro a c h e s  u n i t y ,  N ^ w i l l  a l s o  a p p ro a c h  u n i t y  
and  th e  d em an d -cu rv e  w ou ld  be sm ooth . As h a s  b e en  
p o in te d  o u t ,  th e  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  k — » 1  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  
v i r t u a l l y  a l l  c u s to m e rs  f a l l  i n t o  c a te g o r y  ( 1 ) ,  a  
s i t u a t i o n  w h ic h  i s  in c o n c e iv a b le  w here  c u s to m e rs ' 
p r e f e r e n c e s  a r e  o f  th e  fo rm  o f  d d ' .  T h is  f a c t  w i l l  
be f u r t h e r  d e m o n s tr a te d  i n  A ppend ix  "A" w h ich  f o l lo w s .  
F o r  th e  r e s t ,  so lo n g  a s  t h e r e  a r e ,  f o r  any  g iv e n  
p r i c e - c u t ,  c u s to m e rs  f a l l i n g  i n  th e  c a t e g o r i e s  (2 ) and 
( 3 ) ,  th e  downward e l a s t i c i t y  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  such  a  p r i c e -  
c u t  w i l l  be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  from  th e  upw ard 
e l a s t i c i t y  d e f in e d  by a  p r i c e - c u t  o f  e q u iv a l e n t  o r d e r .
I t  may be o b je c te d  t h a t  n o -o n e  e v e r  b e l i e v e d  t h a t
th e  two e l a s t i c i t i e s  w ou ld  be e q u a l .  H ow ever, I  t h in k
i t  w i l l  be a c c e p te d  t h a t  th e  g e n e r a l  p re s u m p tio n  h a s
b e e n  t h a t ,  w i t h i n  r e l a t i v e l y  sm a ll  r a n g e s  o f  p r i c e -
c h a n g e , th e  one w ou ld  a p p ro x im a te  th e  o t h e r .
C e r t a i n l y ,  th e  i d e a  t h a t  downward e l a s t i c i t y  may be
2 , 3 , o r  e v e n  n  t im e s  g r e a t e r  th a n  upw ard  e l a s t i c i t y
h a s  n o t  b e en  g e n e r a l l y  e n v is a g e d ,  and  t h i s  h a s  l e d
th e  th e o r y  o f  m o n o p o l i s t i c  c o m p e t i t io n  i n t o  a  num ber
o f  l o g i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w h ich  we have  n o t i c e d  i n  t h i s
and p r e v io u s  c h a p t e r s .  The s i g n i f i c a n c e  and 
of
im p o r ta n c e ^ f a c in g  t h i s  i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  m o n o p o l i s t ic  
c o m p e t i t io n  a s s u m p tio n s  w i l l  be f u r t h e r  ta k e n  up i n
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Chapter V. At the moment, we most pause to consider 
two fundamental matters involved in the argument of 
this chapter now that the broad outlines of that 
argument have been stated*
6* Our Concept of Density Reconsidered
Two matters require further consideration*
First, the discontinuous demand curve postulated above 
must appear as somewhat disembodied, as floating in 
mid-air as it were, until we attempt to fix an origin 
from which our elasticities and cross-elasticities 
are measured in the one direction or the other*
Second, some consideration must be given to the size 
of the price-changes which we use to define our 
elasticities and, hence, our numbers coefficient*
In the cases of literally homogeneous competition 
and of independent selling there is no difficulty in 
this connection* Since, in the former case, an 
infinitesimal price-change is sufficient to produce 
the total effect and, in the latter case, substitution 
is continuous, we may think, as has been traditional, 
in terms of infinitesimal price-changes* Also, we 
may take, as is also usual, the given maricet prices 
as the origin from which our elasticities »nd cross­
elasticities are calculated*
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However, this will clearly not do in the case 
of heterogeneous competition,, where producta 
substitute as in dd*. For example, an infinitesimal 
price-change may, in these circumstances, produce 
a cross-elasticity of zero, although a finite change 
in price results in a cross-elasticity which is 
significantly greater than zero* Perhaps the best 
way to approach the issues involved is by analogy.
Imagine any one firm of a large group to 
experiment with its price, beginning at a figure 
very much higher than that at which rival products 
are selling. Small reductions in price at this 
level are likely to provide negligible increases in 
sales. Demand at this level is inelastic*
However, as further reductions in price are made 
so that the firm’s price begins to approach the 
general level of prices for similar commodities, 
the firm will approach a region of greater competitive 
"density”* As it moves its price through this 
region of competitive density, the elasticity of 
demand will Increase sharply* The demand curve will 
be refracted, as It were. As price falls well below 
the general level of prices of related products, it 
again enters a region of lower competitive density,
where only customers of the highest immobility may be
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affected by further reductions in price* In this 
region, the demand curve once again becomes inelastic•
Thus, the kinked demand curve postulated in this
]chapter may be looked upon as a refraction of the 
demand curve as price moves through an area of 
greater competitive density* Clearly, the location 
of this region will depend upon the pattern of prices 
of similar products* The manner of this refraction 
of the demand curve may be shown graphically as in 
Figure 5A.
After all, it is the existence of just this 
region of higher competitive density which distinguishes 
the "large group" of monopolistic competition from 
"pure monopoly"* As previously quoted, Kaldor has
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drawn the basic distinction between the two market
situations in just these terms: *in the case of
polypaly there is (and in the case of monopoly there
is not) a group of firms whose prices jointly exert
23a large influence on the firm’s sales.w
In practice, of course, this region in which 
prices of similar commodities exert an overwhelming 
influence on the elasticity of demand need not 
necessarily be sharply bounded. By and large, 
however* the greater the density of surrounding 
products, i.e. the greater the number of competitive 
products and the closer they are to the particular 
firm, the sharper will be the refractory effect.
In the limit, with pure competition, the refraction 
of the demand curve will take place within the bounds 
of a single line, the line of market price. Above 
that line, the firms loses the whole of its own 
sales; below it, the firm theoretically gains the 
whole world, i.e. total market output. As competition 
becomes less and less dense, the refractory effect 
will become less and less marked* In the uniformly 
thin competitive field of the independent seller, 
it will disappear.
23. N. Kaldors Review of Triffin’s Monopolistic
Competition and General Equilibrium Theory.
Economics* Nov* 1942, p. 410.
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Having thus pictured the '•large groupw demand 
curve in terms of the refraction analogy, we are now 
able to consider the two ambiguities of our analysis 
mentioned earlier, viz* an origin from which to 
measure the elasticities involved in our conception 
of numbers - if you like, the centre of gravity for 
our coefficient of density - and the size of the 
price-changes for which they are defined.
In the case of pure competition, the first
point is easily taken. Clearly, the origin will be
taken at the going market price which will be the same
for all firms. A similar procedure would be in order
where imperfect competitors are selling at a uniform
price. But how should we deal with the situation
in which imperfect substitutes are selling at
different prices? The taking of some sort of
weighted average of such prices suggests itself as
a solution. (Incidentally, Kalecki has based his
new value analysis upon this notion of a weighted
24average price for the "industry11. ) However, such 
a procedure does involve identification of those 
products whose prices are to enter into the average, 
since the average of all other prices would be
24* See Chapter I of Theory of Economic Dynamics.
London, 1954.
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meaningless In this connection. The solution 
suggested here is that we should take as origin the 
weighted average price of all * similar* products, 
i.e. products which consumers predominantly substitute 
integrally, as in dd*. In the case of independent 
selling in which substitution is continuous, there 
is no reason to depart from traditional practice of 
taking the firm*s own price, wherever it may be, 
and calculate elasticities in terms of infinitesimal 
price movements.
Again, in the case of heterogeneous competition 
with its discrete system of consumer preferences, 
the notion of point elasticity of demand — of 
infinitesimal price movements — is also inappropriate. 
What we need is an arc elasticity related to the 
finite nature of the system. With integral 
substitution we will have discrete systems of 
ordered preferences - see Appendix *AW below — and, 
in some sense, the size of the price-changes required 
to bring out the nature of a given situation 
should be related to the size of the price-changes 
required to bring the pattern of consumers1 preferences 
into play, i.e, should be related to the Intervals 
between successive preferences. Since these 
Intervals will vary from consumer to consumer, again
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an average suggests itself. However, not only 
will the height of preference schedules vary from 
oonsumer to consumer, but the intervals between 
successive preferences of the same consumer will, 
in general, be different. In other words, the 
slope of dd* will not be the same as between 
successive pairs of products. As the preferences 
of individuals will tend to be bunched with respect 
to some commodities and dispersed with respect to 
others according to the individuals situation and 
tastes, the modal ddr would probably serve our 
purpose best. Then* for the individual consumer, 
we take as the required price—change that price-change 
necessary move the price-line from a slope of 45° 
(representing the origin of equal average price 
far each commodity) to the modal dd*. For the 
determination of arc elasticities in respect of the 
fim, we then take the weighted average of the 
price-changes so determined for individual consumers.
To sum up; to unambiguously define our numbers 
coefficient for heterogeneous competition* we 
calculate arc elasticities of demand for the 
individual firm in either direction from the weighted 
average price of all "similar11 commodities and in
(103)
respect of finite price movements representing the 
weighted average of consumers1 modal rates of 
substitution as given by the slopes of the indifference 
curves dd1*
(104)
APPENDIX **AW
to
Chapter III.
DI.SCHETB CONSUMER P HEBE HENCE 5 AND THE SHAPE 
OP M E  DEMAND CURVE
As we noticed in Chapter I, little attempt has been 
made to integrate the theory of monopolistic competition 
with the theory of consumers* behaviour. Moreover, we 
have seen that there is very good reason for this. The 
traditional theory of consumers* behaviour has been 
developed in terms of maps of consumer preferences in 
which substitution between products is assumed to be 
continuous, Of course, it has always been recognized 
that in individual cases there may be discontinuities 
in the substitution process, but this has usually been 
held to disappear in the aggregate. Thus Hicks tells us:
"This convenient assumption of continuity does, of 
course, always falsify the situation a little (or 
sometimes more than a little) as far as the individual 
consumer is concerned. But if our study of the 
individual consumer is only a step towards the study 
of a group of consumers on the market, these 
falsifications can be trusted to disappear when the 
individual demands are aggregated.** (l)
1. J.R. Hicks, Value and Capital, p. lln.
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By and large, the monopolistic competition 
theorists, while aware of the discrete nature of 
consumers* preferences between imperfect substitutes, 
have tended, implicitly, to rest their analysis upon 
a similar notion. While individual substitution may 
be integral and jumpy, this discontinuity could be 
expected to disappear in the aggregate, rather as 
a discrete statistical distribution may be approximated 
by a continuous distribution when the population is 
large.
In fact, the analogy does not hold because, where 
substitution is integral and hence the consumption of 
products is mutually-exclusive, we have, from the point 
of view of any firm i, two distinct populations — the 
i-customers and the non-i. If we have a large-number- 
of—firms group, then the non—i population will be very 
much greater than the i population* In these 
circumstances, no increase in the number of customers 
in the market or in the fineness of adjustment of their 
preferences can alter this basic asymmetry* By 
contrast, consumers buying different commodities (as 
in bb*) will, of course, figure in both populations at 
the same time.
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The widespread existence of consumer substitution 
according to a discrete scale of preferences raises 
many problems for the theory of consumer behaviour, 
if that theory is to be general. Here, however, we 
are only interested in the more limited question of 
the relationship between discrete systems of 
preferences and the demand curve for the individual 
product*
Perhaps the best way to bring out the implications 
of discrete scales of consumer preferences is to 
oonsider the conditions which are required if such 
a system of preferences is to generate a symmetrical 
demand function for the individual firm. Alfred 
Nicols has stated the conditions for a smooth falling 
demand ourve, such as is assumed by the theory of 
monopolistic competition, as follows:~
f,As long as all the customers of each seller act 
by elaborate preference scales, with each scale 
roughly the same height, a seller might find this 
to be true. But once it is admitted (1) that not 
all the customers of each seller need be attached, 
and (2) that even where they are attached, the 
various premiums they are willing to offer for 
their favoured products, rather than go without 
them, differ, the demand curve for the individual 
seller becomes far more complicated than the ^
existing theory of monopolistic competition holds.11
2. A. Nicols, loc. cit., p. 119
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We may illustrate these conditions as follows. 
Suppose there are 5 products A, B, C, D and E within a 
group sufficiently well-defined that we may neglect 
substitution with extra-group products, at least for 
modest price-changes. There are 120 customers in the 
market at the going price which, for convenience, we may 
assume to be the same for all 5 products. Each customer
purchases an equal amount — say one unit of product per 
period. Then, if customers1 preference schedules are 
given at random, i.e. if we assume that each order of 
preferences is equally likely, there will be 51 ways in 
which preferences may be ordered. These are set out 
in Table 1 below. Since we have assumed there to be 120 
customers and that each combination of preferences is 
equally likely, each possible combination will be 
represented by one customer. It is clear that there 
will be 24 customers attached to each of the firms 
A, B, G, D and E.
Further suppose that all customers are of equal 
sensitivity or, if you like, that all preferences are 
equally spaced such that every customer will move to a 
lower preference if, but only if, there is, say, a 5 cent 
difference in price* The going price, taken as origin, 
is assumed to be jgl.
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We are now prepared to investigate the distribution 
of customers under the stimulus of price-changes.
Suppose that firm A cuts its price by 5 cents or 5 per 
cent. Then, this price-cut will attract all customers 
of B, C, D and E for whom A is a second preference, 
since we have assumed that a price differential of 
5 cents is sufficient to invoke second preferences.
From Table 1 it is clear that A will gain 6 customers 
(or units of sale) from each of the firms B, C, D and E - 
24 in all. Elasticity for the price-cut is therefore 
100^/5^ = 20. If A raises price by 5 cents, it will 
lose all its 24 customers, 6 to each firm. Hence, 
elasticity of demand for the price-rise will also be 
equal to 20. Thus, we find an apparent symmetry 
between upward and downward elasticity of demand for firm A.
The unreality of the case, however, is immediately 
apparent. For any price-rise less than 5 cents, A loses 
no sales at all. For a price-rise of 5 cents, it loses 
100 per cent of its sales. Clearly, the unreality 
stems from the assumption that consumers* preferences 
are evenly spaced. We must now drop this assumption.
We now consider a market in which 1,200 customers are 
operating. Again, preferences are given at random, 
there being no good reason why one sequence of preferences
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should be more popular than another* However, we now 
assume that there Is a difference in the degree of 
consumers' sensitivity, so that, talcing a rectangular 
distribution, we assume that 120 customers will move 
to the next lowest preference under the stimulus of a
1 cent price differentialr 120 under the stimulus of
2 cents, ♦ ** and 120 under the stimulus of 10 cents*
We can then imagine 10 schedules similar to Table 1, 
with Schedule X having preferences spaced by 1 cent, 
Schedule 2 spaced by 2 cents, **• Schedule 10 spaced 
by 10 cents.
It is clear that, with all products originally 
priced at £1, there will be 240 customers attached to 
each of the 5 firms A, B, C, D and £• Then, as firm 
A reduces price the movement of customers will be as 
set out in Table 2. Firm A 1 s elasticity of demand will 
be as follows:
Price
Differential
Elasticity
Upwards
Elasticity
Downwards
2 cents 10 15
10 20
6 » 10 20
8 • 10 20
10 * 10 21
Thus, for small finite price-changes, A's downward
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elasticity of demand is approximately double its 
upward elasticity• Different shapes of this
curve may be obtained by making different assumptions 
about the distribution of customers of varying degrees 
of sensitivity* In particular9 the asymmetry increases
as we increase the number of firms and their closeness 
together. On any reasonable assumption about the 
distribution of customers' preferences between the 
various alternatives, the demand curve derived does 
not look very much like that traditionally assumed.
Let us briefly consider the reason for the asymmetry 
which appears once all customers are not of the same 
degree of sensitivity, i.e., when all preferences of »11 
customers are not equally—spaced. Each successive price- 
rise exhausts the customers of each corresponding 
schedule of sensitivity. But successive price-cuts do 
not do this. As price falls, a f i m  does not only attract 
the second preferences from each successive schedule, 
but also the third, fourth, or nth preferences of 
preceding schedules.
However, even this second example, in which we have
allowed a spread of customers' sensitivity, is not very
realistic. In the example given, all A's customers
will have left in the face of a price—rise of 10 cents.
All customers will have left B, C, D and E for A when 
A*s price has fallen by 40 cents. fhusr it takes 4 times
(Ill)
Longer to exhaust the potential customers, i.e. those 
who may ultimately be attracted from competitors, than 
it does to exhaust one's own customers* This may not 
at first sight appear unrealistic. However, the 
unreality soon becomes apparent once we increase the 
number of firms (products). Thus, if there are 20 firms 
it will take - irrespective of the particular distribution 
of consumer sensitivity we assume - just 19 times longer 
to exhaust potential customers by price-cutting than to 
lose the whole of one's own customers by raising of price. 
With consumer distributed as assumed in our example, a 
price rise of 10 cents will still exhaust all A's 
customers. On the other hand, with 20 products, a 
price-cut of 100 cents - reducing price to zero - will 
still leave customers attached to other products. In 
short, if A becomes a free good, there will still be a 
significant number of customers buying B, C, D and E 
at the price of 100 cents. Product A could hardly be 
said to be competitive with B, C, D and E so far as these 
customers are concerned. Indeed, their consumption of 
B, G, D or E would be independent of the price of A.
Thus, we find that, if the preferences of each 
customer are ranked and equally-spaced, however one may 
rule as to the distribution of customers between various 
degrees of sensitivity, it will take just n times longer
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to exhaust potential customers than to exhaust one’s 
own, where n is the number of competitive products.
It should be noticed that this means that on the average 
customers will leave A at the same rate at which they 
are attracted to A, roughly the assumption of the smooth 
demand curve usually posited in monopolistic competition 
theory. Nevertheless, the rate at which customers move 
to A will be very uneven, there being a distinct hump 
in the region of the smaller price-cuts, a thinning out 
as larger and larger price-cuts are involved. As we 
have seen, this humping in the lower stages is due to the 
fact that at the same time as a price-cut is invoking the 
second preferences of less sensitive customers, it will 
also be invoking the third, fourth, or nth preferences 
of more sensitive customers.
Thus, when substitution between products is integral, 
we find two extreme asymmetides:
(1) when products are homogeneous, we find that any
given price-cut, however small, will attract 
potential customers at n times the rate at which 
customers will be lost for the same price-rise; and
(2) when products are differentiated, such that all
preference of all customers are ranked or ordered, 
with an equal absolute interval between preferences 
it will require a price-cut n times greater to 
exhaust potential customers than the price—rise
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required for any individual firm to lose the whole 
of its sales*
Clearly, most firms of the real world will lie between
these extremes* Moreover, the closer the substitutes
(i.e* the nearer the approach to homogeneous competition)
and the greater the number of firms, the greater will be
the asymmetry between upwards and downwards elasticities*
Finally, it is easy to verify that once some
3customers become indifferent between some commodities, 
whether as first, second, or subsequent preferences, 
the asymmetry becomes decidedly more marked* In the 
case of first preferences the reason is easy enough to see. 
The existence of some customers who are indifferent 
between some commodities means that there is a sub-set 
of the market which acts within an area of homogeneous 
products, with the resulting asymmetry which arises out 
of homogeneous competition. In the case of lower 
preferences, the reason for the asymmetry derives from 
the fact that, if (say) there are rth preferences which 
are distributed at random between all firms or some firms, 
only a fraction will be attached to any particular firm*
A price-rise of the order required to invoke rth 
preferences will involve the individual firm only in the
3. Indifferent in the sense that customers are not
prepared to pay more for the one product than the 
other.
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loss of its own fraction of the customers concerned; 
whereas a price-cut of the same order would attract 
to the firm all other such customers who will be 
equally distributed among the other firms in the group*
Again, we have assumed in our example a 
rectangular distribution of customers of varying 
degrees of sensitivity, i»e-« we have assumed that 
consumer sensitivity to a 1 cent price-change is as 
equally likely as to a 5 cent change or a 10 cent 
change. Once we assume anything in the nature of a 
normal distribution of consumer sensitivity, with a 
few very sensitive customers, a few very insensitive 
ones, and with most ranged around some modal degree of 
sensitivity, the humping of the demand curve for 
medium-sized finite price-cuts becomes more marked, 
even when, as in our example, only 5 products are 
involved.
Finally, this humping in the movement of 
consumers, involving as it does an asymmetry between 
upward and downward arc elasticities ot demand, 
corresponds to what, in Chapter III, we have called 
nrefraction" of the demand curve as price passes 
through a region of greater "competitive density".
The significance of this asymmetry which arises when
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the demand curve passes through a phase in which 
elasticity is rapidly Increasing in this manner 
is, of course, that the marginal revenue function 
may no longer he taken as mono tonic decreasing, a 
fact which must affect the strategies, as well as 
the condition for reaching an equilibrium, of a firm 
operating in such a context* This is a matter 
which will be taken up again in chapter V.
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TABLE I
The Possible Combinations of Ordered 
Preferences with Five Products: and the Distribution
Between Firms When Prices Are Equal.
Firm A Firm B Firm C Firm D Firm E
ABODE BACDE OABDE DABCE EABCD
ABC ED BAOED CAB ED DABEC EABDC
ABDCE BADCE CADBE DACBE EACBD
ABDEC BADEC CADEB DACEB EACDB
ABEGD BAECD CAEBD DAEBC EADBC
ABEDC BAEDC CAEDB DAECB EADCB
ACBDE BCADE CBADE DBACE EBACD
ACBED BCAED CBAED DBAEC EBADC
ACDBE BCDAE CBDAE DBCAE EBCAD
ACDEB BCDEA CBDEA DBCEA EBCDA
ACEBD BCEAD CBEAD DBEAC EBDAC
ACEDB BCEDA CBEDA DBECA EBDCA
ADBCE BDACE CDABE DC ABE ECABD
ADBSC BDAEC CDAEB DCAEB ECADB
ADOBE BDCAE CDBAE DCBAE ECBAD
ADC SB BDCEA CDBEA DCBEA ECBDA
ADEBC BDEAC CDEAB DCEAB ECDAB
ADECB BDECA CDEBA DCEBA ECDBA
AEBCD BEADC CEABD DEABC ED ABC
AEBDC BEACD CEADB DEACB EDACB
AECBD BECAD CEB AD DEBAC EDBAD
AECDB BECDA CEBDA DEBCA EDBDA
AEDBC BEDAC CEDAB DECAB EDO AB
AEDCB BSDCA CEDBA DECBA EDCBA
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TAJHTjB 2
Demand Schedule for Firm A: 10 Schedules of Sensitivity
£rice Sales
(Cents) (Firm A)
110
108106
104102
048
96
144192
100 240
98
96
9492
90
312
432
528
624720
88
86
848280
792
816
888
936
984
7876
747270
10081056
1056
11041128
68
66
6462
60
1152
11521176
1176
1200
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IV. THE SMALL GROUP: WHAT IS OLIGOPOLY?
1. The Problem
In the last chapter we put aside until now the 
problem of providing a criterion of "oligopolistic 
interdependence" which is, of course, necessary to 
complete our description of markets. Unfortunately, 
this subject is also an area of profound confusion 
which is probably best demonstrated in terms of the 
attitudes engendered towards oligopoly as a result 
of the theoretical muddle.
Thus, in the course of a review of Bain’s 
Pricing, Distribution, and Employment, Stigler wrote: 
"Bain believes that the economy is overwhelmingly 
oligopolistic ... My own tentative estimates ... 
suggest that ... competition is three or four times 
as important as all other forms of market organization 
combined."'1' Here, then, we have crystallized for us 
an impression one cannot escape in any survey of value 
discussions over the past decade or so. For one
1. American Economic Review, December, 1948, p* 915.
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economist oligopoly is the exception; for the next
it is the rule. Interestingly enough, this
fundamental split emerges even in the camp of the
"empiricists** Thus, for Hall and Hitch oligopoly is
virtually ubiquitous; "... the typical case is that
of monopolistic competition with an admixture, which
2is usually large, of oligopoly*" Clearly it is this
aspect of the Hall-Hitch thesis which disturbs
Andrews so much and, in large part, accounts for his
3pains to stress the competitive nature of industry.
In fact, it is this, one suspects, which constitutes 
the real substance of the distinction between a price 
based on "full cost" and a price determined by average 
prime cost plus a "costing margin".
It hardly seems necessary to stress the 
important implications which flow from onefs judgment 
about the market—structure, and in particular the 
pervasiveness of oligopoly, of the economy* It will 
influence one * s views about the adaptability of the
2* R.L. Hall and C*J. Hitch: "Price Theory and Business 
Behaviour", Oxford Economic Papers No. 2 (1939)*
5* P*W.S* Andrews: Manufacturing Business. London (1949)*
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economy to change, the reaction of prices - as opposed 
to output - to an increase in Effective Demand, the 
role of anti—trust policies, and so on.
Therefore, if the widely divergent opinions held 
by economists about the importance of oligopoly in the 
economy represented different professional judgments 
upon the same set of facts, the claim of economics to 
scientific status would be practically nil. 
Fortunately, however, it is possible to put a more 
charitable interpretation upon the matter. Could it 
not be that these writers are, in fact, really talking 
about different things when they speak of "oligopoly”? 
This is the central question to which we address 
ourselves in this chapter.
Ever since the publication of Chamberlin's 
Theory of Monopolistic Competition there have, indeed, 
been two distinct conceptions of oligopoly running 
through value theory. The first (and older) sense 
is that involving the literal notion of "fewness”.
But there is a second conception of oligopoly which 
is general in modem value analysis. In this case, 
oligopoly is defined in terms of the transmissability 
of prioe changes. Thus, as Triff in has it, Mthe crux
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of the distinction between large and small numbers is
really whether or not a price move by one seller induces
4the other sellers to follow suit . ..* It is in this 
sense that Chamberlin and Hall and Hitch speak of 
oligopoly.
In the old scheme - where commodities were 
different in kind, not merely in degree - the connection 
between ’fewness" and a firm’s influence on price was 
clear enough. If a firm’s potential output was 
small oompared with total market supply, then any 
price-output decision of that firm could only have a 
negligible effeot upon market price. On the other 
hand, if its potential output were large, oligopolistic 
implications would arise. But in the modem scheme 
the concept of the ’market” and of "market price" 
dissolves. Moreover, in the general case, a firm can 
only vary its output by first changing price. Hence, 
oligopoly came to defined in terns of the effect of 
a price change by one seller on the price policy of 
other sellers. By and large, the problem has remained 
at this definitional stage. Little has been done to 
work out the conditions of demand and supply which would 
give rise to this interdependence of prices beyond leaving
4. H. Triffin, op. cit., p. 30
us with a vague idea that, on the demand side, the 
products should be more or less "good* substitutes, while, 
on the supply side, the firms should be - loosely - "few" 
in number* Our primary aim in this chapter is to 
investigate how good must be the substitutes and how few 
the numbers, if prices are to be oligopolistically 
interdependent.
2. From Chamberlin to Triffin
Let us return to Chamberlin* s criterion for 
distinguishing the large from the small group which we 
quoted in Chapter II:
"Specifically, we assume for the present that any 
adjustment of price or of * pro duct* by a single 
producer spreads its influence over so many of his 
competitors that the impact felt by any one is 
negligible and does not lead to any readjustment of 
his own situation**(5)
Although this definition remains broad enough to suggest 
an affinity with the older criterion postulated in respect 
of homogeneous products, it leaves us rather uneasy* In 
particular, it overlooks the fact, which we noticed in 
Chapter II, that, in the generality of monopolistic 
competition in which a finite price-cut is required to 
attract a finite volume of sales from other firms, the 
size of the impact upon competitors will not be 
independent of the size of the price-change involved*
(122)
5* op. cit., p* 83
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This seems to have been in Triffin's mind when 
he re-states Chamberlin's criterion symbolically.
In Chamberlin's terms, oligopolistic interdependence 
between firms i and j will be absent, he says, if
the revenue lost by i in response to a price-cut of
related to the size of the price change involved.
This ratio, Triffin claims, is an adequate criterion 
of numbers, given Chamberlin's symmetry assumptions.
Unfortunately, however, this more precise 
formulation of Chamberlin's criterion merely results 
in a coefficient of substitution. The ratio will be 
large when a small price-cut by i is sufficient to 
take a large amount of revenue from i, i.e. when i and 
;) are good substitutes. It will be small when it 
requires a substantial price-cut by j to attract a 
few sales from i, i.e. when i and j are poor 
substitutes* And this is precisely the position to 
which Triff in is led. First, he makes two minor 
modifications to the coefficients (1) he expresses
where
6. H. Triffin, op. cit., p. 100.
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the impact upon i in terms of output instead of 
revenue, merely for the purpose of bringing symmetry 
into his own exposition; and (2) he expresses the 
price-changes and the quantity-changes as relatives, 
i.e* in elasticity form, to allow for asymmetrical 
relationships. The coefficient then becomes of the 
form p.äq /q.äp whioh is the ordinary form of price
J X  1  J
cross-elasticity of demand which we discussed at 
length in Chapter II.
Having derived this coefficient in terms of 
Chamberlins numbers criterion, Triffin immediately 
proceeds to use it as his substitution criterion.
With it, he is able to distinguish the categories of 
homogeneous competition, heterogeneous competition 
and isolated selling. It tells us nothing of 
numbers at all, for Triffin himself agrees that 
eaoh of the first two of his categories may be either 
oligopolistic or non-oligopolistic. Indeed, he 
introduces another coefficient to distinguish these 
sub-categories. Nothing could better demonstrate 
the amazing confusion that has grown up around the 
concept of cross-elasticity than the fact that 
Triffin can, without apparent challenge, derive a
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coefficient specifically as a numbers criterion and 
use it at once as a substitution criterion. This he 
does* not as an aberration on a minor point nor as an 
error in the footnotes, but at the very heart of his 
system. Not only does he get away with it, but It 
is adopted by others. It seems to satisfy both of the
major camps. For those who consider cross-elasticity 
essentially as a numbers criterion there is the 
explicit derivation from Chamberlinrs numbers 
condition, not to mention a numbers coefficient of 
Triffin’s own which looks very much like cross- 
elasticity of demand; for those who believe that 
price cross-elasticity is a substitution criterion 
there is Triffin’s open use of it as suoh. So far as 
a numbers criterion is concerned, then, Triffin’s 
development of the Chamberlinian criterion is a dead end.
However, as mentioned, Triffin himself postulates 
a numbers criterion of his own whiah he writes
./p-^li* This looks, at first glance, very much 
like the reciprocal of the ordinary price-cross-elasticity 
of demand which he uses as his substitution criterion.
It cannot be this, of course, for it could tell us no 
more than its reciprocal. The only other interpretation
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is to take it as a coefficient determined by the reverse
causal sequence; as the ratio of the percentage price-
change induced in firm j as a result of a given percentage
change in the output of i* However, a firm can, generally,
only increase output by first altering price* Hence, the
coefficient must boil down to a measure of the proportionate
effect upon the price of j induced by a given variation in
the offer price of 1. In other words, Triff in does not
advance beyond his original statement that *the crux of
the distinction between large and small numbers is really
whether or not a price move by one seller induces the other
7sellers to follow suit.*." Triffin does not get past 
definitions* He does not tell us the conditions of demand 
(substitutability) or the conditions of supply (number of 
firms) which are likely to give rise to price 
interdependence•
3* The Determinants of Price Interdependence
We are interested in the effect of a price-change 
by firm i on the price policy of another firm j*
Now it is clear that the initial impact upon firm j 
will be in the form of a change in j’s output* Firm i
7 *■ op• cut*, p*‘ 30*
cannot directly force a change in j ’s price.
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It can
only do so in virtue of the effect its price policy
has on firm j 1s output. Let us call the impact on
j fs output resulting from a reduction of i rs price 1 ^
which we define as being equal toAq.-/Q.-* (TheJ i)
impact on ;jfs output is best expressed as a relative, 
since a change in output which may be a fleabite to a 
large firm may be of considerable significance to a 
small one.) Thus —
and since
the re fore
(1)
(2)
(5)
We see then that the impact upon the output of firm ;j 
occasioned by a price-cut by firm i depends on: —
(1) The degree of substitutability between the
products i and j as reflected by the cross­
elasticity of demand E..^; a*id
(2) The size of the price-cut invoiced by firm i.
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Moreover, this conclusion is in accord with 
commonsense • Perhaps it is most clearly seen when 
products are identical physically and only differentiated 
spatially. For example, if we suppose that consumers 
are prepared to travel one mile for a shilling, then 
clearly if a firm cuts price by a shilling it will eat 
into the sales of other firms within a mile radius of 
the price-cutting firm*, if it cuts by two shillings it 
will eat into the sales of firms within a radius of two 
miles; and so on. The impact of the one firm on any 
other clearly depends on the size of the price-cut and 
the distance between the firms.
We can demonstrate the same conclusion by reference 
to the relationship dd’ which we postulated in 
Chapter III for "similar* products. In such a situation 
it is clear that any particular customer will transfer 
his allegiance if the price-line moves sufficiently, i.e. 
if relative prices are changed sufficiently. And the 
rate at which individual customers will change over will 
depend upon the degree by which their indifference line 
deviates from the line of perfect substitution aaf.
In short, the impact of a price-cut by one firm on the 
sales of another product will depend on the size of the 
price-cut invoked and the closeness of the substitutes.
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The influence of the degree of substitutability upon 
interdependence is more or less recognized by economists, 
although not without misgivings in some quarters. Most 
economists would agree that two sellers, one of beer and 
one of bricks, could be correctly described as "isolated*, 
They would also agree, no doubt, that two adjacent sellers 
of beer are likely to constitute a duopoly. Clearly, the 
distinction drawn depends solely on the degree of 
substitutability in the two cases.
The misgivings which sometimes arise about saying 
straight-out that oligopoly pre-supposes a high degree of 
substitutability between the individual products concerned 
stem from the fact that pure competition involves perfect 
substitutability; yet pure competition has been 
traditionally regarded as the very antithesis of oligopoly.
Certainly for pure competition the E And it is
true that this expresses "the rigid connection between
0the prices of economically homogeneous goods ..." But the 
fear that this implies a condition of oligopoly is 
groundless; for, as Bishop has pointed out, "the purely 
competitive firm is essentially a quantity-decider rather 
than a price-quo ter. Hence the extreme interdependence 
as to price that is implied by infinite cross-elasticities
8. R. Triffin, op. cit., p. 140.
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has no oligopolistic consequences, in the light of the 
fact that the purely competitive firm has no significant
* Qprice decision in the first place.”
On the other hand, the fact that, in the general case 
of monopolistic competition, the impact of a price-cut 
of one firm on the sales of another will depend on the size 
of the price-cut involved has not generally been recognized 
explicitly. Thus, to take a case at random, Papendreou 
asks: "How large must the number of firms in an industry
be in order that it may fall in the category of a large- 
number-of-firms industry? ... The number must be so large 
that firms cannot influence one another’s volume of sales 
by cutting p r i c e . H o w e v e r ,  in the general case of 
monopolistic competition, we can, theoretically, always 
make the volume of sales transferred by a price-cut as 
small (large) as we like, if we make the price-cut small 
(large) enough.
Two conclusions follow from these facts. Firstly, 
a "quantity* criterion is the appropriate one in the case 
of literally homogeneous goods, since their producers are 
not in a position to make finite changes in offer prices. 
Secondly, a "quantity” criterion is not applicable in the
9* R.L. Bishop, loc. cit., p. 791*
10. "Market Structure and Monopoly power”, American Economic 
Review, Sept-, 1949, p. 888. My emphasis.
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general case where substitutes are imperfect, however 
slightly, because the quantities involved will depend upon 
the size of the price-changes with which they are 
associated*
In the case of homogeneous products, the question of 
the presence of oligopoly must be posed in the form: will
a variation in the quantity supplied by any one firm 
significantly affect market price? Symbolically, if 
is market elasticity of demand, then
TP _ ^m^Snm " Vpm
or
Then, if the addition to market supply by any one firm is 
Aci± -
(4)
Therefore, with a given elasticity of market demand, the 
question whether Ap^/p^ is significantly different from 
zero depends upon the ratio of firm i*s potential capacity 
to total market supply* It follows as a corollary that 
some limitation upon the capacity of the individual firm 
is an essential condition for the existence of pure
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competition. Kaldor was surely wrong when he argued, in 
opposition to Triffin, that pure competition is compatible 
with constant costs.'*''**
In the general case of monopolistic competition, the 
concept of market price and market supply dissolves. 
Moreover, the individual firm can only finitely add to 
supply by first cutting its price by a finite amount.
Hence, the oligopoly criterion poses itself in the form: 
will a price-cut by any one individual firm i significantly 
affect the price of any other individual firm j? However, 
as we have seen above, the impact of a price-cut by i 
on the position of j depends on the size of the price-cut 
invoked by i. This fact, as we have seen, has been the 
source of a good deal of logical confusion* Triffin 
attempted to take account of it by taking the ratio 
between j ' s loss of revenue and i*s initiating price-cut, 
but this led him directly to a substitution coefficient. 
Clearly, the correct statement of the criterion should 
be: will a price-cut by i induce firm j to also cut price
by an amount significantly large in relation to i*s initial 
price-cut? This formulation avoids the difficulties 
discussed above. In the first place, any price move by 
one seller will theoretically involve some readjustment 
in the position of all related sellers, however small.
11. See Triffin, op. cit., pp. 155-157; and Kaldor's
review of Triffin, Economica, Nov. 1942, pp. 409-12.
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However, so long as 3*s price reaction is negligible 
compared with i Ts initial price-cut, firm i can afford to 
neglect it. At the other extreme, if 3 reacts by cutting 
price in the same proportion as i, so that in the outcome 
the ratio of the two prices remains the same, then the 
effect of i ’s price move is completely nullified vis-a-vis 3* 
Let us consider the matter in detail.
We take r firms linked by cross-elasticities, E . .3i
of the same order. Cross-elasticities with any other 
firms are zero or so small as to be quite negligible*
We wish to find the effect of a price-cut by one firm 1 
upon the price of any related firm 3. For the present, 
we make the further simplifying assumptions:
(1) that all firms act unilaterally in attempting to
maximize their profits, i.e. they individually 
attempt to equate their marginal revenue and 
marginal cost;
(2) that the demand curve for firms is linear, at least
over the relevant range, i.e. that sales are 
transferred from one firm to another under the 
impetus of a price-differential at a constant rate;-
(3) that marginal cost is constant over the relevant
range.
Then the equation of firm 3 * s demand curve in the 
initial situation is of the form:
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q = k - mp (5)
0 0 / 0where m = q E^/p , the upper suffix denoting values at
the initial point, and where k is a constant* How let
firm i cut its price by an amount 3p^, so that 3 is
involved in a loss of sales L = q°B^.^P./p., where isi l 3i
the initial value of the cross-elasticity existing 
between i and j. Then the demand curve of firm 3 will 
shift downwards and its equation becomes : —
(k - L) - mp (6)
Multiplying through by q gives
_ - _ Qt -  i i ) n _ q2
i>si m ^ m (7)
The equation of 3's new marginal revenue curve is 
therefore i—
M p q ) _ (k L ) _ 2^ ,Q,
oq m " m v ;
Firm 3 will now attempt to expand output to q T where its
new marginal revenue is equal to its marginal cost (which
we have assumed to be constant)* This new output will
be given by s-
k - L _ 2 q* _
rn m
where c is marginal cost*
c
Then -
(9)
q' = 4(k - L - mo) (10)
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Substituting for q in equation (6) we get
P' =  §  (r~~ +  o )  ( 1 1 )
We are now in a position to calculate the immediate 
change in jfs price induced by the price-cut by i. Prom 
(5) we have k = q° + mp°, so that
P' = i(ä° + P° - i + 0) (12)
Moreover, we know that m = q°E° /p° $nd L = quE^.dp./p.
DJ * 1 *
o_o
and hence
£ O 0 Ji . /p1 = i(E° + p - p s°i äp^p. + o) (13)
Now in virtue of our assumption that firms attempt to
maximize their profits by unilaterally equating marginal 
cost and marginal revenue, we may write p°/B^ = p° - c
and hence
b °.l
P' = 4(2p° - p° Eo äpi/pi)
«3 «3
(14)
and
P - P T
Eu 
o
ECiP^  w° ip/Pi33 (15)
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Expressing the relative change induced in j * s price, in 
the first instance, in terns of the relative price-cut 
initiated by i, which ratio we call we gets-
- i / —
P j pi
(16)
However, having cut its price in this proportion, firm j 
will find that it has not achieved its aim of an output 
of q r. Since we are assuming a symmetrical situation 
in which all firms are unilaterally attempting to equate 
marginal cost with marginal revenue, the firms k , 1, m ... 
will also react in a manner similar to J , with the result 
that j will only have succeeded in increasing its output 
to the extent to which it has been able to regain sales 
from i. This it will do in the proportion which its 
price-cut matches i*s. (When j fs percentage price-cut 
is equal to that of i, j should have won back all 
customers lost to it, since the ratio of their prices 
will now have been restored vis-a-vis the initial
situation.) Let the sales regained from i by the first
0p1 /5piprice-cut by j be so that * __i/ L, L being
pj pi
j rs original loss of sales to i. Then, from (16),
=  - D ^ I j *
In the new situation, j fs demand curve will be;
( 137 )
q = k r -  mp (17)
w here  k '  = q° -  L + + mp*. S in c e  j  w i l l  h av e  b een
d i s a p p o in t e d  i n  i t s  a t t e m p t  to  r e s t o r e  an  e q u i l i b r i u m  
o u tp u t  (b e c a u s e  r e l a t e d  f i r m s  h av e  m oved w i th  i t )  , i t  
w i l l ,  so lo n g  a s  i t  i s  c o n c e rn e d  o n ly  w i th  i t s  own 
m a rg in a l  c o s t  an d  m a r g in a l  re v e n u e  p o s i t i o n ,  t r y  to  
a t t a i n  an  e q u i l i b r iu m  (maximum) p o s i t i o n  by  r e s o r t  to  a 
f u r t h e r  p r i c e - c u t .  P ro c e e d in g  a s  b e f o r e ,  we o b t a i n  th e  
new e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e :
p "  «  i ( " |  + ° )*
S in c e  k T = q °  -  I» + + m p1,
p "  = * < £  -  i + i t + p< + o ) -
F u r t h e r ,  s in o e  R, = D-.L an d  q°/m  = p ° /E  . . *  p °  -  c
-*■ ■* J J
p "  = 4 ( p °  + p '  -  i  1 -  D!  )
M o re o v e r, L/m = 2p°D-j 9 p ^ /p ^ , so t h a t
p "  = p '  -  p QB1 ( l  -  D1 )^ P i / P 1 + 
w here  äp^  = p °  -  p * . H ence -
p» -  p V p °  = ä p ^ /p 0 = Dx ( l  -  B1 ) ä p i / p i  “ i ^ P q /p 0
(138)
so that
SS Dj/1 - Dx) -
= Dx(i - Dx) (18)
* * * * *
igain, f i m  i will fail to achieve its target output - 
although it will have got closer to it - because of the 
simultaneous unilateral action of other related films. 
Bepeating the above argument, it can be seen that firm j 
will now wish to invoke a further price-cut in an effort 
to attain an equilibrium (unilaterally maximum) position* 
It can be shown that this third-round price-cut will be:
Thus, firm j will, theoretically, move to its new 
equilibrium position by a series of price-cuts of 
diminishing magnitude* The total proportionate price-cut 
which 1 will make in response to a price-cut by i may, 
therefore, be expressed in the form of the infinite series:
D (19)
* * * * *
D
(1 3 9 )
D1 ♦  V *  ’  V  4 V *  "  V  + • • • • ( 20 )
This series must converge, of course; otherwise no 
new position of stable equilibrium would be attainable* 
In fact, the series (20) has a common ratio of 4 - 
Moreover, since D = 4E /E and E ^  E , therefore
j .  J  w  V V
D-, ^  4* If E.. * B , as in a symmetrical duopoly 
situation in which firm j is  related to fim  i and to no 
other in any degree whatsoever, then = 4 and D =
In other words, the first-round price-adjustment is all 
that is  necessary to achieve a new equilibrium. In 
general, however, D^ <. 4 and the common ratio 4 - is 
positive and less than 4« Hence, generally, the series 
converges to the limit:
i * Di
1  ♦
( 21)
Moreover, since in the symmetrical situation assumed
E /E = r - 1 (the relationship expressed in Bishop’s 
J J
’’numbers equivalent" and discussed in Chapter II), therefore
( 2 2 )
r- being the number of films in the group
(140)
Thus* we find that, on the assumptions we have 
adopted, the relative price-reaction of a firm which will 
toe induced toy a price-cut toy a related firm varies 
inversely with the number of firms so related or, if you 
like* the number of firms in the "group*. This is the 
link between numbers and the trangmi ssability of price- 
changes inherent in Chamberlin* s analysis* Going back 
to relationship (21)* the precise significance of Bishop*s 
"numbers equivalent* is brought aut» It is in fact 
directly related to the Chamberlin!an concept of numbers 
but, as Mshop himself has pointed out, has the advantage 
of being applicable to asymmetrical situations in which 
the mere counting of firms would be misleading. At this 
level and on these assumptions, it will also be seen 
that Bishop is oorrect* as against the many writers who 
have taken cross-elasticity of demand as a numbers 
criterion (high cross-elasticities imply oligopoly, low 
cross-elasticities the absence of it), in asserting that 
it is the ratio of cross-elasticity and own-elasticity 
which is significant in regard to Chamberlin*s conception 
of numbers* Directly, however, it will be shown that 
at another level - on different assumptions - cross­
elasticity does become the important factor. It is 
almost certainly this fact which has given rise to much 
of the confusion in this matter.
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In fact, the analysis developed above does not take 
us very far, mainly because of the restrictive nature 
of some of the assumptions* However, before proceeding
upon more general assumptions,. i*e* before we relax our 
more fundamental conditions, it is worth pausing to 
consider the consequences of varying some of our minor 
assumptions*
Firstly, we assumed marginal cost to be constant over 
the relevant range of output changes. The algebra 
necessary to obtain a similar solution for variable 
marginal costs is much heavier even than that involved 
in the result obtained above and will not be undertaken 
here. However, it may be said in passing that, if 
marginal costs are rising in the relevant range, the 
price-reaction will be greater than for constant costs; 
if they are falling, the price-reaction will be smaller.
Secondly, in our analysis above, we assumed that 
second-order cross-elasticities were negligible and could 
be ignored. Insofar as the sum of all second-order 
cross-elasticities ("market* elasticity of demand) is 
significant, this will damp down the price-reaction by 
firms related to the price-cutting firm by cross-elasticities 
of first-order significance. The reason for this is fairly 
obvious» The more sales which intra-group firms can 
attract from extra-group firms as they successively cut
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price In the search for a new equilibrium, the less they 
will have to cut their price in order to restore an 
equilibrium output, with marginal cost and marginal 
revenue equated.
More fundamental to the whole argument is the 
assumption that firms unilaterally seek to equate their 
marginal cost and marginal revenue. Indeed, it might 
be thought at first sight that this assumption implies 
the answer, since it is equivalent to assuming that 
firms act “non-oligopolistieally*. In fact, the 
argument is of the reductio ad absurdum type which 
purports to show:-
(1) that unilateral maximizing behaviour by a large
number of firms represents consistent behaviour;
(2) that such action by a small number does not,
because in this latter case individual firms 
will become aware that their own price moves 
will produce significant reactions in the 
price policies of competitors.
Nevertheless, such an argument cannot sustain the 
converse: that the absence of small numbers necessarily
implies that firms will attempt unilateral maximization 
by equation of their individual marginal revenues with 
their marginal cost.
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For this reason the argument so far leaves a large 
question mark in the air* Should we consider any firm 
which does not equate marginal cost and marginal 
revenue as "oligopolistic*, ex hypo the si? In terms of
the traditional concepts of Chamberlin and Mrs. Robinson, 
it would appear that the answer should be *yes*!
However, I think there are good reasons for not leaving 
the matter there -
(1) This delineation would cut across the Chamberlin-
Triffin definition of oligopoly in terms of 
price interdependence. It is both conceivable 
and possible that a firm should not attempt 
to equate its marginal cost and marginal 
revenue, and yet should be sufficiently 
insulated from other films not to be forced 
to match their price moves. (e.g. firms which 
are ignorant of the shape of their demand curve, 
or firms faced with a discontinuous demand curve 
such as that derived in Chapter IU.)
(2) Oligopoly, with its literal connotation of
"fewness*, would be compatible with a substantial 
number of firms.
(3) 111 firms operating In such manner as posited by
Andrews, for example, would be oligopolists, 
by definition.
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Therefore, It becomes necessary to examine further 
the problem of the interdependence of the price-output 
policies of related films. To this end, we gfoall now 
ask the question the other way round; under what 
conditions will a firm follow a price-cut in full (i.e. 
reduce its price in the same proportion as the firm 
initiating the price-cut) and for certain. We will 
retain our minor assumptions:
(a) that marginal coat may be taken as constant over
relatively small changes in output; and
(b) that second-order cross-elasticities are negligible
compared with first-order (intra-group) cross­
elasticities*
However, we no longer posit the assumption that firms 
necessarily attempt to achieve a maximum position by 
unilateral action based upon their individual marginal 
revenues and marginal costs. Bather, we ask: under
what circumstances will a firm alter its price-output 
policy, on whatever basis it may have reached its 
initial position, in response to a move by a competitor.
4* Pull and Certain Price Betaliation
We shall begin with two firms i and j* We have to 
determine under what conditions a price move by firm i 
will be followed by an equi-proportional price move by
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firm j. Now if firm i outs price, firm J will, other 
things being equal, be certain to follow the price-cut 
if its net revenue, after adaption of this course, is 
greater than It would be if it stuck to its original 
price.
If firm j does not fallow i's price-cut, its net 
revenue will be reduced by -
marginal cost.
On the other hand, if firm j makes the same 
proportionate price-out as that initiated by i, it will, 
it may be assumed, retain the customers which it would 
have otherwise lost to 1, since the ratio of the prices 
will be unchanged. Then, the net revenue of j will be 
reduced to the extent -
It is clear then that j will follow the price-cut, 
if (1) is greater than (B), i.e. if:-
aVpj" V W
(B)
V p3 " V  >  *jap3 (23)
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äp. as —i äp. • Then substituting in (23) we get 3 P± 1
‘ V  > *jpj
pi^j
43api
> p3
p - m
3 3
(24)
Now the expression on the left-hand side Is clearly the 
cross-elasticity of demand E..^ * so that (24) may he 
re-written
E. > (25)
* * # * #
We must now generalize this result by considering 
the effect of increasing the number of related firms*
Let us now take four firms i, j, k and 1* Now if firm i 
cuts its price, there are eight possible re suits: *^ -
Firms Cutting Price
i
13
ik
il
i3*131
ikl
ijkl
Firms Maintaining Price
3*1
kl
31
3*1
k
3
(U7)
The important difference between this case and that of
only two sellers is that, in this situation, firm, j will,
when calculating whether or not to follow a price-cut
by i, have to take account of the fact that, if it
does cut price, it may not only forestall any transfer
of sales to i, but may also attract sales from k and 1,
12provided these firms do not also follow 1*8 price-cut»
In the general case, there will be 2 alternatives 
where n is the numbercf firms related to i. The task 
of calculating all these separate cases would, of courset 
be prohibitive - both in theory and practice - even if 
we ware given all the relevant- cross-elasticities* How 
then can we detexmine the basic determinants of 
reaction-pattern?
We could, of course t postulate symmetry assumptions, 
leaving it to the business-men to do the calculating* 
Then, if one firm follows, they all follow, since their 
calculations are identical» It is easy to establish 
the the condition for all firms following, whether they 
take the decision individually or collectively, is that 
of our inequality (25).
But this is, I feel, to lean too heavily upon 
symmetry assumptions* A more realistic approach 
suggests itself. Now it is clear that if firm ;j*s 
worst position after following i is better than its best
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position by not following, then i will be certain to 
follow. It is clear also that the worst position for j 
after cutting price is when all other firms related to 
i and i do likewise.* On the other hand, j * s best 
position for maintaining price is when firms k, 1 ... n  
also maintain price. Then, it is easy to verify, on 
this basis, that J will be certain to follow, if s—
which is the condition of our inequality (25) •
Of course, this in no way implies the converse.
Some firms in some situations with cross-elasticities 
lower than that required by (26) may have strong reasons 
for following price-cuts fully and unhesitatingly.
However, these borderline cases represent the genuine area 
of "oligopolistic uncertainty11 which, in practice, is 
probably small* It will be noticed that the calculation 
required of firms is of the "greater or lesser" variety* 
Most firms in most cases will know whether their cross- 
relationship with other individual firms (products) is 
significantly large or negligibly small* It is only 
in the intermediate cases that uncertainty will arise.
(26)
5*. Some Results
The first interesting aspect of the above result
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is that the expression on the right-hand side of (26) 
would, if firms were unilaterally equating marginal cost 
and marginal revenue, be equal to the elasticity of
, V 0O°a1““ “r “*
would require that the cross-elasticity, be greater
than the own-elasticity, , which, in general, is 
impossible» This is consistent with our earlier result 
that, when firms are so equating marginal cost and 
marginal revenue, the greatest extent by which a price- 
cut by one firm will be matched by another is one-half, 
in the case of duopoly» In short, full (proportionate) 
price-re action will never occur if firms are equating 
marginal cost and marginal revenue unilaterally»
It is an obvious and interesting corollary of this fact 
that, where firms do match the price-moves of other 
firms fully (i»e. in the same proportion), then we 
have prima facie evidence that the firm is not 
unilaterally maximising profits and that the situation 
is one of "oligopoly*.
The second thing to notice about the above result 
is that, once we drop the assumption of unilateral 
action by firms, it is cross-elasticity of demand which 
becomes important in determining whether or not a price- 
cut by one firm will induce other firms to follow suit» 
It is almost certainly this fact that has led to the
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widespread belief that cross-elasticity is, of itself,
an adequate numbers criterion*
Moreover, in the light of the above discussion,
a number of other propositions familiar in economic
theory can be brought together in harmony. Thus, the
fact that marginal cost — or rather the level of
marginal cost - is an important determinant of price
interdependence lends colour to Efraymson's thesis
that the direction of price-interdependence may vary 
13cyclically» Thus, the normal "obtusely* kinked 
demand curve, normally associated with oligopoly, is 
likely to have strangest application in depressed 
business situations where there is a good deal of excess 
capacity» By contrast, the curve may become of the 
"reflex* type - when price increases are followed, price- 
cuts are not - as may occur at high levels of employment 
when output is pressing against capacity. In terms of 
our result (26) this may be re-expressed in terms of 
marginal cost. When marginal cost is low, relative to 
price, firms have a strong incentive to chase after 
low cost sales; when marginal costs are very high, firms 
may be prepared to follow price-moves of competitors
13** C.W. Efroymsons *1 Note on Kinked Demand Curves*,
.American Economic Review, Vbl. XXXIII, March, 1943, 
pp. 98-109*
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upwards, deciding upon the price increase as the more 
important as against the possibility of losing some 
high-cost (marginal) sales to rivals who might not 
follow the movement upwards.
On the demand side, we are also able to shed some
interesting light on a problem which has been the subject
of some debate in economic literature. This case
originally arose from Mr., Harrod*s so-called *Law of
p-imitvl«hing Elasticity of Demand, which means that, as
output as a whole increases and individuals become more
affluent, their sensitiveness to price differences 
14declines*" In virtue of this "law", Harrod suggests 
that markets are more perfect in the slump, less perfect 
in the boom. Monopoly power therefore varies directly 
with the level of output over the course of the trade 
cycle*
However, increasing sensitivity of customers to 
price differences can. only be reflected in increasing 
coross-elastioities of demand — firms (products) come . 
closer together* And increasing cross-elasticities 
tend to make for stronger price interdependence. Thus, 
we arrive at the paradoxical notion that, as the
14* R.F. Harrod, Trade Cyole. p. 21
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"perfection* of the market increases (in the slump), so 
does the degree and certainty of "oligopolistic* price- 
interdependence tend to increase» Incidentally, this 
tendency will be reinforced if, during the slump, 
marginal costs fall relative to price as compared with 
the boom, when firms may be working near capacity 
outputs*
The tendency for price—interdependence to increase
in the slump has been noticed by a number of writers.
And because of this increased interdependence, it is
also noticed that the area of agreements, both overt
and tacit, is widened, and existing agreements are
strengthened. Thus, discussing the Harrod thesis,
Kalecki writes: "Probably more important than the
effect of cyclical changes in market imperfection
upon u is the influence of ’tacit agreements* in a deep
slump which may be classified as changes in the degree 
-15of oligopoly."
The important thing to notice that, in the light 
of our conclusions above, there is no necessary 
contradiction in the two points of view» Increased 
substitutability between products, far from being
15. M» Kalecki, Studies in Economic Dynamics, p» 18.
Incompatible with increased price-interdependence, is 
the most likely factor to give rise to it.
But the most interesting aspect of the above
argument is its implication for those theses on price
formation which depend upon some ad hoc or conventional
formula * This can best be illustrated by reference to
16the work of Andrews* Andrews, it will be recalled, 
believes that the typical behaviour in manufacturing 
industry is to calculate price as average prime cost 
plus a ttcosting margin* which includes and allowance for 
overheads and a margin for profit* Also, business-men 
take average prime cost as a good approximation for 
marginal cost over the significant ranges of output. 
Then, if average prime cost ( marginal cost) amounts 
to 80 per cent of price, any cross-elasticity of demand 
greater than 5 must, in the light of (26) above, induce 
price-interdependence. If average prime cost is 50 per 
cent of price (as it is in many industries), then any 
cross-elasticity greater than 2 will involve price- 
interdependence» If, as Andrews always suggests, 
most manufacturers are ii^competition with close 
substitutes, then most manufactueers, on his thesis, 
are "oligopolists* in the Chamberlin-Triff in sense.
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16. See P»W.S» Andrews, ibid
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We may or may not agree with the appropriateness of 
this conception of "oligopoly*. I am sure, however, 
that it would not evoke Mr. Andrews* approval. Yet 
it is the usual, if not the most consistently applied, 
view!
6. Oligopolistic Uncertainty.
Often, the problem of oligopoly is put forward 
in terms of "uncertainty*. The basis of the well-known 
kinky oligopoly curve Is usually described: the curve
is elastic upwards because firms fear that, If they 
raise price, they will not be followed by rivals; it 
is inelastic downwards because firms fear, if they out 
price, they will be followed.
[Ehe relationship (26) derived earlier purports to 
erpress the conditions under whioh a price-out is 
certain to be followed. In the real world, there is 
bound to be many situations in which a firm has little 
illusion about what other firms will do* It can be 
sure that firms close enough will follow a price-cut; 
and that firms far enough away will not* Hence, it is 
not true to say that the essence of oligopoly is 
uncertainty. However, it is perfectly true that in 
between the two cases mentioned - the very close and the 
far away - there will be a wide area of uncertainty*
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From the point of view of the film, uncertainty may
derive from two main sources: (i) uncertainty of
knowledge about demand and cost; and (ii) uncertainty
about the actions of rivals* Latterly, increasing
emphasis has been placed on the former. Indeed,
ignorance of the shape of the firm's demand curve and
of the firm's marginal cost has been represented as a
chief reason why it does not attempt to maximize profits
17by equating marginal cost with marginal revenue* This 
argument is not altogether convincing* On the one hand, 
it must be recognised that in a dynamic economy prices 
and costs do change considerably from time to time*
reFurther * seldom ax readjustments in the firm's position, 
carried out instantly and simultaneously with the changes 
in basic data* Consequently, one would expect that an 
entrepreneur would, on the basis of experience in a 
changing wo rid, form a fairly accurate picture of the 
shape of his demand curve* Again, it is difficult to 
explain the disinterest of cost accountants and business 
men in marginal cost in terms of their inability to 
calculate it* In any case, however one may rule as 
to the importance in practice of the argument, it is of
17. Hall and Hitch, loc* cit* (for example).
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doubtful value theoretically. Lack of knowledge of this 
sort is a limitation which affects many facets of economic 
behaviour and is the reason that most economic propositions 
are stated as "tendencies*. The problem is therefore a 
general one and not specifically one of "oligopoly*.
More central to the oligopoly problem is the 
uncertainty surrounding the probable actions of rivals*
In the earlier formulations of monopolistic competition 
theory this "poker game element* was given pride of place. 
The relationship (26) derived above purports to show that 
a firm is "certain* to follow a price-cut by another 
firm, if the condition of the inequality holds* The 
firm is certain to act in this way in the sense that, 
in terms of cost and revenue, it will be better off in 
the second position than in the first, i.e. maintaining 
price, irrespective of how other firms react. However, 
if this inequality does not hold - as indeed it never will 
if firms are equating marginal cost and marginal revenue - 
it will pay firms collectively not to follow the price-cut. 
In other words, it will pay any one firm to hold its 
price provided other related firms hold theirs. (This 
is not, of course, to rule out the possibility that in 
practice firms may sacrifice short-period £±*am and 
follow a price move in the interests of long-period
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"discipline *•)
Thus, whether firms in this position will hold their 
prices in the face of price-cutting by one particular 
fizm depends upon whether they are in agreement — either 
overtly or tacitly - or not* Clearly, the likelihood and 
reliability of such agreement will depend principally on 
the number of firms involved — the smaller the number, 
the more likely is concerted action« This is a fairly 
well-recognised phenomenons it is easier to maintain 
discipline in a small group than in a crowd* Thus we 
arrive at a somewhat paradoxical result* Where firms 
are related in this second, looser manner, the probability 
of price retaliation becomes less, the fewer the number 
of firms concerned*
Prom the point of view of the economist - interested 
in the prediction of a firm* s behaviour in various 
circumstances — there is a second sort of uncertainty, 
vis* uncertainty about the motives, at any particular 
time, of the firm itself* Mention has already been made 
of changes in price-output policies for "tactical* reasons* 
Once a firm is in a situation where it can do better by 
agreement or cooperation with rivals than by unilateral 
action, tactical considerations become of first 
importance* On the one hand, they will be directed to 
preserving agreement so long as agreement is tenable; on 
the other hand, they will be directed to obtaining the
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best strategic position in the event of agreement
breaking down, of war breaking out* As Rothschild has
pointed out, the analytical starting point for this type
of study is not Newtonian mechanics nor Darwinian
18biology, but Clausewits's Principles of War. This 
involves, of course, the introduction of many factors 
other than cost and demand, factors with which the 
economist is not accustomed to deal, if prediction of 
the firm's behaviour is to be accurate and realistic.
Where there is a definite interdependent group, as 
distinct from pure monopoly, duopoly or chain 
relationship, and the group-effect is manifest in a 
curve of the nature derived in Chapter III, this 
uncertainty must be magnified, because with a 
discontinuous demand curve of this type the firm cannot 
attain any position of stable equilibrium by unilateral 
action. While in peace firms may seek haven by 
directing their attention to the upper segment of the 
curve, the lower segment remains an ever-present 
invitation to war. The implications of this type of 
curve for the theory of price formation will be discussed 
more fully in Chapter Y which follows* It is sufficient
18. K.W. Rothschild, "Price Theory and Oligopoly", 
Economic Journal, September, 1947«
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here to notice that this type of relationship will give 
rise to uncertainty of the kind usually associated with 
oligopoly, although a large number of firms may be 
involved.
7. Oligopoly and "Bigness".
Another large source of confusion about the 
oligopoly problem arises from the pre-conception that 
oligopoly is closely related to •bigness*. On the 
one hand, we envisage an oligopolistic industry as 
consisting of a handful of entrenched industrial 
giants, protected from outside competition by technical 
economies of scale, a network of patent rights, 
financial dominion or exclusive access to vital raw 
materials. On the other hand, from a formal, 
analytical point of view, derived from the criterion 
of demand inter-relationship, we may classify two milk- 
bars on opposite sides of a street in the same category 
as two automobile manufacturers of empire-like 
p ro portions.
Clearly, the latter, for many purposes, are 
something quite outside the world of milk—bars. Giant
oligopolists, unlike milk-bar proprietors, may make 
and unmake governments. As Rothschild has it, "the
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oligopolistic struggle for position and. security
includes political action of all sorts right up to 
19imperialism,,"
It has almost certainly been a mistake to use 
the term "oligopoly* to de sari be all situations other 
than those in which a firm acts upon the assumption 
that its demand curve is independent of the actions 
of other individual firms or in which a firm does not 
unilaterally attempt to equate its marginal revenue 
and marginal cost because of its consciousness of 
being a member of a group. Such situations involve a 
very muoh larger area than those in which the firms 
making up an industry are both large and few.
Confusion will persist so long as the one term is 
used to describe a whole range of situations involving 
many radically different characteristics.
8. Conclusions
On the basis of the discussion of this and the 
previous chapter, we could make the following formal 
classification of market relationships? —
19* K.W. Rothschild, loc. oit., p. 319.
(161)
Substitution
Criterion
Eji
Numbers
Criterion
J S  as
Pure Competition oo Large (= n-1)
Large Group High* Large
(Diffe rent!ated Competition)
Small Group High Small
(Oligopoly)
Duopoly High — * 1
Independent Selling — ► 0 — * 1
(Pure Monopoly)
This classification differs from an interesting
20alternative suggested by Professor Bishop in 
respect of both the substitution and numbers 
criteria.
Cross-elasticity is used for the substitution 
criterion in preference to own-elasticity as proposed 
by Bishop. The main advantage of cross-elasiicity 
for this purpose is that it represents a better 
measure of the relationship between individual firms 
than is own-elasticity. It is especially superior 
for the description of oligopolistic situations 
because it is an important factor determining the
20. R.L. Bishop, loc. cit., p. •
* i.e. significantly different from zera.
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impact which the price-output moves of one firm will 
have on another firm, a matter we discussed at length 
in Section 4 above.
In the matter of the numbers criterion, a case 
could, be made out for the use of Bishop* s "numbers 
equivalent" in conjunction with cross-elasticity as 
a substitution criterion. As was shown in Section 3 
above, a high Bishopian "numbers equivalent" - i*e. a 
high ratio of own-elasticity to cross-elasticity - is 
a necessary condition for the absence of significant 
price-reactions by competitors* On the other hand, 
the coefficient of numbers or density derived in 
Chapter III brings out a fundamental characteristic 
of the firm*s demand curve as we move from the extreme 
of pure competition, on the one hand, and pure monopoly 
or independent selling, on the other.
Formal classifications such as those proposed by 
Bishop and others from time to time, including the 
classification set out above, probably serve little real 
purpose, except perhaps an historical one. They do 
purport to show what conditions are necessary for the 
unilateral action along marginalist lines which is the 
behaviour traditionally assumed for the firm in the 
majority of instances.
If the analysis of this Part serves any significant
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purpose it is to show that, apart from the independent 
seller and the quantity-deaider of pure competition, 
the likelihood of situations in which firms will 
usually attempt to maximize profits by unilateral 
action to equate their individual marginal revenues 
with marginal costs is small, a result, incidentally, 
which would accord with the general findings of 
empirical studies and, the practices of cost accountancy. 
Such a conclusion would leave a large area of the 
economy in which firms are not likely to act 
unilaterally and marginally, without thought to their 
group existence. The basic question then becomes: 
Should the whole of this area be described as 
^oligopolistic* merely for this reason? If not, 
what principles should be invoked to further 
gub-divide this area?
Certainly* attempts to delimit the area of *true" 
oligopoly by use of mechanical definitions such as 
that used by Chamberlin and Triff in, viz. that "the 
crux of the distinction between large and small numbers 
is really whether or not a price move by one seller 
induces the other sellers to follow suit ...” does 
not meet the case, although this may sometimes be one 
of the characteristics of an oligopolistic situation.
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As we have seen, there is no simple connection between 
the fewness of firms and the interdependence of prices* 
Quite a large number of firms operating in the Andrews 
manner would be quite consistent with interdependence 
of their prices. On the other hand, the fewness of 
firms may actually assist the maintenance of prices 
by rivals in the faoe of price-cutting by one firm*
In other words, sometimes failure to follow a price 
cut may be indicative of small numbers. Further, 
because of tactical and strategic considerations, 
a firm may resort to price retaliation in one set of 
circumstances, but not in another* In short, a firm 
may not folLow a price move today, but may well do so 
tomorrow* More generally, one would expect a film* s 
behaviour to be radically different, depending upon 
whether it is at peaoe or war with its competitors*
Perhaps the fundamental weakness of most systems 
of market classifications is that they are usually 
cast in terms of the demand relationships existing 
between firms. But we oannot ignore the cost 
characteristics of the firms concerned. To do so, 
is to use only one blade of Marshall’s scissors.
We have already seen that even the matter of 
interdependence of prices is not independent of the
5i
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cost position of the firms involved. .Again* the
relationship between numbers and size which we
briefly discussed earlier must largely be described 
cost
in terms of/economies of size related to a given 
market area. What we urgently require for a 
realistic description of markets, and in particular 
for the description of oligopolistic situations of 
various kinds, is a comparative anatomy of 
industrial structures based on objective 
considerations of demand and cost from which the 
probable behaviour of firms may be inferred. To 
attempt a description in terms of the behaviour 
of firms is to put the cart before the horse.
This is easily enough said, of course. The trouble 
is that we still lack the tools for making such an 
objective description. Indeed, we may well 
oonclude this chapter as it began,, by asking: what
is oligopoly?
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V. ELEMENTS OF A SYNTHESIS
In this final chapter of this Part, a brief 
indication will, be attempted of the signposts which 
point in the direction of a possible synthesis of the 
various fragmentations which make up present-day value 
theory*.
1* The Theory of Consumers* Behaviour
One of the main purposes of Chapter III and the 
Appendix thereto was to show - I think conclusively - 
that to reconcile the theory of consumers* behaviour 
and the assumptions of monopolistic competition a new 
approach is required* Whereas, traditionally, this 
subject has been a field of application solely of the 
mathematics of the continuousr it is necessary, to 
handle the type of consumer behaviour posited by 
monopolistic competition theory,, to introduce the 
mathematics of the discrete* If indeed consumers have 
ordered schedules of preferences as between "similar* 
commodities and substitute between them integrally 
under the impetus of price-changes, there is no other 
way out. Whether advance along these lines would 
merely increase the complexity of an already complex - 
and abstract - branch of theory, or whether it could
result in a more realistic analysis that would provide
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us with sorely needed additional tools, is an open 
question*
If the attempt to state a more general theory of 
consumers' behaviour were to lead, for example, to a more 
adequate development of community indifference curves or 
some analogous conoept, the result might well be a gain 
in simplicity and applicability* A satisfactory 
solution of the many problems associated with such curves 
would go a long way towards bridging the gap between the 
theory of consumers' behaviour and the sort of demand 
characteristics assumed by monopolistic competition 
theory* Gross-elasticity of demand, and the inter­
dependence of firms, could then be directly linked with 
the appropriate indifference curves and this would 
provide the required bridge between the two branches of 
theory. On the other hand, it may be necessary to 
develop a parallel theory of consumers* behaviour based 
upon the mathematics of pemutations and combinations*
In any event., however, the matter must ultimately rest 
very much with the mathematicians.
2 *  Non-marginalist Theories of Price Formation
It is, I feel, generally agreed that there is little 
difficulty in reconciling the practice of "full cost" or 
"average cost" pricing with the theory of oligopoly.
Under conditions of oligopoly, firms will not be expected 
to act unilaterally in noimal circumstances, i.e* in 
times of peace, although they may do so in the event of 
war. Therefore, in greater or lesser degree, the 
emphasis shifts from the firm to the (oligopolistic) 
group. Since group elasticity of demand will generally 
be small, it will be in the interests of the firm to seek 
to maintain the greatest margin between cost and price 
either by open or tacit agreement* The ceiling on the 
price which may be safely charged will be set by the 
potential or actual threat to the group from new or 
outside competition* Then, since entry is a function 
of "full cost" - the new firms must cover total costs - 
existing firms, or more usually the price-leader among 
existing firms, will have every reason for deciding 
upon their price policy upon the basis of "full cost"* 
Indeed, precisely the same conclusion emerges as soon 
as we attempt an analytical definition of "full cost".1
The real difference of opinion does not, I think, 
lie in this direction* Rather the puzzle is to account 
for the generality of the practice of "full cost" price
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1* See Chapter VII below.
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formation (or variants thefeof) , to explain why a seller
in a "non-oligopolistic group11 does not attempt to
equate marginal revenue with marginal cost* The
problem is to reconcile the theory of the "large group"
with the practice of "full cost" pricing*
There are two ways in which this difficultly may be
answered*. Firstly, it may be held that, in fact,
oligopoly is quite general. This, for example, is
the position taken by HalL and Hitch* For them, "..the
typical case is that of monopolistic competition with
2an admixture, which is usually large* of oligopoly." 
However, this is not a complete answer unless we can 
also show why oligopoly should be so ubiquitous.
The second answer would be to concede that there 
are situations broadly corresponding to the assumptions
of the "large group"; but to posit additional reasons
hotwhy this doesAlead to unilateral action resulting in the 
equation by firms of marginal cost and marginal revenue. 
This is broadly the line taken by Andrews.
The analysis which we have undertaken in this Part 
puts us in both camps, although, of course, for different 
reasons. On the one hand, we showed in Chapter IV that
2. HalL and Hitch, loc. ait., p. 21*
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literal oligopoly - In the sense of a *few* firms 
sharing the total "market • — is merely the leading 
species of a large genus. (Chain relationship, for 
example, is another such sub-group which may be 
clearly distinguished. )
However, more fundamental than this is that our 
analysis of Chapter III helps explain why oligopolistic 
forms should, be so widespread, why markets should, 
generally, tend to break up into smaller areas.
Usually, the explanation for this tendency runs in 
terms of costs only. Economies of scale are such that 
in many instances there is only room for a few firms 
producing at economic cost in each industry. Moreover, 
it is almost certainly from this argument that the 
identification of •fewness1* with •bigness'* has arisen.
By contrast, we can offer a supplementary explanation 
of the growth of oligopolistic forms from the demand side. 
We have seen that, as a small element of product 
differentiation is introduced into a large group, the 
demand curve will become discontinuous, with the downward 
elasticity greater than the upward. One consequence 
of this is that firms will tend to concentrate upon 
the one segment of the curve or the other. Some firms 
will look to the upper segment of the curve, where it 
will cater for the less sensitive demand at a higher price.
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Other firms will direct attention to the downward segment 
representing the loweivpriced mass demand. (Often, of 
course, the one firm will operate in both directions by 
marketing a speciality line and a mass-appeal line at a 
lower price.) Thus* it may be seen that, once product 
differentiation enters upon the scene, further different­
iation is likely to follow- Product differentiation* in 
short, tends to beget further product differentiation.
As a result, the market for any "product" will tend to be 
broken-up into smaller areas. This process is likely 
to continue so long as there is a significant asymmetry 
on the demand side, i.e. so long as there is a "large 
number" relationship between firms- Advertising is also 
likely to be an integral part of the process of break-up. 
The net result of such trends will be, of course, to 
split the market into smaller and smaller sub-sets of firms 
which are more or less insulated one from the other.
The end product, therefore, is almost certain to involve 
"oligopoli stic " relationships-
However, the process outlined is probably not 
continuous and is likely to develop by fits and starts.
It would probably involve a fairly long period in which 
to work itself out and would be continually subject to 
shifts induced by spontaneous changes in consumer 
behaviour or the effects of advertising. Hence, a demand
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curve such as "that postulated in Chapter i n  may be
found in practice» .Although this situation is
essentially a transitional stage - although of
possibly lengthy duration - it is interesting to
consider the consequences of such a curve for the
theory of price determination*
Speaking of a "reflex* curve of this type - which,
however, he posutlates for quite different reasons -
Efroymson says: "the entrepreneur may be pictured
moving in a succession of leaps toward the profit
maximising solution; but each time, just as he
arrives at the new solution, the profit maximizing
solution moves swiftly away, probably in the direction
4from which he jumped." This assumes, of course, that 
firms are acting unilaterally in their search for a 
maximum position - by no means a necessary state of 
affairs. But even if this were so the picture is too 
static! In practice, there is likely to be, at any 
time, a constellation of other factors in the situation 
which wild make one or the other segment of the curve 
more attractive. For example, eaqpeetations about the
3. Efroymson*s reflex curve is posited as an inverse 
kinky oligopoly curve - where rivals follow 
. price-rises but not price-cuts.
4» C.W. Efroymson, loo. cit., p. 106.
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future course of prices will be important. Again, 
considerations of long-period strategy are likely to 
exercise a large influence - the old problem of short- 
period versus long-period maximization. Moreover, in 
the face of general changes in basic data as distinct 
from those changes specific to one firm, the pressures 
upon firms are likely to be impulsive for all in the 
same direction.
In the real world, stability in the price-output
relationships of films in such a situation would most
likely occur as a result of tacit agreement or the
operation of trade convention. Operation along the
lower segment of the demand curve will be ruled out as
"ungentlemanly* or as "unfair competition". By contrast,
the convention or agreement that each firm should look
to the upper segment of its demand curve vis-a-vis its
policy towards rivals would result in higher prices all
round. And there is some evidence that this is indeed
ashow firms normally act. Thus, D.C. Hague has,/a result 
of a Hall-Hitch type of examination of business 
behaviour, concluded among other things that: "the main
occupation of most entrepreneurs is keeping the margin 
between these average cost and price as wide as 
possible at any given level of output."
5. "Economic Theory and Business Behaviour", Review of 
Economic Studies, XVT, 1949-50, p. 154.
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This is, I believe, the real essence of Kahn* s 
**second degree of collusion - of Professor Fellner* s 
esprit de corps* which ft would pay the individual to 
ignore but which * yet he does not violate because he 
places above individual advantage good standing in the 
group, or the interests of the group. But this
second degree collusion derives its force not from any 
altruistic esprit de corps or pure patriotism towards 
the group (although appeal is almost certainly made to 
such notions as part of the system of sanctions), but 
simply because all firms happen to be in the same boat..
(If one or a few firms get the upper hand at any time, 
war is very likely to break out*) Competitors will 
certainly nibble at each other* s markets insofar as they 
can get away with it. The whole system of non-price- 
competition, secret rebates, selling expenditures, 
quality variation, and so forth, bears witness to this 
fact. But this will only generate into open price 
warfare in exceptional circumstances. The price weapon 
is much too overt and has too many unpleasant implications 
for normal use.
Moreover, it is easy to see why such emphasis is 
placed by firms - and particularly price-leaders —  on
6. R.F. Kahn, **Oxford Studies in the Price Mechanism**, 
Economic Journal, March, 1952, p. 123*
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the notion — however formulated - of "full cost" and 
why this conception is the chief preoccupation of cost 
accountants* By and large, the lower segment of the 
individual fIra* s demand curve will also approximate - 
in elasticity — to the demand curve facing potential 
entrants into the industry* There are, therefore, 
very definite limits to the height to which price may 
be lifted by agreement or convention. Andrews is 
almost certainly correct when he asserts that long 
before the highest price which could be gained from 
exploitation of individual consumer attachments and 
immobility is reached firms collectively will be 
threatened by an inrush of new competition* In other
7words, above a certain price - "full cost" in some sense - 
the demand curve for firms is likely to become very 
elastic to further price increases. "In the long run, 
then, demand is very sensitive to differences in prices, 
and even a well-established market will give no 
protection against the competition of those who are 
able to quote a lower price for the same quality product 
with the same level of associated services* The 
business mem thinks in terms of a right level of price, 
to passi which would mean that he would have the ground
<
7. See Chapter VII below.
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cut from under his feet and lose his market through
Qthe encroachment of other businesses ...*
We may conclude, then, that the normal state of 
affairs for firms in the situation described by the 
curve of Chapter III will be one of neutral equilibrium 
sustained by tacit agreement or convention* However, 
it should perhaps be pointed out that this collusion does 
not necessarily imply monopoly exploitation. In 
general, it should be regarded as in the nature of a 
non-aggression pact rather than a monopoly alliance.
It serves to put a floor under price, to prevent “cut­
throat competition*. This is, as I understand it, an 
important element in Andrews1 position» But it would,
I feel, be equally wrong to go to the opposite extreme, 
as Andrews tends to do, and to conclude that price will 
be essentially a competitive one. Clearly, much will 
depend upon the vulnerability of the market to entry 
by “outsiders* (which, incidentally, may be existing 
fims, e*g- foreign competitors, as well as potential 
entrants)» It is hard to agree with Mr. Andrews1 
inference that entry will usually be sufficiently free 
to ensure a competitive result. In fact, a good deal 
of the energies of “insiders“ is devoted to erecting
8. P.W.S. Andrews, Manufacturing Business, p., 154*
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barriers against the encroachment of "outsiders*. It 
is difficult to believe that these efforts are 
altogether ineffectual.
3. (Ehe Classification of Market Relationships
A few brief comments may now be made on the 
overall subject of market classification.
Firstly, the argument of this Part has provided 
us with alternative definitions of "pure monopoly* 
which are free from the objections discussed in 
Chapter I. Thus, we may define as a "pure monopolist* 
a firm with a smooth demand curve of finite elasticity 
and not subject to "oligopolistic interdependence* 
in respect of any other firm. Oligopolistic 
interdependence may be ruled out in terms of small 
cross-elasticities of demand with all other firms. 
(Although the existence of high cross-elasticities is 
not a sufficient condition to establish interdependence 
the absence of them is a sufficient condition to rule 
interdependence out.) More precisely* we may rule 
out interdependence by the condition that cross­
elasticity should be small in relation to own- 
elasticity whioh, for the firm, must be greater than 
unity. This is essentially Bishop’s position in the 
matter of providing a numbers criterion, although this
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way of stating ft avoids some of the implications which 
are suggested in his formulation. In this case, it is 
not so much the number of firms between whom the 
particular relationship exists which is important, 
but rather the fact that there is a great "distance* 
between any two of them.
As an alternative, we may take our definition back 
one stage further and define a "pure monopolist" in 
terms of the substitution characteristics of his 
product. Then, pure monopoly exists where substitution 
between the own-product and other products is 
continuous in all directions, as in the case with the 
bb* curves of Chapter III.
It should be noticed that such definitions of 
"pure monopoly* are ideal ones in the sense that the 
definition of "pure competition* is an ideal one»
In the real world, films will only approach the one or 
the other. However, firms may approach our definition 
of "pure monopoly* as close as it likes without 
involving us in the logical difficulties noticed In 
connection with traditional definitions of pure 
monopoly, especially the Chamberlin-Triffin conception 
of pure monopoly as a limit in which the elasticity of 
demand for the "pure monopolist* approaches unity.
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Onoe we are able to formulate a satisfactory 
definition of "pure monopoly" we are able to provide 
the other bound to the middle ground of market 
relationships variously described as imperfect or 
monopolistic competition» We are able to answer 
Mrs« Robinson^ question: "But what is the limiting
case at the other end? . *• We know what we mean by 
»selling in a perfect market* , but what is a perfectly 
imperfect market?" Once having answered this 
question, we are then able to yield to Mrs* Robinson's 
temptation "to arrange actual, oases in a series of 
which pure monopoly would be the limit at one end 
and pure competition at the other* " However, it 
should be pointed out again here that the transition 
from the one limit to the other is not simply a linear 
movement along one scale* The transition will take 
place both along the scale of numbers and the scale 
of substitutability; and, in practice, there will be 
an infinite number of combinations possible between 
the two variables*
Finally, what can we say about the "middle ground" 
of imperfect or monopolistic competition. Very little! 
But one. thing does seem obvious: the simple
classification of this large field into "large group" 
cases and "small group" cases is quite inadequate and
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highly misleading. In particular, the idea that 
the cases may be clearly separated and that distinctly 
different pricing behaviour may be expected in either 
camp is almost certainly wrong; and this in turn 
represents an almost insuperable barrier against
the bringing together of price theory and business 
behaviour into a coherent and satisfactory relationship. 
What is clearly needed is the development of a 
comparative anatomy of market forms by which significant 
likenesses and significant differences may be 
distinguished«
In her Economics of Imperfect Corn-petition. Mrs.
Robinson told us that "no sooner had Mr« Sraffa released
the analysis of monopoly from its uncomfortable pen in
a chapter in the middle of the book than it Immediately
swallowed up the competitive analysis without the
9smallest effort. " But, if the argument of this Part 
has been correct, it would appear that in the theory 
of imperfect (and monopolistic) competition the only 
thing "swallowed up* by traditional monopoly analysis 
is something very much like traditional monopoly.
Por the rest, a new start — freed from the 
preconceptions of imperfect and monopolistic competition 
is demand?if we are to make significant headway with
the problem of price determination within the "middle 
ground* which, after all, represents the general case.
THE MEAgtTHEMENT OF AMD CHANGES IN  THE
DEGREE OF MONOPOLY POWER
(181)
VI • MONOPOLY AND ITS MEASUREMENT
Ever since the capitulation of value theory to the 
general monopolistic assumptions sponsored by Mrs# 
Robinson and Professor Chamberlin, there have been 
intermittent attempts to devise an analytical measure 
of the degree of monopoly power.1 If one believes 
the degree of monopoly to be a significant economic 
variable, either in the short- or long-period, then the 
importance of possessing at least a conceptual measure 
of it can hardly be over-estimated. As Machlup puts it: 
wIt is easier to justify the efforts devoted to the 
question of measurement than it would be to justify a 
failure to attempt an answer. Sheer intellectual 
curiosity compels us as economic theorists to work on 
this problem, for we could not with good conscience go on 
talking about "great" or kittle” monopoly power, or 
about various degrees of monopoly, without trying to 
ascertain the meaning of these words. And this implies 
at least the possibility of Conceivabler measurement,
1. For a comprehensive survey of the various measures 
which have been proposed from time to time, see 
F. Machlup, The Political Economy of Monopoly. 
Baltimore, 1952, Ch. 12.
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ev en  i f  p r a c t i c a l  m easurem ent w ere to  rem ain  
2
im p o s s ib le • M
P r e f e r a b ly ,  o f  c o u r s e , th e  m easure s e le c t e d  sh ou ld
be s u s c e p t ib le  to  e m p ir ic a l  a p p l ic a t io n .  I t  may w e l l
be b e t t e r  to  a c c e p t  an i n f e r i o r  m easure w hich  i s
ca p a b le  o f  e m p ir ic a l  a p p l ic a t io n  th an  a more r e f in e d
m easure w h ich  i s  n o t .  Thus, f o r  exam p le, ev en  i f  the
p — m
w ell-k n o w n  L e m e r  in d e x  &------- , where p i s  p r ic e  and m
P
i s  m arg in a l c o s t ,  were i n  o th e r  r e s p e c t s  a d eq u a te , i t  
w ould  s u f f e r  a g r e a t  d e a l beoause o f  i t s  r e s t r i c t e d  
e m p ir ic a l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  d a ta  on m a rg in a l c o s t  b e in g  
n o t o r io u s ly  d i f f i c u l t  to  o b ta in .
A l l  a n a l y t i c a l  m easu res o f  m onopoly power are b ased  
e i t h e r  d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y ,  upon some c o n c e p tio n  o f  
a gap b etw een  p r ic e  and " c o s t* . H en ce, the problem  o f  
m easu rin g  m onopoly power s p l i t s  in t o  two s u b s id ia r y  
q u e s t io n s :
(1 )  Which i s  th e  r e le v a n t  p r ic e  and how i s  i t
de term ined?
(2 )  V/hat i s  th e  a p p r o p r ia te  " cost*?
The v a r io u s  a n a l y t i c a l  m easu res o f  m onopoly power so f a r  
p rop osed  d i f f e r  e s s e n t i a l l y  i n  th a t  th e y  are b ased  on 
d i f f e r e n t  an sw ers to  th e s e  q u e s t io n s ,  p a r t i c u la r ly  the
2 . M achlup, o p . e i t . ,  p .  469
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latter.
For example, Marxfs measure of surplus value, which 
is a first cousin of Kalecki*s percentage gross margin 
measure and must be looked upon as a prototype of 
modem measures of monopoly power, takes wages (variable 
capital) plus materials and depreciation (constant 
capital) as the only real or social cost, so that surplus 
value is measured by the sum of all net factor incomes 
other than wages, expressed as a percentage of the wage­
bill. Among the modems, Lemer assumes price to be 
determined by the equation of marginal revenue with 
marginal cost and takes the difference between price 
and marginal cost, expressed as a percentage of price, 
as his measure of monopoly power. For him, then, 
marginal cost is the relevant cost. Kalecki, starting 
with the Lemer index and upon the further assumption 
that marginal cost is normally equal to average prime 
oost (wages + raw materials), arrives at the percentage 
gross margin as his measure of the degree of monopoly.
It is interesting to notice that this definition of what 
constitutes monopoly is even more sweeping than Marx*s 
conception of surplus value because, whereas Marx would 
allow some salaries (as payments to special forms of 
labour) and depreciation as legitimate social costs,
( 1 8 4 )
K a le c k i’ s m easure d e s c r ib e s  th e se  as monopoly e lem ents»
A n e c e s s a ry  p r e r e q u is i t e  to  the  m easurem ent o f  th e
degree o f  monopoly i s ,  o f  c o u rse , a  f i lm  c o n c e p tio n  o f
w hat we a re  m easuring  -  monopoly. The fo rm s o f
monopoly a re  i n f i n i t e l y  v a r io u s ,  so much so t h a t  i t
h a s  been h e ld  im p o ss ib le  to  reduce them to  a  common
denom inato r, a  n e c e ss a ry  c o n d itio n  f o r  m easurem ent.
F o r exam ple, Sweezy h a s  s ta te d :  "No re a so n a b ly  g e n e ra l
law s o f monopoly p r ic e  have been  d isc o v e re d  because
none e x i s t "  and "We m ust n o t  *». e ^ e c t  to  be a b le  to
reduce th e  th e o ry  o f monopoly p r ic e  to  q u a n t i t a t iv e
p r e c i s io n ;  anyone a t te m p tin g  to  do so w i l l  o n ly  succeed
3
i n  g e t t in g  l o s t  i n  a maze o f  s p e c ia l  c a s e s . "
I s  th e re  a common f a c t o r  r e s id e n t  i n  th e  g r e a t  
v a r i e ty  o f  s i t u a t i o n s  w hich we commonly c a ll .  m o n o p o lis tic ?  
That i s  th e  q u es tio n »  Gan we d is c e rn  i n  c a r t e l s  and 
c o rn e re d  s u p p l ie s ,  i n  t o l l - g a t e s  and tra d e  u n io n s , a  
common e lem en t?  I f  we c a n n o t, we m ust abandon the  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  m easurem ent.
I t  seems c l e a r ,  when the  problem  i s  so s t a t e d ,  th a t  
th e re  i s  one f a c t o r  common to  th e se  s i t u a t i o n s :  th e y
3 , P a u l Sweezy, THEORY OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT. London 
(1 9 4 9 ), p .  271.
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involve some barrier to the *free" flow of economic 
re sources• Wherein does the power of a trade union lie?
It rests firstly in the control - of greater or less 
degree — which it is able to exercise over the training of 
the necessary skills and the enforcement of entrance 
qualifications, and secondly in the sanctions which it can 
bring to bear against non-union labour offering for 
employment within the particular industry,. The essence 
of what we call "pure competition1* as a market situation 
is that the unit-firm is freely reproduce able, i.e. new 
firms may enter the industry without incurring costs 
additional to those which have to be met by established 
units, Contrawise, the essence of "monopolistic 
competition** is that the "product* of a seller cannot - 
at least so far as the customers of that seller are 
concerned - be duplicated. As Chamberlin has put its-
"Mr, Kaldor has rightly pointed out that the assumption 
that ,entranoe to the field in general and to every 
portion of it in particular was unimpeded1 implies that 
»every producer could« if he wanted to, produce 
commodities completely identical to those of any other 
producer ...» Logically, this is what »free entry' in 
its fullest sense must mean, and it is quite 
incompatible with a differentiated product. With 
respect to the particular product produced by any 
individual firm under monopolistic competition, there 
can be no »freedom of entry' whatever. No one else can 
produce a product identical with it, altho he may be able 
to produce others which are fairly good substitutes 
for it. "4
4« E.H. Chamberlin: "Monopolistic or Imperfect Competition?" 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, LI (1937), pp. 566-7.
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Since, ultimately, the ability to produce substitutes is 
universal — in the last analysis as an alternative outlet 
for income - it follows that "freedom of entry" is a 
matter of degree which, if we can measure it, immediately 
suggests a measure of the degree of monopoly power in 
terms of our conception of monopoly as a barrier to the 
"free" flow of economic resources.
Let us take as our starting point the notion of 
perfect reproduceability, in the economic sense, of a 
good or service. This implies both (a) that the good or 
service can command the same price as those currently on 
the market, i.e* it can be made homogeneous with them; 
and (b) that it can be produced at the same cost. By 
contrast, it is the essence of imperfect ability to 
reproduce a commodity or service that either (a) additional 
costs are involved, such as those associated with 
advertising, sales promotion and quality competition; 
or (b) a lower price must be accepted, insofar as it is 
necessary to induce substitution by price-competition. 
Hence, the departure of a given situation from one of 
"free entry" or "perfect reproduceabilityM may be 
expressed in terms either of a cost or a price 
disadvantage, or a combination of both, attaching to a 
newcomer or potential newcomer as compared with the
(187)
entrenched "monopolist*. In this way we may reduce the
infinite variety of the forms of monopolistic impediment 
to the free flow of economic resources to the common 
denominator of cost and/or price advantage.
A measure of the degree of monopoly power along 
these lines was proposed by Mr* Kaldor a few years ago. 
Kaldor*8 suggested measure proceeds from the premise that 
"in a purely competitive industry, where entry is 
completely free, the maximum price which 'insiders* can 
charge without attracting 'outsiders*, and the minimum 
price which they require in order to continue to supply 
the same market, are approximately equal to each other." 
Henoe, he suggests, the divergence from equality of these 
two prices provides a measure of the degree of monopoly 
power enjoyed by an industry. 'Thus, "if we denote the 
price which just fails to cover the costs of production 
(including, of course, a normal rate of profit under 
'cost') of potential new entrants by P and the costs of 
production (inclusive of normal profit) of the 
representative firm by C, then P - C is the amount by 
which the selling price of the representative firm can
P - Cexceed its own costs, and P is the measure of the
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5degree of its Monopoly power*.”
It is this approach to the measurement of the degree 
of monopoly which we will use as a starting point for our 
investigation of the measurement of monopoly power which 
is undertaken in this Part. However, even at first 
sight, Kaldor*s proposed formula is bristling with 
difficulties: the notion of ”full cost1* as applied to an
established firm and the concept of the ”representative 
firm**, to mention only two. These difficulties will be 
the subject of detailed examination in the next two 
chapters, theoretically in Chapter VTI and statistically 
in Chapter VIII. Nevertheless, adoption of Kaldor's 
formula as a point of departure does enable us to clear 
up oertain preliminary problems at this stage.
As has been mentioned above, the first question to 
be determined is what is the relevant price to take in 
a price-minus-cost measure of monopoly power. Since we 
have decided that our measure is to be designed to reflect 
the degree to which impediments to the free flow of 
economic resources are present, it is clear that we must 
allow an appropriate time-interval in which the adjustments 
demanded by a particular situation may take place. It 
follows, then, that the relevant price will be the long-
5* N. Kaldor: ”The Economic* Aspects of Advertising”,
Review of Economic Studies, No. 45, 1949—50, p^o.
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period price. Perhaps we should further justify this 
decision, since the two best-known measures of the 
degree of monopoly have been related to the short-period. 
Lerner proposed that his measure should apply to *the 
very shortest period*, while Kaleckirs measure, derived 
from the Lerner formula, is also based upon the short- 
period variables.
There does appear to be a good case for making an 
index of monopoly power independent of temporary, short- 
period changes in demand and/or cost conditions, and 
certainly this procedure would be in the spirit of most 
economic thought to date. At first sight, it may be 
thought that the Lerner index would not reflect such 
short-period variations, because it depends on the ratio 
of price to marginal cost and, hence, would only change 
with changes in the elasticity of demand. However, it 
is almost certain that elasticity of demand is subject 
to short-period variation for all sorts of reasons. 
Moreover, It would, in particular, be hard to sustain 
the proposition that short-period elasticity of demand 
is independent of the level of short-period price. 
Further, it is worth noticing that the degree of monopoly 
calculated on the basis of short-period price and 
marginal cost will bear no clear relation to the degree
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of monopoly based upon similar criteria, but calculated 
in respect of the long-period. This point has been made 
by Machlup who says: "It would not disturb me to find
two different degrees of monopoly for a particular firm, 
one referring to short-run considerations, the other to 
the long run.
With Kalecki the difficulty is more apparent, since 
his measure is based on the assumption of constant 
marginal costs or, in other words, perfectly elastic 
supply. However, he is forced to recognize that there 
may be some short-period situations in which output may 
be straining against capacity so that price rises to ration 
sales* The consequent increase in the percentage gross 
margin Kalecki attributes to "bottleneck factors". 
Presumably, if a temporary reduction in the percentage 
gross margin were forced, e.g. by short-run dumping by
6. F. Machlup, op. cit., p. 512. Cf. also: "Long-run
marginal cost included new investment outlays while 
short-run marginal cost does not include any part of 
investment cost. But new investment outlays are made 
only when the cost of increased output with the given 
capacity would be too high, that is, when long-run 
marginal cost - the additional cost of producing 
additional output with increased productive capacity - 
is less than short-run marginal cost. It follows that a rule to use only short-run marginal cost for 
calculations of the degree of monopoly may sometimes - 
namely, when capacity is utilized almost to the limit - 
result in a lower monopoly index than if long-run 
marginal cost were used." (p. 512n.)
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"outsiders*, this would have to be treated as a sort of 
negative "bottleneck factor* deductible from the degree 
of monopoly. Theoretically at least, the degree of 
monopoly as defined by Kalecki would be susceptible to 
quite sharp short-period fluctuations, particularly so 
far as the individual firm or industry is concerned.
A measure of the degree of monopoly referred to 
a long-period basis is free of these objections and 
therefore has much to commend it» The long-period 
itself will be defined as the period necessary, in virtue 
of technical or physical conditions of production, 
for resources to flow into a given industry. The 
appropriate price then for our monopoly index will be 
the long-period price; and the precise manner in which 
this long-period supply price is determined will be the 
subject of detailed examination in Section 1 of the 
next chapter.
Meanwhile, it is necessary to give some preliminary 
attention to the cost element of Kaldor*s measure of 
monopoly power which we have adopted as our starting point. 
The relevent cost, Kaldor suggests, is the "full cost* 
of the "representative firm*. As already indicated, 
both these concepts are very slippery and will require 
detailed investigation. This will be the task of 
Section 2 of the following chapter. Here, rather, we are
concerned with the broader question: what elements
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should we allow to enter into the calculation of "cost*? 
There are two problems here concerned with the treatment 
of (1) selling costs; and (2) rental elements.
(l) Selling Costs
On this subject, Kaldor has put the position 
succinctly:
MIt would be wrong to suppose , however, that the 
difference p - c is normally retained by the firms in 
the form of profit. In an industry that is not a 
pure monopoly but consists of a number of separate 
concerns, each of which is striving to obtain a 
growing share of the market, a considerable part, if 
not the whole, of the difference will tend to get 
taken up by the expenses incurred in order to enlarge 
the size of the market, the expenses consequent on 
»non-price-competition*, commonly referred to by 
economists as » selling costs*• The distinguishing 
mark of »selling costs* is that they arise in 
consequence of the fact that the price is higher than 
the purely competitive price, and their magnitude 
will be proportionate to this difference, i*e* it will 
depend on the magnitude of the obstacles facing 
outsiders* Selling costs exist with all kinds of 
market organization (except with the perfect market 
which dispenses completely with good=will). They 
arise, therefore, with »wholesalers* domination* just 
as much as with »manufacturers* domination*. But it 
is only in the latter case that they become 
quantitatively important as a proportion of final 
price. A further complication arises from the fact 
that the difference p — o cannot be taken as given, 
irrespective of whether selling oosts are incurred or 
not, or of how they are incurred. In so far as the 
services provided in conjunction with these selling 
costs are such that they increase the manufacturer*^ 
goodwill and attach his customers more firmly to 
himself — which they mostly are - the level of p is
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raised. Hence the incurring of selling costs may 
be regarded as partly Competitive * (i.e. aiming to 
enlarge the fiim*s share in the market) and partly 
protective* (i.e. aiming to increase the firm's 
monopoly power), though these two kinds of effects 
may not always be clearly distinguishable from each 
other.*7
Thus, selling costs are both a cause and a 
consequence of monopoly power. Insofar as they are 
a consequence, no problem is involved, since the degree 
of monopoly will stem from some other sourcet e.g. 
economies of large-scale, which may be determined 
independently. However, protective* selling costs 
are creative of monopoly power and must enter into any 
measurement of it as a separate factor. As Kaldor has 
pointed out, it is difficult to identify any particular 
selling expenditure as belonging to the one category or * 
the other. However, one way out of the difficulty 
which suggests itself is to take as an index of the 
protective effect of selling outlay the degree to which 
an entrant firm would have to match the selling costs of 
insiders in order to obtain an economic foothold in the 
market. Then, entry supply price, P, will include 
such necessary outlays; while G, the full production cost 
of established firms, will, of course, be exclusive of
7. N. Kaldor: **The Economic Aspects of Advertising**, 
loc. cit., p. 21. Italics in original.
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the selling costs of those firms. In this way, the 
selling outlay mandatory for a potential entrant will 
enter into the determination of the magnitude of P - C.
The precise relationship between the selling outlays 
required of potential entrants and the degree of monopoly 
shelter enjoyed by established firms in virtue of them 
will be examined in the following chapter.
Meanwhile, there remains, on the subject of selling
costs, only one other problem requiring preliminary
notice, viz* the problem of distinguishing "selling costs”
from "production costs”. In the real world the distinction
becomes blurred at the margin; and we require some
theoretical criterion by which the distinction may be
drawn. Kaldor treats the issues involved at length -
and, in the writer*s view, adequately; and it is not
proposed to re-cover the same ground here. Kaldor
concludes that selling costs are ”the excess of the total
expenditures actually incurred, at all stages of the chain
of production and distribution, over the amount that would
have been incurred, if all separate services performed in
the course of the productive and distributive process had
0been priced separately."
Although this definition is derived from the criterion
8. N. Kaldor, loc. cit., p* 23
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of perfect competition, it does not involve the description
of all expenditures other than those which would occur
in the very specialized form of market organization -
a form which could not conceivably apply to the marketing
of many goods and services of the real world, however
little the monopoly power present - which is the subject
of the perfectly competitive model as "selling costs”.
Even a socialist society would undoubtedly - and the
Soviet Union does - undertake, for example, a minimum of
advertising and packaging of a wide range of goods and
services. Thus, a cinema, in any society, would be
bound to advertise to some extent the programme on offer
from time to time. Classified advertising which is
largely informative in character represents nearly 40 per
9cent of total press advertising even in our economy.
Again, cigarettes would presumably need protection from 
damp and heat, such as is provided by cellophane, just as 
much under socialism as capitalism. It may even be 
thought worthwhile making the packaging attractive.
In short, a socialist society would incur expenditures 
which would not be found in the theoretical "perfect 
market”. It would be difficult to justify similar 
expenditures being described as monopolistic merely
9. See B. Hieser, "Advertising Outlay in Australia”, 
Economic Becord, Dec., 1951, pp. 176-189.
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because they are made under capitalism.. It is the 
advantage of the Kaldor criterion that these types of 
service, which could command a price if offered 
separately, do not fall into the category of "selling 
costs" and hence do not rank as monopoly elements.
(2) Rental Elements
Our problem in relation to rents is somewhat analogous 
with that of selling costs; and arises out of the fact 
that any monopolistic advantage may be capitalized and 
appear as a money cost of production (as rent) either to 
the established firm or potential entrant. An established 
firm may be making barely normal money profits, yet there 
may be a considerable degree of monopoly resident in the 
situation. A good example of this is provided by 
Australian hotels, where the capital cost of purchase of 
a licence or its rental is so high that the purchaser or 
lessee may make very modest profits on the capital he must 
invest. (Incidentally, this is a principal reason why 
so little of hotel profits is ploughed back into improved 
facilities and services in the case of individually owned 
or leased premises. The brewery-tied hotels do much 
better in this respect.) Other examples of the 
capitalization of monopoly privilege come readily to mind.
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Thus, a firm owning a patent may make large monopoly profits 
whereas a firm which is otherwise similarly situated hut 
which has to licence (rent) a patent may make very small 
profits* Again, the purchase of goodwill - in large 
part the capitalization of past selling expenditures - 
may be an alternative to current selling outlay* It is 
clear that rents paid in respect of such goodwill must 
be accorded the same treatment as current selling costs, 
from the point of view of calculation of the monopoly 
surplus in a given situation* The rent of urban land 
sites is another example* A new firm entering the retail 
trade may well have a direct choice between paying a high 
rent for a particularly favoured site or spending heavily 
on advertising to attract customers to a less favoured 
location. Clearly, the one form of expenditure must 
be placed in the same category as the other*
Thus, we find that rents arise directly out of many 
situations which have almost always been regarded as 
monopolistic* The problem then arises of where we are 
to draw the line between rents which may be looked upon 
as a monopoly surplus and those which may not* One way 
out would, of course, be to reckon all rents as monopoly 
elements in the manner of Kalecki* However, this 
solution must be rejected for the following reasons:
(1) Although there Is every precedent for the treatment
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of rent as an "unearned surplus", to describe this 
surplus as "monopolistic" would be to stretch the 
meaning of the word "monopoly" far from its traditional 
and usual sense* Substantial monopoly surpluses would 
then become compatible with market situations 
approaching the conditions of perfect competition.
(2) Rent is an expenditure alternative to capital 
outlay. For example, one may pay a high rent for land 
with a natural water supply or, alternatively, pay a 
lower rent and expend capital on providing such a supply. 
Clearly, if we count all rents as monopoly elements, we 
would also be bound to include quasi—rents accruing to 
capital. The result would be a portmanteau conception 
of monopoly which would swallow up many distinctions 
which it is valuable to make. For example, rents 
arising out of the productive advantages of natural 
resources are quite compatible with the best allocation 
of resources from the point of view of production - 
though not of course necessarily from the point of view 
of distribution. By contrast, the presence of monopoly 
implies some distortion from the optimum allocation of 
resources.
Therefore, we are left with the problem of 
distinguishing rents arising from monopoly situations 
from those which do not. A first approach to an answer
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to this problem may be made by invoking our distinction 
drawn in the previous section between production and 
selling costs* Using the same criterion, we may then 
distinguish between rents arising out of a selling 
advantage and those arising out of a production advantage* 
Then, all rents in the former category may be isolated 
as monopoly elements* This class would include, for 
example, rents payable in respect of capitalized goodwill, 
restrictive selling licences (as with hotels), and urban 
selling sites (the excess of the rent over the opportunity 
rent eamable in production).
However, rents deriving from monopolistic selling 
advantages do not exhaust those rents which may be 
legitimately described as monopolistic. Two further 
types, falling in the category of production rents, may 
be identified; (1) those deriving from patents and the like; 
and (2) those deriving from the exclusive or near-exclusive 
possession of the supply of some natural raw material, e.g. 
in Australia B.H.P* 1 s control over the rich iron ore 
deposits of Iron Knob and Iron Monarch; or in Africa 
the diamond cartel. Both involve a barrier to the entry 
of new producers, the one due to law, the other to nature. 
The treatment of rents earned by patents is simple enough; 
they are measured by the excess revenue eamable by the 
patented process over that eamable if unpatented, freely
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available, techniques were used. In the case of 
exclusive access to natural raw materials, we are, 
however, faced with the subsidiary problem of 
distinguishing the monopoly rents implied in such a 
situation from rents ordinarily earnable from any other 
"free gift of nature," such as a fertile tract of land* 
This distinction is best drawn in terms of the transfer- 
earnings of the asset. In a competitive regime, the 
rent payable for "land" must be sufficient to keep it 
employed in the particular line of production. It will 
therefore be just greater than the rent it could earn 
in an alternative line of production* On the other 
hand, monopoly elements are present when "land* is 
not transferable from one line of production to another. 
New "land” cannot come into the particular line of 
production; there is a large gap between the earning 
capacity of this highly specialized type of "land" and 
its earning capacity in an alternative line of production. 
For example, Iron Knob and Iron Monarch and its environs 
would certainly be extra-marginal if it were not for 
the iron ore deposits there. Consequently, we define 
the excess of rents of specialized natural resources 
over their transfer-earnings as a monopoly surplus.
In effect, then, we class all rents other than those 
which would occur in a regime of perfect competition as
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monopoly elements.
Having settled these preliminary questions, we are 
now ready to begin the task of developing a measure of 
the degree of monopoly power, upon the basis of the 
general principles outlined above.
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CHAPTER VII
THE DEG-REE OP MONOPOLY POWER1 
1* Entry Supply Price
In this chapter it is proposed to investigate in 
detail the measure of monopoly power suggested hy Kaldor, 
taking into account the general considerations discussed 
in Chapter VI* The more straightforward of the elements 
of Kaldor*s measure is P, the price required to attract 
new entrants into an industry* To give precision to the 
concept it is necessary to consider the conditions which 
will determine whether entry is attractive or not and, if 
it is, upon what scale. Let us first prepare a schedule 
relating full production cost of the potential entrant to 
the various volumes of output which he is likely to 
consider* Pull production cost will include ’'normal 
profit1', the price necessary to attract free capital into 
the industry, which will depend on the ruling long-term 
rate of interest and the degree of risk attaching to the 
particular line of production* It will also include all
1* The "basic argument of this chapter was published under 
the title: "The Degree of Monopoly Power", Economic
Record, May 1952, pp* 1-12. However, some important 
modifications are introduced into the version given 
here.
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"production rentals" which the newcomer has to meet.
(The outlay involved in such rentals is, of course, merely 
an alternative to the expenditure of capital or labour to 
achieve a given productive result, e.g. in the simplest 
case, a factory may he rented or built.) Pull production 
cost will, however, exclude selling costs and "selling 
rentals" in virtue of the argument of the previous chapter. 
The full production cost schedule so prepared will, then, 
define a cost curve which we reproduce as curve CG! of 
Figure 6.
Let us now consider the demand side. Y/here monopoly 
elements are present, we cannot simply draw a demand curve 
for the entrant firm, because this will not be independent 
of the selling outlay undertaken by the new firm nor of 
the commitments it is prepared to undertake in the form 
of "selling rentals", i.e. in the purchase of existing 
monopolistic selling advantages. Since our treatment of 
these latter rents will be the same as for current selling 
expenditure, we may proceed on the understanding that the 
portmanteau term "selling costs" is used to include these 
rents. Then, in the general case of imperfect markets, 
the entrant firm will have the choice, between limits, of 
attracting an economic volume of sales either by price- 
competition with existing firms or by resort to selling 
outlays or a combination of both. Theoretically, for each 
such output, a ,  there will be a whole range of varying
~u\.
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combinations of price- and non-price-competition which a 
potential entrant might consider, although in practice 
the choice is likely to be much more restricted.
At all events, for each output there will be a best 
combination of these elements - best in the sense of 
yielding the greatest net revenue per unit of sale. Let 
us denote this maximum net revenue obtainable in respect 
of any output, a , by R . Then to each such R there willX X  Xpbe a corresponding best price P • If we plot theseX
values against the outputs concerned, we obtain a net 
revenue curve RR* and a price curve PP* as in Figure 6.
2. The price which will be relevant is, of course, the final 
price the entrant may expect to be able to get in the 
market, after allowance has been made for the fact that 
existing sellers may greet his entry by lowering their 
prices, that is to say, it must take full account of 
oligopolistic reactions to his own decision to enter.
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Prom Figure 6 it is easy to see that the price which 
"insiders" may charge without attracting "outsiders" is 
the price Just "below that given "by the point of tangency 
between the curves RRf and CC*. For, if RRf lies wholly 
below CC*, there will be no point of entry which is 
profitable and, consequently, "insiders" can charge a 
higher price. On the other hand, if RR1 lies above OC1 
at any point, then at that point entry is attractive and 
the influx of newcomers may be expected to force down RR1 
to the point of tangency.
The difference P - R in respect of any output x at
A  X
which the firm may enter we shall call, following Kaldor, 
the cost of entry in respect of that output.
The curves we have drawn in Figure 6 are those which 
may be expected in a substantially imperfect or monopolistic 
market situation in which the revenue curve RRf may be 
presumed to fall fairly rapidly as the new firm*s target 
output is increased, this for three reasons: (1) the need
to invoke greater price-competition to break existing 
attachments of a larger number of buyers; (2) the larger 
the projected incursion into the markets of established 
sellers, the more likely is retaliatory price-cutting by 
those sellers, thus requiring further reduction in the 
price which the entrant may expect to receive; and (3) 
sooner or later, diminishing returns to selling outlay are 
likely to set in. It is impossible to say a priori
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whether the price or the revenue curve will fall the more 
rapidly. On the one hand, the possibility of retaliatory 
price-cutting will tend to make non-price competition more 
attractive; on the other, diminishing returns to selling 
outlays will tend to make it less attractive. Whether 
price- or non-price competition becomes the more or less 
important as the scale of the new firm1s target output 
increases will clearly depend upon how these opposing 
tendencies balance out.
As a market situation approaches that of pure 
competition, the curves PP* and RR* will move towards 
coincidence and their slopes will approach the horizontal. 
This means, of course, that in such a situation a small 
price differential is all that is required to attract any 
volume of sales desired. The second condition of the pure 
competition model may also be noticed. For pure 
competition to obtain, individual firm outputs must only 
represent a small fraction of total market supply. In 
other words, economies of scale must be negligible compared 
with the size of the market which is merely another way of 
saying that operation at a point of minimum cost is 
consistent with a large number of firms. In this case, 
then, the curve CCT will be U-shaped over the relevant 
range. Entry supply price will be given by the point of 
tangency betv/een the horizontal PP* (= RRf) and the U-shaped 
GO* as in Figure 7» This is, of course, the normal long-
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Figure 7
period equilibrium position of the special case of pure 
competition* In short, then, the analysis advanced here 
is able to embrace the limiting case of pure competition, 
in correspondence with our conception of monopoly discussed 
in Chapter VI.
There are two further matters on the subject of entry 
supply price which demand consideration. Firstly, the 
analysis given above, as it stands, is far too static.
In the real world, a firm considering entry into an 
industry is not faced with a situation in which it may or 
may not secure an economic share of market output at any 
particular point in time. Rather it is a question of 
whether such a firm can hope to build up to such an 
economic output over a period of time. This period may
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"be considerable, even years; and during such time a new 
firm may have to be prepared to incur losses* Such 
losses represent, of course, a cost of entry - and often 
a formidable one. We must, therefore, take account of 
this factor in our analysis.
To do this we must take a look at a potential entrant 
position, not as at a point in time, but over a period. 
This period must be that over which a firm is able to 
foresee, with a reasonable degree of probability, future 
trends - trends of costs and of demand principally. Let 
us divide this period into smaller intervals - say the 
accounting year, for example. Then in respect of each 
such "year" we will have a corresponding pair of curves 
CC’  ^and HR1 In general the position of these curves 
will change through time. If at no point throughout the 
period under consideration does the curve RR* stand above 
CC’, then at no time will entry be profitable. However, 
it will often be the case that, while RR1 will lie below 
0G! over the early years of establishment, it will rise 
above GC* in respect of later years as the new firm’s 
market is established and consolidated. Then, for any 
given planned or possible rate of growth of the firm’s 
market, specific losses will be incurred in the earlier 
years. In respect of each such year this loss will be 
equal to a (G„ - R ) where a is the output for the year.
X  X X X
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Clearly, this loss represents a cost of establishment 
which must he a charge against subsequent years. Within 
the framework of our analysis this situation is best 
dealt with by successively deducting from the revenue of 
each year the cost of liquidating losses anticipated in 
respect of the immediately preceding year, such losses, of 
course, having been charged with the appropriate rate of 
interest. It will then remain a condition of entry that 
in some year the corrected RR1 stands above 00* in respect 
of some output. The successive reduction of RR* in 
relation to PPf specifically allows anticipated establish­
ment losses to enter into the final ,fcost of entry" as 
conceived above. The practical importance of this change 
from a purely static model is that it brings into view 
at once that, other things being equal, the cost of entry 
into an industry will be lower in an expanding industry 
than in one that is stationary or declining.
The second matter v/hich requires consideration to 
complete this part of our analysis is the question of 
defining the "industrjr". So far we have taken this for 
granted and talked of the "industry" and of "insiders" 
and "outsiders" without considering the well-known 
difficulties of these concepts. In many cases, of course, 
the "industry" will be fairly easy to define in practice; 
in others it will not. However, in this context we need 
not worry too much about the exact bounding of an "industry
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as such* Here we are concerned with entry, and the main 
significance of the industry v/ill he: (a) from the point
of view of the potential entrant, the most favourable 
place to enter; and (b) from the point of view of the 
existing firm, the most vulnerable spot for encroachment 
by new firms* Perhaps this may best be made clear by an 
illustration* Suppose we have a situation of pure chain- 
relationship* Clearly, it will be most profitable for a 
new firm to enter at the "weakest" link in the chain. 
Similarly, the "insider" cannot be content merely to 
estimate the danger of entry in his sector. He must 
also look at the weakest link, because entry here will 
produce repercussions which are likely to be passed along 
the chain to other firms in it*
Therefore, an established firm will be concerned with 
entry from tv/o main points of view: (1) identification
of the most favourable point of entry; and (2) calculation 
of the repercussions on itself both directly and by 
transmission through the price-output policies of associated 
firms* Formally this problem could be set out in terms 
of impact coefficients something along the lines of cross- 
elasticities* (Cross-elasticities, however, are not 
themselves suitable for this because they are not adapted 
to measuring cross-relationship with "potential firms" 
whose outputs and price are not given*)
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In practice, however, the industry is likely to he 
a business-political entity representing a grouping of 
firms with a common interest which may stem from other than 
purely economic factors* This grouping may be inter­
national, national or local, and it may change from time 
to time although the actual firms may remain individually 
the same. We have our international cartels, of course. 
Contrawise, we get local manufacturers producing for a 
local market who will consider similar producers in the 
next State as “outsiders”. But probably the most important 
demarcation is that along national lines. Indeed, we 
have special associations of national producers and business 
Jargon talks of national products and nationally-advertised 
products. Here we have groups of national producers with 
the domestic producers representing the “insiders” and 
foreign producers “outsiders”. This type of grouping 
gains its special significance, of course, in virtue of 
the fact that tariffs run on national lines.
At all events, in identifying the most dangerous 
threat to their market, producers will have to take account 
of the existence of established “foreign” firms which may 
or may not represent a more immediate danger than “domestic” 
entrants into the industry. The concept of entry 
therefore needs to be modified to this extent. If entry 
supply price as defined above is lower than the "landed” 
price of “foreign” goods then price will tend to settle
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around the "domestic" entry supply price. If, on the 
other hand, "foreign" producers can enter the market at 
a lower price than new "domestic" entrants then clearly 
price will tend to he held down to this figure. It follows 
that the degree of monopoly obtaining in any particular 
industry will he very strongly influenced hy transport 
costs and hy tariff policies.
2. The "Full Cost" of an Existing Firm
We now turn to consider C, the "full cost" of 
production of the representative firm. For the time 
being, we put aside the problem of defining the "represen­
tative firm" and concern ourselves with the full production 
cost of any existing firm.
No difficulty arises in the case of current production 
costs, which we shall designate hy c, that is with those 
costs for which the firm may re-contract and which it has 
to meet so long as production continues. These costs will 
include prime costs (wages and raw materials), current 
overheads (salaries, printing and stationery, telephones 
and postages, etc.), normal profit on working capital 
(since this can he varied in response to both output and 
value changes) and prime depreciation. We assume, as is 
usually the case, that prime depreciation - wear and tear - 
is continuously made good hy maintenance expenditures which
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are determined "by current values. Obsolescence, of 
course, is in an altogether different category.
It is when we come to consider those costs of 
production which are fixed, either because they are 
embodied in past contracts (e.g. leaseholds) or represent 
expenditures which are ''sunk and gone" into fixed capital 
equipment, that our real difficulty begins. Clearly, 
the purchase price (the accounting value) is irrelevant 
here. Obviously something in the nature of reproduction 
value is required. But reproduction value is a loose 
concept when applied to investment in capital equipment, 
for there may be no present market for the actual physical 
units being used in production. Actual equipment will 
differ from currently purchasable equipment in that it 
will, in general, have suffered obsolescence (or wear and 
tear not made good) of greater or lesser degree. The 
value of the contribution of the existing equipment can, 
therefore, only be established in terms of its efficiency 
in producing the given product as compared with the 
efficiency of currently purchasable equipment, that is 
the most up-to-date technique available to a newcomer.
This value we shall call product reproduction value.
Also, there is the question of excess capacity to be 
taken into account. In general, some excess capacity 
will exist. Often this general under-capacity working 
in manufacture is attributed to technological factors.
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But this is not the only reason nor, necessarily, the 
most important reason* No entrepreneur "building a new 
plant, or enlarging an old one, would dream of designing 
its capacity so as to "just fit" his anticipated immediate 
output. Some slack will always he provided. Apart from 
the diseconomies of subsequent ad hoc extensions and 
additions, every entrepreneur will want some excess 
capacity with which to meet sudden increases in demand, 
since it is much easier to form the buying habits of new 
customers than to break these habits once formed. At all 
events, irrespective of whether excess capacity is of the 
nature of a margin for expansion or of a technological 
character, the same considerations will operate for the 
existing firm and for the potential entrant.
But where excess capacity exists in excess of the 
"normal" the case is different, since this clearly 
represents an over-investment of capital in relation to 
current market conditions. The newcomer, on the other 
hand, can choose a scale of plant more appropriate to 
these conditions. Therefore, it is clear that capital 
sunk in excess equipment of this category cannot enter 
into the product reproduction value of the existing firm1 s 
capital.
In terms of accounting practice, our argument may be 
summed up as follows. In so far as the supply price of 
equipment has altered (in terms of money) this represents
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a capital loss or gain which has actually "been incurred.
In so far as the equipment has suffered "normal1 
obsolescence or depreciation this will have been a charge 
against past production, the value of the equipment having 
been appropriately written down. Where unforeseen 
obsolescence (e#g. due to innovation) occurs, this also 
represents a capital loss which has in fact been incurred 
and cannot be a charge against future production. Exactly 
the same may be said in respect of idle capacity in excess 
of the "normal". Although accountants do not actually 
treat these phenomena in the way described, it is 
interesting to notice how, in practice, they do modify 
their formal approach to capital values in the face of 
large changes in the product reproduction value of the 
capital invested in fixed assets. Often, in the face of 
substantial changes in money values, assets will be re­
valued. Again, it is quite common accounting practice 
to provide large amortization charges in times of high 
income and a negligible charge in times of low earning 
capacity. Moreover, in the face of large and more or 
less permanent contractions in income-earning capacity, it 
is common practice for firms to "reconstruct" or "reorganize 
their capital structures (in terms of book values) to bring 
these values more into keeping with the earning capacity 
of the capital concerned.
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To give precision to the concept of product repro­
duction value, let us call the capital cost of the most 
up-to-date technique available to a newcomer at the output 
corresponding to entry supply price, k • (Capital cost
V/
is defined as the estimated amortization charge plus 
normal profit on capital invested.) For the moment, we 
abstract from economies of scale or, in other words, we 
assume an identical output for the existing firm and for 
the new entrant* Then the full production cost of the 
new producer is defined as C = k + c , where c is the 
current cost as defined above of the new firm. Clearly,
then, C is the reproduction value of the product and k 
is the contribution to this value of the capital employed. 
If c’ is the current cost per unit of product of an 
existing firm, then c! + k* = C is the full cost of 
production of that firm. But since the value of the 
product is defined as C then G1 = C and, hence, 
k ’ = Ce - cf; and k*, related to the expected life of 
the equipment, gives the product reproduction value of 
the existing firm1s capital equipment. This is so because 
the lower efficiency of existing equipment as compared with 
that available to the newcomer can only manifest itself in 
a rising c* per unit of product. Thus, we define the 
full production cost of an existing firm as being equal to 
the full cost of a new producer using the best available
technique and producing an identical output* If outputs
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are in fact identical - or, what amounts to the same thing, 
if economies of scale are absent - then clearly P - C will 
he identical with P - CQ which is egual to E, the cost of 
entry as defined in Section 1* This, then, constitutes 
the first element of our definition of the degree of 
monopoly power#
We must now consider the more general case where the
output of the existing firm differs from that of the
newcomer* It is easy to see from the previous discussion
that, if G = k + c is the full cost of production of an
entrant firm at the actual scale of output enjoyed by the
existing producer with whom we are concerned, then C* =
and k* = CQ - c1* But, in general, G0 will not be equal 8 8
to G , for the existing firm may enjoy economies of scale ©
not available to a newcomer* Thus, CQ - G0 measures the 
shelter enjoyed by the existing producer in virtue of his 
established scale of output* Economies of scale, which 
we designate by S, are very important in practice and may 
often constitute the most formidable obstacle to competition 
from new producers* Thus, S = CQ - G . measuring the 
economies of scale enjoyed by the established firm, is the 
second element to be embraced in our measure of the degree 
of monopoly power, and P - C = E + S*
We must now turn our attention to a point which we 
neglected in the foregoing analysis* It will be recalled 
that we defined the capital cost of an existing producer
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as k* = C - c*, where G is the full cost of a new 
producer at the actual scale of output enjoyed by the 
existing firm and c! is the existing firmfs current cost. 
This is the general case; hut it is important to notice 
two special cases* Firstly, we consider the case where 
cf > 0a and, consequently, k* is negative. This means 
that the current cost of the existing producer is greater 
than the full cost of a new entrant at the same output.
This could easily happen in the face of rapid technological 
progress. Under competitive conditions this would mean 
that the existing firm would have to re-equip or cease 
production. The firm has become extra-marginal. But 
under monopoly conditions a firm may continue in production 
so long as its monopoly elements, E + S, are sufficient to 
shelter it from the consequences of c'> C_. In other 
words, the firm does not become extra-marginal until 
o’ - Gq (= -k*) is greater than E + S or, v/hat amounts to 
the same thing, until cf is greater than P, that is when 
price fails to cover the current costs of production.
This illustrates a facet of monopoly which is of fundamental 
importance, namely, that the barriers to the exit of 
marginal firms are exactly of the same order as the barriers 
to the entry of new firms. It will be clear, then, that
we need make no amendment to the conclusions reached above 
for this case. A negative k! will, of course, make a big
difference to accounting profits, but will not affect the
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degree of monopoly shelter enjoyed "by the firm*
A second special case must now he noticed, namely, 
the case where the current costs of production of an 
existing firm are lov/er than those of a newcomer at the 
same scale of output, i*e. where c’< c  . This means 
that the productive efficiency of the existing producer 
cannot he reproduced hy a newcomer* This could he the 
result of the possession hy the existing firm of secret 
or patented technical processes not available to an 
entering firm or (and this factor is becoming increasingly 
important in the modern world) of the possession of what 
is nowadays called ‘'know-how'1. This type of monopoly 
shelter is very important in certain sectors of a modern 
economy; and it must he embraced by our measure of the 
degree of monopoly power. This element we call T, the 
shelter enjoyed hy virtue of secret or patented processes 
of production or secret "know-how", and clearly T = ca - c
3* The General Measure of Monopoly Power
We are now in a position, tentatively, to define our
general measure of the degree of monopoly power which for
P — Gthe time being we will denote hy M". Then, M" = — p— ,
where P - C is equal to E + S + T; and where
E = P - CQ is the "cost of entry";
S = C - C measures economies of scale; and e a *
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T = c, - o' is the shelter provided by the possession
of secret or patented technical processes 
or equipment or "know-how"«
Of course, in any particular situation, any of these elements 
may be equal to zero*
To show these relationships graphically, we reproduce 
the curves of Figure 6, leaving out the net revenue curve 
RRT for the sake of clarity. We add a "shadow" cost 
curve TT* for those cases in which shelter of the nature 
of T is enjoyed. Clearly, the ordinates of this curve will
be less than those of CC! by an amount c& - c*. Then, from 
Figure 8 it is clear that M" = ■ = ~~ and E = PR, S = RS
and T = ST.
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One final modification is required at this stage.
When firms act unilaterally in the pursuit of profits, 
long-period price will tend to - settle automatically around 
entry supply price as the result of the entry and efflux 
of firms. However, when there is cohesive action "by the 
firms within an industry or when oligopolistic warfare 
breaks out price may deviate from entr3^ supply price in 
one direction or the other. In particular, in a "tight" 
oligopoly situation price may he held above entry supply 
price even in the long-period. Price can be maintained 
at this higher level because entry may be held off by the 
threat of cohesive reduction of prices by insiders to a 
level which may well deter the most venturesome potential 
rival. In practice, strongly oligopolistic industries 
resort to all sorts of variants of this strategy. For 
example, a common occurrence is to threaten potential or 
actual newcomers with long and very expensive litigation 
over alleged patent infringements and associated legal 
technicalities. Again, threats of boycotts, various 
forms of physical intimidation and the use of political 
influence have been used from time to time to prevent the 
entry of new firms. Clearly, in so far as such tactics 
are successful, "insiders" may be able to hold their price 
above the purely economic entry supply price.
On the other hand, where oligopolistic cohesion breaks 
down and firms enter on protracted warfare v/ith the end of
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achieving hegemony for one or a few firms, price may he 
held well "below entry supply price over a considerable 
period of time*
Therefore, to take account of these factors, we 
introduce a coefficient into our measure of monopoly power 
which may he described as a coefficient of oligopolistic 
cohesion* If we use k to denote this term, then our 
monopoly measure may he recast in the form:
Clearly, k may he rather greater than unity when firms are 
able to maintain price above entry supply price by resolute 
cohesive action; k will be less than unity when there is 
a breakdown of intra-group discipline which forces price 
below entry supply price.
4*  Monopoly Forms and Monopoly Strategy
One of the principal advantages of the measure of 
monopoly power developed above is that it is directly 
referable to the strategy and activities of monopolies 
in practice. By contrast, the Lerner index of monopoly 
power is several times removed from the practices of 
monopolists as they are manifest in the real world. It 
is only in the most indirect way that one may link the 
everyday strategy of monopolists with the aim of reducing 
elasticity of demand and thereby altering the relationship
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"between marginal cost and price. It will therefore "be 
useful to pause at this stage and "briefly consider our 
measure of monopoly power in terms of the forms and 
strategy of monopoly as they appear in the real world.
Economies of Scale and Numbers
Perhaps the most important single tendency towards 
monopoly is found in the concentration of production, 
either in virtue of horizontal or vertical integration. 
Horizontal integration has its principal raison dfetre 
in economies of scale. The reduction in the number of 
firms which results from such integration is not so much 
a cause of monopoly as a consequence of it. Fewness of 
producers is a symptom of the existence of monopoly 
power - resident in economies of scale or some other form 
of shelter from "outside" competition - not a cause in 
itself; for it is clear that a small number of producers 
could exert no monopoly power beyond the shortest period, 
if it were unsheltered from the competition of new 
producers. By and large,'then, one should expect the 
existence of monopoly power of the sort we have denoted 
by S to be reflected in a reduced number of producers.
Usually, when economies of scale are discussed, 
attention is focussed on economies in prime production 
costs arising out of technological factors. However, 
there are other economies of large-scale operation which
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should not "be overlooked« These occur in the realms of 
marketing and finance - working capital in particular - 
and may also derive from the spreading of more or less 
indivisible overheads over a larger output« This kind 
of economy of scale is perhaps the most important 
inducement towards vertical integration. As Kaldor has 
pointed out, ’’The economies of ’vertical’ expansion are 
largely pecuniary rather than technological in character.
Two further points may he made in this connection. 
Firstly, because of the economies possible in the spreading 
of overheads, elimination of duplication of function, 
reduction in working capital requirements and the stream­
lining of marketing arrangements, we may still expect a 
growth in concentration, even after technological economies 
of scale have been exhausted, e. g. where multi-plant 
production exists. Secondly, it will be noticed that 
the element S in our measure of monopoly power embraces 
all economies of scale, whether they be in prime costs or 
overheads.
3* This is not to deny that there are sometimes technical 
economies of scale involved in vertical integration, 
e.g. in. the steel industry, nor that horizontal 
integration often brings some economies in overheads.
4* N. Kaldor, ’’The Economic Aspects of Advertising”, 
loc. cit., p.20n.
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The Degree of Oligopolistic Cohesion
We have argued above that monopoly power does not 
derive from fewness of numbers, per se* but rather that 
fewness is a consequence or symptom of the existence of 
monopoly power* This argument needs qualification in 
one important respect, namely that discussed in Section 3 
where it was argued that fewness of numbers will tend to 
facilitate intra-group discipline and thereby enable 
producers to exploit their position to a point more 
closely approaching the theoretical maximum* Many of 
the conventions and organisational forms of business are 
directly explainable in these terms* Price leadership, 
basing point systems, and trade associations are typical 
arrangements for the stiffening of intra-group discipline* 
Likewise, pricing conventions and those aspects of the 
businessman’s ethos which are expressed in terms of 
antipathy towards "cut-throat competition” or "unfair 
trading practice" serve a similar function*
Costs of Entry and Defensive Strategy
The two chief ways in which monopolists may raise 
the cost of entry to newcomers are (a) the development of 
goodwill and product-attachment by selling expenditure - 
in the broadest sense; and (b) vertical integration, or 
control over marketing outlets which stop short of
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integration. Successful use of these strategies will "be 
reflected in the element E, the costs which a new producer 
must meet to enter the market.
We have already discussed vertical integration insofar 
as it derives from economies of scale, usually of an 
overhead nature. However, a good deal of the drive 
towards vertical combination stems, not from this source, 
hut from attempts to raise E, the extra costs associated 
with a newcomer’s entry into the market. This strategy 
can best he illustrated hy an example. In Australia, 
vertical integration between the breweries and hotels has 
advanced a long way. Under the "tied-house" system, a 
potential newcomer in the brewing field is faced with the 
very substantial obstacle of securing or establishing 
alternative retail outlets. This, of course, greatly 
enhances the degree of monopoly power enjoyed by the 
existing producers, A similar strategy, stopping short 
of actual integration, seems to be implicit in recent 
attempts by oil companies to introduce "one-brand’' service 
stations.
But it would be a mistake to believe that this 
strategy is directed solely towards enhancing the degree 
of monopoly power and thereby raising price. In large 
part the aim is to insulate output, not so much against 
the newcomer, but against rival producers, particularly 
in respect of possible contractions in demand.. This has
( 2 2 7 )
two a s p e c ts *  F i r s t l y ,  l o s s  o f  o u tp u t  in v o lv e s  th e  f i r m  
in  some l o s s  o f  econom ies o f  s c a le  and hence  o f  m onopoly 
p r o f i t*  S e c o n d ly , th e  r e n d e r in g  o f  some c a p i t a l  e q u ip ­
m ent i d l e  in v o lv e s  th e  f i r m  i n  c a p i t a l  l o s s  o f  th e  n a tu r e  
d is c u s s e d  i n  S e c t io n  2 above* M oreover, th e  im p o rta n c e  
o f  o u tp u t  i s  th e  g r e a t e r  th e  g r e a t e r  i s  th e  d e g re e  o f  
monopoly* F o r  u n d e r  c o m p e t i t iv e  c o n d i t io n s  much o f  th e  
l o s s  i n  g roup  o u tp u t  w i l l  be  ta k e n  up by  th e  d is a p p e a ra n c e  
o f  m a rg in a l  f i r m s .  B ut we have  se e n  above t h a t  th e  e a s e  
w ith  w hich  m a rg in a l  p ro d u c e rs  may be  f o r c e d  o u t o f  an 
in d u s t r y  i s  o f  p r e c i s e l y  th e  same o rd e r  a s  th e  e a s e  o f  
e n t r y  o f  new com ers. I f  th e  d e g re e  o f  m onopoly i s  
s u b s t a n t i a l ,  th e n  we may e x p e c t c o n t r a c t i o n s  i n  demand 
to  be  m et, n o t  b y  th e  d is a p p e a ra n c e  o f  h ig h  c o s t  p r o d u c e r s ,  
b u t  b y  th e  s p re a d  o f  i d l e  c a p a c i ty  th ro u g h o u t  th e  i n d u s t r y .  
I t  i s  im p o r ta n t  to  n o t i c e  t h a t  t h i s  fo rm  o f  ’' r e s t r i c t i o n i s m ” 
i s  n o t  a c a u se  o f  m onopoly b u t  a co n seq u en ce  o f  i t .  I t  
i s  a m is ta k e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  to  lo o k  upon th e  mushroom grow th  
o f  c a r t e l s  and  p r ic e -m a in te n a n c e  a g re em e n ts  i n  th e  slump 
a s  i n d i c a t i v e  n e c e s s a r i l y  o f  a  r i s e  in  th e  d e g re e  o f  
m onopoly. O u tp u t may b e  f a r  more im p o r ta n t  to  a  f i rm  
th a n  p r i c e  o v e r  any  g iv e n  p r a c t i c a b l e  ra n g e  o f  v a r i a t i o n .  
C o n se q u e n tly , i n  a slum p, th e r e  w i l l  be  an a lm o s t 
i r r e s i s t i b l e  te m p ta t io n  f o r  th e  f i r m  s u f f e r i n g  s e v e re  
s e tb a c k s  i n  o u tp u t  to  c u t  p r i c e  i n  an a t te m p t t o  ’'b e a t  
th e  gun”. P r ic e -m a in te n a n c e  a g re em e n ts  i n  th e  f a c e  o f
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the demand contraction of the slump should he seen, 
therefore, as non-aggression pacts rather than as monopoly 
alliances* And, as we know from contemporary history, 
non-aggression pacts are not indicative so much of a 
heightened state of peace as of a greater threat of war* 
Again, in many cases oligopolists are aware of just 
these consequences* Therefore, during an expansion of 
demand they leave a fringe of demand to he satisfied hy 
smaller firms* In the slump, the hulk of output loss is 
taken up hy the closing down of these smaller producers.
It is important to notice here, however, that tactics of 
this kind are only practicable when the price-leaders 
enjoy monopoly shelter of the nature of S and T and also 
where E is small. Where E is large, different tactics are 
necessary, since a large E would protect once-estahlished 
marginal firms from the consequences of all hut large 
price-cuts, which the price-leaders will not he anxious 
to make. It is in these cases that selling costs play 
an important role.
It is sometimes puzzling why oligopolists, who 
certainly combine in their dealings with labour and pursue 
a common price policy, should dissipate a substantial
5« See, e.g., G.P. Haddon-Cave, "Trends in the Concentration 
of Operations of Australian Secondary Industries,
1923-43"* Economic Record« June, 1943> p.73«
(229)
proportion of their profits on competitive advertising.
In many instances, it is obvious that, as far as the 
redistribution of consumer demand is concerned, much of 
such advertising cancels out in its effect. The answer 
is sometimes advanced that advertising outlays are not 
scaled down because it results in an increase in overall 
demand for the product of the group and, although it does 
little to alter the intra-industry status quo, it benefits 
each of the members of the group in virtue of the enhanced 
group demand, However, it seems certain that, in those 
cases where such a result would be significant (and it is 
hard to believe that, except perhaps in the case of new 
products, group demand is very responsive), the same 
result could be achieved at considerably less cost to the 
group. It would seem, therefore, that apparently 
competitive selling expenditures of this kind have their 
rationale in two more fundamental aims. Firstly, selling 
expenditures of existing firms will raise E and thus give 
added protection against the encroachments of "outsiders''. 
Secondly, they will tend to insulate the demands of 
individual firms and thus act as a deterrent against 
ruinous intra-group price competition. To revert to 
our’ earlier analogy, "wasteful" selling outlays are no 
more inconsistent with oligopolistic agreement than com­
petitive armament building is inconsistent with a pact of 
non-aggression, and for the same reason.
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Patents, Designs and Technical Improvements
Exactly the same considerations apply to the modern 
trend tov/ards competitive (and often duplicative) research 
"by oligopolists. These firms are not particularly 
interested in the acquisition of knowledge for its own 
sake. The essence of their efforts is the attempt to 
keep one jump ahead of competitors or potential com­
petitors, either in the technique of production or the 
quality of product. Research outlays perform the same 
function in respect of T as selling expenditures perform 
in respect of E.
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VIII. THE DEGREE OF MONOPOLY POWER 
(Continued)
1. Statistical Application of the Measure of Monopoly
Power
We have now developed a tentative analytical 
measure of the degree of monopoly power; and it 
remains in this chapter to submit it to empirical test. 
For this purpose, we shall use the data of the 
Australian Production Bulletin (Secondary Industry) 
for the year 1338-39. In choosing this year we have 
had to balance a number of considerations. The later 
the year we take the better* in general* is the 
infoimation available from the point of view of 
comprehensiveness and dis-aggregation. On the other
hand, the war-time years and the post-war period of 
inflation have had a distorting effect on the economy 
and, in particular, on the money values in which some 
of our important infoimation is expressed, e.g. capital 
values. Also, price controls, of which some remnants 
still exist, have, in the post-war period, almost 
certainly caused significant departures from the course 
which business would have taken given a *free* market.
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Again, short-period bottleneck factors have been 
important practically throughout the post-war period.
For these reasons, then, we have decided upon the 
last pre-war year, viz. 1938-39.
The data available are, of course, not exactly 
what we require, an almost inevitable feature in 
economic matters. In particular, the values given 
for capital and depreciation are book values — sometimes 
imputed — which are almost certainly highly formalized 
and which certainly would not correspond with the 
definitions used in Chapter VII. Also, information 
by industry about selling costs and overhead 
expenditure other than salaries and depreciation is 
non-existent, as is data on economic rents. No 
details are available as to stocks and consequently 
no calculation of the period of production is possible, 
so that no estimate can be made of working capital 
requirements whioh probably constitute an important 
element in the cost structure of some industries.
However, even allowing for these limitations, one 
would expect, if the argument of Chapter VII is 
substantially correct, to obtain some significant 
correlations between the percentage net profit margin^
1* i.e* net of salaries and depreciation,
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on the one hand and capital intensity on the other.
Also, there should be some correlation between the 
N.P* margin and such independent indices of monopoly 
power, e.g. the degree of concentration of production 
or the degree of shelter against imports, which we 
are able to assemble* In fact, these correlations 
do not occur.
Searching around for the reason, one is 
inevitably made aware of the strong inverse correlation 
between the percentage net margin (and the percentage 
gross margin) and the fraction of value of output (price) 
represented by raw materials* Indeed, this can be seen 
at once by inspection. One example is sufficient to 
illustrate this effect. Thus, Sugar Refining is 
known independently to be one of Australian most 
highly monopolistic industries. Raw materials 
represent 87 per cent of value of output, while the 
percentage net profit margin is only 8*4 per cent.
By contrast, Toys, a fairly easily entered industry 
and one highly competitive with imports, has a net 
prefit margin of 24 per cent, but with a materials 
b ill representing only 45 per cent of value of output.
In Table Ü we have listed 60 industries of the
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139 which are shown independently in the Production 
2Bulletin. This selection is not strictly random, 
since we have selected the industries taking into 
account the following considerations:
(1) Industries wholly or substantially run by
Government or semi-Government bodies, i*e. 
those run on a non-profit basis, have been 
excluded*
(2) Service rather than manufacturing industries,
e.g. Boot Repairing and Dry Gleaning, have 
3been omitted*
(3) Preference has been given to the better-defined
industries over those which are in hotchpot 
or portmn^teau classifications*
(4) At least one industry from each of the 15 broad
industrial groupings has been included.
The resulting 60 industries is therefore a large and 
representative, although not strictly random, sample 
of Australian manufacturing* It is found that there is
a simple inverse correlation between the percentage 
net margin and the ratio of raw materials to value of
2* Heat, Light and Power industries have been ignored 
beoause these are normally run by Governments or 
controlled public utilities. This practice is 
followed throughout this chapter.
3. One reason, for this is the high proportion of
Working Proprietors in these industries. This tends to seriously underestimate labour cost.
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output of -0.69. This very strong correlation
swamps other factors which enter into the determination 
of the percentage net profit margin.
It is clearly desirable that the influence of 
this factor should be eliminated from our measure of 
monopoly power. Now it can be shown that -
where m is the material bill and V is value added or 
income. Then, if we hold the term m/P constant, the 
ratio ■ - suggests itself immediately as an
appropriate index of monopoly power. This ratio we 
denote in future by the undashed M.
It is interesting to pause for a moment to 
consider the significance of the choice of income or 
value added in place of value of output as the 
denominator of our measure of monopoly power. Two 
views may be taken of the matter. Firstly, from a 
philosophical standpoint, one would e^qpect that only 
factors of production would earn a surplus in the 
process of production. Materials, once having been 
given a market value, would tend only to pass that 
value, without increment, to the final value of output.
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In other words, in a market economy, the monopoly 
elements involved in the production of raw materials 
will have already been incorporated into their value* 
Then, if  materials merely transfer their value to 
the final product, i*.e„ if  they earn no surplus, 
the weighting of the denominator by the inclusion of 
materials will certainly skew the percentage margin, 
as indeed comes out in the figures. I t  should be 
pointed out, however, that insofar as an established 
firm has a monopsonistic advantage in the buying of 
raw materials not accessible to a new firm, the lower 
price of raw materials will be reflected in P - C and 
will thus enter into the overall degree of monopoly 
power enjoyed by such established firm.
At a lower level of generality, i t  is fairly clear, 
once one thinks about i t ,  that a potential entrant firm, 
the firm which we have argued sets the limits to 
the monopoly power exertable by established firms, 
will not be guided by the return i t  can expect upon 
turnover as suoh, except in the usually minor respect 
that i t  must cover its  working capital costs which in 
turn will depend upon the value of the materials outlay 
as well as income-payments. Bather i t  will look to
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get a minimum return, on i t s  capital. The idea is
commonly put forward that firms determine their
prices by adding a fixed percentage mark-up on cost,
including material cost. Although this may appear
as the formal method of price determination adopted
as a matter of convenience, i t  can only operate
within very narrow ranges* If  there is  a substantial
and permanent increase, say, in the value of materials
in relation to other oosts, a fixed percentage mark-up
would increase profits in relation to capital (and
income) more than would be necessary to cover the
increase in working capital requirements which would be
involved. These profits could not for long be
protected from new competition. However, failing
substantial and permanent movements in material cost
in relation to other oosts, i t  is  likely that firms
tend to accept the good with the bad, as i t  were, and
iron out short-period fluctuations by the application
of fixed pricing formulae. However, this would
involve no increase in long-period profits which, we
have argued, will determine the degree of potential 
new
or actual/competition to which established firms are 
eaqposed.
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We may now proceed to examine our amended
monopoly power formula in relation to our data.
We should now expect to find some correlation between
4the share of net profit in value added or income, 
which we shall hereafter refer to as the "profits 
share of value added1*, and such independent criteria 
of monopoly as we may be able to construct. Two 
such indices suggest themselves:
(a) the degree of shelter from imports which an
industry enjoys, an important factor in 
an economy such as Australia*s; and
(b) a measure of the concentration of production in
the various industries.
Also, one would expect some correlation between the 
profit share in value added and the degree of 
capital intensity. Let us examine these matters in 
turn.
The Degree of Shelter from Imports
It is very difficult, of course, to measure 
precisely the degree of shelter from imports enjoyed 
by one industry as compared, with another,. Not only 
are tariff structures very complicated, but other
4. Again "net1* in that it is net of salaries and 
depreciation, the only overheads for which we 
have information.
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considerations such as costs of transportation would 
have to be taken into account* However, a rough 
measure of the exposure of domestic producers to 
foreign competition could be based upon the actual 
volume of imports which enter the country taken in 
relation to the value of home-production* Unfortunately 
i t  is  not normally possible to get imports in 
classifications oomparable with those of domestic 
manufacturing production. However, in the 1927 
Tariff Committee* s Report, Appendix G, we have imports 
and domestic manufactures compiled by the Commonwealth 
S tatistician  in oomparable categories in respeot of 
the years 1923-4, 1924-5 and 1925-6.
In Table 2 we have set out the profits share in 
5value added in  respeot of 78 industrial classifications* 
together with imports as a percentage of the value of 
home-production. I t  is  found that the simple 
correlation between these variates is  -0*43 which is  
highly significant for such a large sample.
Thus, given that the domestic monopoly power of 
producers is  substantially influenced by the degree of
5. But th is includes depreciation, information on
depreciation not being available in these earlier
years.
6. Only a handful of industries, such as Government-run
ones, have been le f t  out. The Tariff Report gives
86 separate classifications.
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shelter from imports enjoyed by the domestic producer, 
we find this facet of monopoly power reflected in our 
amended index.
The Degree of Concentration
7A. few years ago, C.P. Haddon-Cave suggested the 
following foimula as a measure of the degree of 
concentration of productions
Number of factories employing half the workers
______________ of an industry__________________
Total Number of factories in the industry
If we are prepared to use a rough interpolation, 
especially in the class of factories employing 101 
hands or more, this ratio can be calculated from 
Table 9 - Classification in Each Industry by Number 
of Hands * - of the Production Bulletin.
There are, of course, some very serious 
limitations to such an index as a measure of 
concentration, the two most important beings
(a) It is an index of the concentration of
factories, not of firms; and
(b) It necessarily calculates numbers on an
7. "Trends in the Concentration of Operations of
Australian Secondary Industries," Economic Record 
June, 1945.
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Australia-wide basis, whereas for many 
industries the "competitive field" does 
not extend beyond the boundaries of the 
one State, (Clearly, 6 fims competing 
throughout the Commonwealth represent 
something different from 6 firms each with 
a pure monopoly * or virtually so, within 
their own States. )•
♦These difficulties are inherent and there is 
little we can do about them. However* there is a 
more fundamental difficulty with the Haddon-Cave 
index which we must consider. As a matter of fact, 
this index is not so much a measure of concentration 
in the usually accepted sense as of skewness of 
distribution. Consider two industries, the first 
of which embraces 100 firms of which 50 produce one- 
half the output (employ one-half of the workers), 
the second of which is composed of 2 firms* one of 
which produces half the output. In either case, 
half the output will be produced by 50 per cent 
of the firms (or factories in our case); and 
consequently the Haddon-Cave index will reckon both 
as having the same degree of concentration. From 
this example it is clear that the index is not very
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sensitive to numbers as such, when 100 firms may- 
take the same index of concentration as 2 firms*
What we really need is an index which combines both 
the number of firms engaged in an industry and the 
proportion to whom falls the lion's share of output.
If we could feel confident that the boundaries 
of the Statistician's classifications were congruent 
with those of the competitive fields of the industries 
concerned, little difficulty would be experienced 
in constructing such an index* However, no-one 
would be found to assert such confidence, least of 
all the Statistician.
As a compromise, then, an index on the 
following lines is suggested:
(a) We take the number of firms employing half
the workers (producing half the output) 
as of basic importance.
(b) However, the total number of firms engaged
is also important, but less so.
Therefore, we take the square root of 
this figure.
(c) Multiplication of (a) and (b) gives a
figure whioh is a compound both of total
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numbers and the skewness of their 
distribution.
(d) However, since the absolute number of 
firms (factories) appearing in any 
industrial classification is largely 
arbitrary, we damp our index by this figure.
Thus, our final index of concentration is given
n
= J*
where n is the number of factories producing half the 
output (employing half the workers) and T is the total 
number of factories within the classification concerned.
This ratio is found to be fairly stable and seems 
to refleot sensibly what one would feel about 
comparative degrees of concentration from first 
principles. Thus, applying it to our example above, 
in which 50 of 100 factories produce half the output 
and 1 of 2 factories do likewise, we would get values 
of 5 and l/fi = 0.7 respectively. Although it gives 
a broad result along these lines, it is not however 
capable of fine distinctions whioh would tend to be
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requ ired  when the numbers between which comparison 
i s  made are sm all* However, the data them selves are 
not s u f f i c i e n t ly  w e ll-b a sed  to  make such d is t in c t io n s  
anyway.
At a l l  e v e n ts , we s h a ll  use t h i s  in d ex  as a 
rough measure o f  the degree o f con cen tra tion  o f  
p rod u ction . We may to  some ex ten t con so le  o u rse lv es  
th a t i t s  d e f ic ie n c ie s  w i l l  be o f f s e t  by our use 
o f o a p ita l - in t e n s i t y  data which are l i k e l y ,  a t  l e a s t  
in  some d egree, to  r e f le o t  f ir m s r monopoly power.
C ap ita l I n te n s ity
For many purposes, the b est  measure o f  c a p ita l  
in t e n s i t y  i s  the r a t io  between o a p ita l and income 
(va lu e added). However, in  t h i s  co n tex t we are 
in te r e s te d  in  t e s t in g  the determ inants o f  the mark-up 
on c o s t  whioh i t s e l f  c o n s t itu te s  an im portant elem ent 
o f va lue added. Since our independent num erical 
c r i t e r i a  o f  the co n tr ib u tio n  to the mark-up made by 
elem ents o f  monopoly are so l im it e d , i t  seems b e tte r  
here to take a measure o f c a p ita l  in t e n s i ty  whioh i s  
independent o f  the s iz e  o f  the monopoly mark-up, v iz .  
the conoept o f  o a p ita l  p er man. This i s  probably  
b est  estim ated by the r a t io  o f  c a p ita l  to  wages and 
s a la r ie s .  Again, i t  i s  not worthwhile attem pting too
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fine distinctions because, as has been pointed out, 
the figures for oapital values are unlikely to be 
particularly precise.
* * * * *
We are now prepared to return to a consideration, 
of our 1938-39 data. As already mentioned, no 
appropriately classified figures for imports are 
available in respect of 1938-39* Therefore, to 
eliminate the influence of this factor from our 
calculations, we confine ourselves to those 
industries which are sheltered or virtually so*
Also, in view of the nature of our measure of 
concentration, we have had to keep for present 
purposes to even stricter criteria of industrial 
homogeneity. (Some industrial classifications are 
so hotchpot, so widely-drawn, that an index of 
concentration would be meaningless.) 'Forty 
industries more or less meeting these requirements 
have been assembled in Table 3, together with the 
percentage net mark-up on value added which we have 
designated by M. M a p -  G/V where T is value 
added and C includes salaries and wages and 
depreciation. Also, one further minor refinement
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h a s  b een  in tr o d u c e d . I n  v iew  o f  our e l im in a t io n  o f  
many i n d u s t r i e s  from  c o n s id e r a t io n  f o r  r e a so n s  s ta t e d  
a b o v e , i t  h a s  b een  n e c e s s a r y ,  to  m a in ta in  a f a i r l y  
la r g e  sam p le , to  tak e  i n  some in d u s t  l i e s  w h ich  have a 
la r g e  number o f  W orking P r o p r ie to r s  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  
em ployed h an d s, e . g .  B a k e r ie s .  Where th e r e  i s  a 
h ig h  p r o p o r t io n  o f  W orking P r o p r ie t o r s ,  la b o u r -c o s t  
te n d s  to  be s e r i o u s l y  u n d e r e s t im a te d , a s  may r e a d i ly  
be se e n  from  an exam ple* I n  th e  o a se  o f  "B oots and 
Shoes"  w h ich  h a s  a  n e g l i g i b l e  number o f  W orking 
P r o p r ie t o r s ,  th e  sh are o f  w ages and s a l a r i e s  i n  
v a lu e  added f o r  1 9 3 8 -3 9  w as 71 p e r  c e n t;  i n  th e  
c a se  o f  "Boot R e p a ir in g " , by no means a m o n o p o lis t ic  
in d u s tr y  b u t w here W orking P r o p r ie to r s  r e p r e s e n t  
s l i g h t l y  more th a n  h a l f  th e  w o r k -fo r c e , th e  sh a re  
o f  w ages and s a l a r i e s  w as o n ly  30 p e r  c e n t .
To c o u n te r a c t  t h i s  e f f e c t ,  a t  l e a s t  
a p p r o x im a te ly , th e  wage and s a la r y  b i l l  f o r  ea ch  
in d u s tr y  h a s  b een  "blown up" i n  p r o p o r t io n  a s  
W orking P r o p r ie to r s  c o n s t i t u t e  a  c e r t a in  p e r c e n ta g e  
o f  em ployed h a n d s, th e  r e c ip i e n t s  o f  w ages and 
s a l a r i e s .
I n  a d d it io n  to  M -  th e  p r o f i t  sh a re  o f  v a lu e  
added -  a s  c a lc u la t e d ,  Table 3 shows:
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(a )  th e  d e g r e e  o f  c o n c e n tr a t io n  f o r  ea ch  in d u s tr y
a c c o r d in g  to  our m o d if ie d  Haddon-Cave 
form u la  w hioh  we d e s ig n a te  by c ; and
(b ) th e  d eg ree  o f  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y  -  th e  r a t io
o f  c a p i t a l  em ployed to  th e  wage and s a la r y  
b i l l  -  d en o ted  by k .
The sim p le  c o r r e la t io n  b etw een  M and c w orks o u t  
a t  - 0 .2 8 7 ;  th a t  b etw een  M and k a t  0 .4 6 8 .  The 
sim p le  c o r r e la t io n  b etw een  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y  and 
c o n c e n tr a t io n  w orks o u t  a t  - 0 . 1 1 .  The t o t a l  
c o r r e l a t io n  b etw een  M a s  an e s t im a te  o f  th e  d eg ree  o f  
m onopoly , on th e  one hand, and c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y  and  
th e  d e g r ee  o f  c o n c e n tr a t io n  a s  c a lc u la t e d ,  on th e  o t h e r ,  
i s  fo u n d  to  be 0 . 5 2 5 *
There o th e r  f a c t o r s  w h ioh  w ould ten d  to  
c o n tr ib u te  to  th e  p r o f i t s  sh are o f  v a lu e  added i n  
a d d it io n  to  th o se  we have c o n s id e r e d , e . g .  th e  amount 
o f  w ork in g  c a p i t a l  r e q u ir e d  i n  th e  in d u s tr y .  A lth ou gh  
no a c c u r a te  e s t im a te  o f  w ork ing  c a p i t a l  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  
we c o u ld  u se  th e  r a t io  o f  m a t e r ia ls  to  v a lu e  added  
a s  an in d e x  a t  l e a s t  o f  abnoim al w ork ing  c a p i t a l  
r eq u ire m en ts  a r i s in g  from  v a r ia t io n s  i n  th e  c a r r y in g  
c o s t s  o f  s to c k s *  H owever, th e  c o n c e n tr a t io n  o f  such  
seco n d a ry  f a c t o r s  i s  swamped by th e  e r r o r  f a c t o r s  i n  
ou r d a ta  b o th  f o r  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y  and th e  d eg ree  o f
(248)
concentration of production* It is unlikely that 
we could improve our result by further refinements.
This comes out plainly enough once we introduce 
information of a qualitative kind which is not 
susceptible to systematic enumeration. Take by way 
of illustration those industries for which M has a 
value of 65 or greater. These ares
Now Breweries, Soap, and Sugar Refining are known 
independently to be among the most highly monopolistic 
of all Australian industries, although no arithmetic 
concept of concentration could be expected to bring 
this out fully* Ice Cream is generally monopolistic 
on a State—to-State basis, there being virtually no 
interstate competition for obvious reasons. Also, 
butter substitutes may only be manufactured under what 
amounts to monopoly licence, production being highly 
restricted by the State to prevent competition with 
butter. Cereal Foods, as well as Soap and Ice Cream, 
is a highly advertised commodity, with the bulk of 
the market in the hands of very few companies.
Breweries
Soap
Ice Cream 
Sugar Refining 
Cereal Foods 
Butterine & Margarine
74
70
69
65
65
65
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Likewise, at the other end of the scale9 we 
have as the industries with M of 30 or lesss
Saddlery 30 
Sugar Mills 30 
Joinery 29 
Cooperage 28 
Furniture 26
With the exception of Sugar Mills, these are 
essentially artisan manufactures conducted on a 
relatively small scale, with entry comparatively 
easy. The presence of Sugar Mills in the l is t  may 
occasion some surprise at f irs t sight, hut this is 
almost certainly a result of the fact that the 
greater part of the industry is in the hands of 
growers * cooperative s.
I t  is clear that many of these factors would 
be difficult to embody in strict quantitative form, 
even if  all the data were available, which i t  is not 
of course. The main point of introducing these 
observations here is to indicate that "profit share 
in value added" can be sensibly related to 
independently known facts of a qualitative kind about 
the degree of monopoly in the industries concerned» 
The percentage net margin ( and the percentage gross 
margin) bear no such sensible relationship.
(250)
2* The Degree of Monopoly and the Percentage 
Gross Margin
It is interesting at this stage to compare 
briefly the measure of monopoly power elaborated in 
these two chapters with its nearest relative, viz. 
the percentage gross margin which was sponsored by 
Kalecki as a measure of monopoly power. Our 
measure differs from KaleofcPs in three important 
respects: —
(l) The Short-period versus the Long-period
The first difference between the two conceptual 
measures of monopoly power is that ours is explicitly 
related to the long-period,, whereas Kaleckir s, like 
L e m e r ’s, is conceived to measure short-period 
phenomena.
In part, this difference is not a real one..
For on the cost side Kalecki assumes constant 
marginal cost over the short-period with which he is 
concerned. Then, as far as changes in cost in 
relation to output is concerned, these will occur 
only as the result of long-period decisions.
Moreover, on the demand side, short-period changes in
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th.e volume of demand have no effect, since these merely 
imply movement along a horizontal marginal cost curve. 
It is, of course, the elasticity of demand which is the 
primary determinant of the finn’s monopoly power in 
terms of Kalecki’s thesis. But even this is unlikely 
to be determined, for the most part, on short-period 
considerations* Schumpeter was probably not far 
from the facts in his assumption that "We will 
throughout act on the assumption that consumers1 
initiative in changing their tastes ... is negligible 
and that all changes in consumers * tastes is incident
Q
to, and brought about by, producers’ action."
And most producers’ action such as the changing of 
products and the addition of new products or the 
disappearance of old ones is essentially referable to 
the long-period. In short, Kalecki’s measure of the 
degree of monopoly power is much more a creature of 
long-period factors than he allows.
(2) The Treatment of Overheads 
The second difference our measure from Kalecki’sA
8. J. Schumpeter, Business Cycles. Vol. I„ p. 73.
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is that it reckons as cost those overheads which must 
be met if production is to continue in the long-period, 
e.g. salaries* depreciation and ordinary overhead 
expenses such as postages, audit fees* lighting and so on. 
Kalecki*s inclusion of such expenditure as elements of 
monopoly power has often been, correctly I believe, the 
subject of criticism. The problem of maintaining 
production in the long-period presents itself at once 
as soon as we consider the conditions for long-period 
equilibrium of Kalecki*s model* Clearly, the 
attainment of such equilibrium as a result of the 
influx and efflux of firms must be conditional on 
fime being able to cover average total cost in some 
sense •
(3) The Influence of the Raw Material Factor
The third distinction between our position and, 
that of Kalecki is, of oourse, that our measure is 
expressed in terns of income, whereas Kalecki* s is 
referred to value of output which is equal to income 
plus raw material cost* This matter has already been 
discussed at some length. It is interesting, however, 
to notice how this influence comes out in Kalecki* s 
own figures. In his Studies in Economic Dynamics,
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he shows that In the year 1937, for example, the 
percentage gross margins in the United States were 
24*8 per cent for manufacturing, 12„9 per cent for
9wholesaling and 28.7 per cent for the retail trades.
Does this mean that manufacturers and retailers enjoy 
something like double the monopoly power of wholesalers? 
The answer almost certainly lies elsewhere. The 
material cost (purchase of goods turned over) is much 
higher in relation to value added for wholesalers than 
it is for manufacturers and retailers, for fairly 
obvious reasons. This higher cost of materials in 
relation to value added is reflected in the lower 
percentage gross margin. This confirms the argument 
advanced in this chapterj and indicates that this 
inverse relationship between the ratio of material cost 
to price and the percentage gross margin is a general one.
It may, of course, be objected that Kalecki never 
intended the percentage gross margin to measure the 
absolute value of monopoly power enjoyed or to measure 
comparative degrees of monopoly, but only to reflect 
changes in them. However, if the percentage gross 
margin does not measure such comparative degrees of
9• v * 16.
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o f  m o n o p o ly  p o w e r, th e n  th e  ta k in g  o f  a w e ig h te d  
ave rag e  f o r  th e  economy o r  s e c to r  o f  th e  economy 
i s  q u i t e  m e a n in g le s s .
F i n a l l y ,  th e  in v e r s e  c o r r e la t io n  be tw een  th e  
p r o p o r t io n  o f  p r ic e  re p re s e n te d  b y  th e  m a te r ia l  b i l l  
and th e  p e rc e n ta g e  g ro s s  m a rg in  a ls o  i l l u m in a t e s  a 
fu n d a m e n ta l a s p e c t o f  K a le o k i* s  o v e r a l l  t h e s is .
K a le c k i ,  i t  w i l l  be rem em bered, a rg u e d  t h a t  th e  sha re  
o f  wages i n  inoom e was a f u n c t io n  o f  (a )  th e  degree  
o f  m o n o p o ly  as m e asu red , i . e .  b y  th e  p e rc e n ta g e  g ro s s  
m a rg in , and (b )  th e  r a t i o  o f  th e  raw  m a t e r ia l  b i l l  
to  th e  wage b i l l .  T h is  sha re  had  been f a i r l y  
c o n s ta n t  b o th  th ro u g h o u t th e  t ra d e  c y o le  and i n  th e  
lo n g - p e r io d  because o f  th e  s c is s o r s  movement o f  th e se  
two f a c t o r s :
(1 )  I n  th e  lo n g - p e r io d ,  th e re  had  been a s te a d y
in c re a s e  i n  th e  degree  o f  m onopo ly  pow er 
w h ic h  was more o r  le s s  o f f s e t  by  a s e c u la r  
te n d e n o y  f o r  th e  p r ic e s  o f  raw m a te r ia ls  
to  f a l l  i n  r e la t i o n  to  th e  p r ic e  o f  
m a n u fa c tu re d  goods and to  w ages.
(2 )  O ve r th e  t r a d e  c y c le ,  th e  sha re  o f  la b o u r  te n d e d
to  have re m a in e d  c o n s ta n t  be cause , i n  th e  
s lu m p , th e  de g re e  o f  m onopo ly  w o u ld  r i s e ,  b u t  
t h i s  w o u ld  be c o u n te rb a la n c e d  b y  th e  f a c t  t h a t
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the price of raw materials fall more than 
industrial prices and money wages, and 
conversely in the boom.
Keynes, who welcomed Kalecki*s work as something
"which may prove to be an important piece of pioneer 
, «10work," was nevertheless worried about the fact that 
Kalecki’s two basic determinants of labour* s share 
in national income worked in suoh a way as to always 
more or less exaatly compensate for each other.
Keynes sayss **His own explanation is based on the 
assumptions that marginal real costs are constant, 
that the degree of the imperfection of the market 
changes in the opposite direction to output, but that 
this change is precisely offset by the fact that the 
prices of basic raw materials (purchased by the 
system from outside) relatively to money wages 
increase and decrease with output. Yet there is no 
obvious reason why these changes should so nearly 
offset one another ...
However, if it is true, as has been argued here, 
that Kalecki's two determinants are inversely 
correlated, the difficulty of explaining why their 
movements tend to offset one another disappears at once.
10* J.M. Keynes, **Relative Movements of Real Wages and 
Output**, Economic Journal, March 1939, p. 49*
11. loc. ext., p. 49*
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The explanation of why labour’s share in income tends 
to be fairly stable must be sought elsewhere.
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TABLE 1
P e rc e n ta g e  N et M argin and  P e rcen tag e  o f Raw M a te r ia ls
In d u s try P ercen tag e Raw M a te r ia ls
Net M argin* to  V alue o f  
O utput
* *
Cement & Cement Goods 26 47
G lass 23 46
G lass  B o t t le s 29 35
W hite Lead, P a in ts  & V arn ish  26 59
O ils ,  V egetab le 16 74
O ils ,  M inera l 27 66
O ils ,  Animal 14 64
Soap & C andles 37 47
Chem ical F e r t i l i z e r s 14 68
Matche s 22 52
A g r ic u l tu r a l  Im plem ents 11 46
B rass  & Copper 18 55
W irew orking ( in c .  N a ils ) 15 64
S to v es & Ovens 20 42
Lead M il ls 22 69
W ire le s s  A ppara tu s 12 55
* Net o f  S a la r ie s  and D e p re c ia tio n
Table 1 (Cont'd.)
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Industry P.N.M.
*
R.M./V,
*
Watehe s & Clocks 16 41
Cotton 16 61
Wool 13 62
Hope & Cordage 20 56
Fellmongery 4.2 82
Tanning 12 67
Tailoring & Slop Clothing 16 51
Shirts, etc. 13 60
Boots & Shoes 13 54
Grain Milling 8* 3 84
Cereal Foods 26 60
Cattle & Poultry Food 10 79
Chaffcutting 9.7 76
Bakeries 21 61
Biscuits 20 57
Sugar Mills 6.2 79
Sugar Refining 8.4 87
Sugar Confectionery 23 57
Jam, Fruit & Vegetable Canning 13 70
Pickles,, Sauces & Vinegar 24 58
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Table 1 (Cont'd.)
Industry P.N.M.
*
R.M./V,
$
Bacon Curing 7.3 82
Butter 4.7 90
Butterine & Margarine 19 70
Salt Refining 31 40
Aerated Waters 32 48
Breweries 44 41
Distilleries 25 62
Winemaking 19 66
Malting 17 66
Bottling 60 25
Tobacco & etc. 15 73
Ice Cream 40 43
Sausage Skins 11 62
Joinery 17 50
Cooperage 18 44
Boxes & Cases 15 61
Bedding & Mattresses 18 64
Manufactured Stationery 30 49
Cardboard Boxes, etc. 21 50
Papermaking 18 56
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Table 1 (Contrd.)
Industry P.N.M. R.M./V.0.
* $
Tyres, Motor & Cycle 16 62
Pianos, etc. 21 21
Surgioal, Optical & Scientific 24 39
Instruments
Toys, Games & Sports Requisites 24 45
n =s 60 ; r -0.69
( 2 6 1 )
TABLE
P r o f i t s  Share o f  Value
2
Added and Im p o rts  i n  R e la t io n
to  Home P ro d u c tio n
(Y ear 1925-26)
P e rc e n ta g e Im p o rts  a s  a
p r o f i t s  share P e rc e n ta g e
i n  Value o f  Home
Added P ro d u c tio n
if *
T an n e rie s 39 5
Sausage S k ins 48 79
O il & G rease 73 449
Soap & C andles 63 3
B r ic k s ,  T i le s ,  e t c - 37 15
G lass  ( in c .  B o t t le s ) 51 28
G la s s , O th er 37 100
Lim e, P l a s t e r ,  Cement, 54 9
e t c .
M arb le , S l a t e , e t c . 36 14
Cooperage 30 1
J o in e ry ,  Boxes, C ases 31 3
W oodturning, C arv in g , e t c . 44 34
A g r ic u l tu r a l  Im plem ents 28 35
B rass  & Copper 52 19
C u tle ry 47 785
E n g in e e rin g , Ironw orks, 32 52
e t c .
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P r o f i t
M a rg in Im p o r ts
* *
G a lva n a ize d  I r o n ,  e tc * 38 96
N a i ls 49 33
S toves  & Ovens 30 3
W ire w o rk in g 35 3
E le c t r io  A p p a ra tu s 38 336
Lamps & F i t t i n g s 32 1033
Sewing M achines 67 867
Bacon C u rin g 57 1
B u t te r ,  Cheese, e to . 64 2
B u t te r in e  & M a rg a rin e 68 1
M eat & P is h  P re s e rv in g 33 20
B is c u i t s 54 1
C o n fe c t io n e ry 53 2
C o r n f lo u r ,  O atm ea l, e to * 61 9
F L o u r M i l l s 62 -
Jam, F r u i t  C ann ing , e tc * 50 6
Sugar R e f in in g 74 1
A e ra te d  W a te rs , e tc * 58 1
B re w e r ie s 70 3
C ond im en ts , C o ffe e , e tc * 67 12
D i s t i l l e r i e s 70 232
Tobacco, C ig a rs , e tc * 65 7
S a lt 38 35
Profit
Margin Imports
* *
Cider IB 6
Animal & Poultry Poods 66 -
Woollen & Tweed Mills 43 82
Cotton Mils -43 2250
Boots & Shoes 35 4
Clothing 35 2
Dressmaking & Millinery 39 14
Furriers 52 40
Hats & Caps 42 30
Wate rproof & Oilskins 48 74
Shirts, Ties, etc. 39 4
Hosiery & Knitted Goods 54 43
Rope, Cordage & Bags 50 207
Tents & Sailmaking 56 1
Papermaking, Paper Products 47 119
Musical Instruments 37 111
Perambulaters 37 18
Saddlery, Harness, etc. 28 1
Spokes, etc. 46 5
Billiard Tables, Furniture, 34 3
etc.
Piature Frames 47 12
49 23
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Window Blinds
( 264)
Seagrass & Wickerware
Baskets, etc*
Brooms & Brushware
Chemicals, Drugs, etc.
Fertilizers
Paint, Varnishes, etc*
Essential Oils
Inks, Polishes, etc.
Surgical, Optical &
Scientific Instruments
Ele c troplating
Manufacturing Jewellery
Matches
Carbide
Leather Goods
Rubber Goods, Tyres
Toys
Umbrellas
Profit
Margin Imports
* f t
31 7
30 41
37 50
67 71
60 26
64 34
63 241
71 12
43 140
36 64
40 102
56 55
-4 88
42 14
42 63
55 408
53 9
r ss -0*43
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TABLE 3
NET PROFIT SHARE IN VALUE ADDED. CAPITAL INTENSITY. 
AND THE DEGREE OP CONCENTRATION 
(Year 1938-39)
Industry
Lime, Plaster & Asphalt 
Cement & Cement Goods 
Bricks & Tiles, etc.
Glass Bottles 
Boiling Down Works, etc. 
Soap & Candles 
Chemical Fertilizers 
Matches
Brass & Copper 
Wireworking (ino. Nails) 
Stoves & Ovens 
Tanning
Saddlery, Harness & Whips 
Grain Milling 
Cereal Foods & Starch 
Cattle & Poultry Foods 
Chaff cut ting
Profit Capital Index of
Share Intens- Concen-
in V.A. ity tration
M k c
43 1*4 1.7
48 4.1 1.0
31 2.0 2.6
45 1.8 .6
42 3.4 1.4
70 2*4 .5
44 6.2 1.2
46 3.3 .9
38 1.3 .7
39 1.6 .4
33 1.1 .7
35 1.4 1.1
30 1.6 1.4
50 4.2 3.0
65 4.5 .7
48 4.2 .8
32 1.8 4.7
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T ab le  3 ( G o n t 'd . )
s
B a k e r ie s
X
44
k
2 .6
0
8 .6
B i s c u i t s 45 2 .0 .9
S u g a r  M i l l s 30 7 .0 . 2*5
S u g a r  R e f in in g 65 9 .6 *9
S u g a r  C o n f e c t io n e r y 53 2 .6 *7
Jam , F r u i t  & V e g e ta b le  C a n n in g 43 1 .5 1 .0
B acon  C u rin g 39 2 .3 1*1
B u t t e r 45 3 .8 3 .2
C ondensed  M ilk 45 4*4 .3
B u t t e r i n e  & M a rg a r in e 65 1 .9 .7
S a l t  R e f in in g 50 7 .2 .5
A e ra te d  W a te rs 56 2*5
C
\i.
C
\i
B re w e r ie s 74 4 .5 1 .1
W inem aking 54 4 .9 1 .9
M a l t in g 51 4 .5 1*4
T o b acco , e t c . 56
00•rH .9
I c e  Cream 69 5 .7 .6
J o i n e r y 29 1 .1 3 .2
C ooperage 28 0*9 .9
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T a b le  3 ( C o i r t 'd . )
M k c
B oxes & G ases 34 1 .1 1 .5
B i l l i a r d  T a b le s , F u r n i t u r e , e t c  .  26 1 .0 3 .2
B ed d in g  & M a t t r e s s e s  46 1 .6 1 .8
C a rd b o a rd  B o x es , C a r to n s ,  e t c .  42 2 .1 1 .3
•
011a
r Mk = ° * 4685 r Mo = - 0 *287s
110UM - 0 .1 1
R = O .525  (38 d . o f  f . )
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IX. CHANGES IN THE DEGHEE OF MONOPOLY
In this Chapter, it is proposed to consider the 
chief factors underlying changes in the degree of 
monopoly, both over the course of the trade cycle and 
in the long-period. However, before doing so, it is 
necessary that we briefly examine the doctrine of 
"countervailing power" which has achieved wide 
acceptance in recent years* Clearly, the weight 
given to this thesis will have a large bearing on 
what we may say about changes in the degree of monopoly.
1. Monopoly Power: Additive or Countervailing?
*Galbraith sets out his doctrine of countervailing 
power in the following terns:
"With the widespread disappearance of competition 
in its classical form and its replacement by the 
small group of firms if not in overt, at least in 
conventional or tacit collusion, it was easy to 
suppose that since competition had disappeared, 
all effective restraint on private power had 
disappeared.
In fact, new restraints on private power did 
appear to replace competition. They were nurtured 
by the same process of concentration which impaired 
or destroyed competition. But they appeared not on the same side of the market but on the opposite 
side, not with competitors but with customers or 
suppliers. It will be convenient to have a name
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f o r  t h i s  c o u n te rp a r t  o f co m p e titio n  and I  s h a l l  
c a l l  i t  c o u n te rv a i l in g  pow er«
. . .  p r iv a te  economic power i s  h e ld  i n  check by 
the  c o u n te rv a i l in g  power o f  th o se  who a re  s u b je c t  
to  i t .  The f i r s t  b e g e ts  th e  second. The lo n g  
t r e n d  tow ard c o n c e n tr a t io n  o f i n d u s t r i a l  e n te r p r i s e  
i n  th e  hands o f a r e l a t i v e l y  few f irm s  h as b rough t 
in to  e x is te n c e  n o t o n ly  s tro n g  s e l l e r s ,  as 
eco n o m ists  have supposed , b u t a ls o  s tro n g  b u y ers  
as th e y  have f a i l e d  to  see . The two develop 
to g e th e r ,  n o t i n  p r e c is e  s te p  b u t i n  such manner 
t h a t  th e re  can  be no doubt t h a t  th e  one i s  in  
resp o n se  to  th e  o th e r .* (1 )
Thus, i t  i s  a rg u ed , c o u n te rv a i l in g  power may be 
e x e rc is e d  a g a in s t  a m o n o p o lis t o r  group o f 
m o n o p o lis ts  from  b o th  s id e s ,  e i t h e r  from  th e  supp ly  
s id e  o r  th e  demand s id e .  S u p p lie rs  o f  m a te r ia l s  o r  
f a c t o r s  o f p ro d u c tio n  ( e s p e c ia l ly  Labour) a re  l i k e l y  
to  combine to  in c re a s e  t h e i r  b a rg a in in g  s t r e n g th  
v i s - a - v i s  th e  monopoly and , by so d o in g , fo rc e  the  
c o n c e ss io n  o f  some o f th e  monopoly g a in s  in h e re n t  i n  
th e  s i t u a t i o n  to  th e m se lv e s . On th e  o th e r  hand, 
p u rc h a s e rs  o f  th e  p ro d u c ts  o f a  monopoly o r  monopoly 
group w i l i  ten d  to  band to g e th e r  to  reduce th e  power 
o f  e x p l o i t a t i o n  en joyed  by th e  m o n o p o lis t. The 
fundam en ta l q u e s t io n  w hich we have to  ask  i s  w hether 
t h i s  developm ent o f  d e r iv a t iv e  monopoly does i n  f a c t  
a c t  a s  an o f f - s e t t i n g  o r  c o u n te rv a i l in g  f a c t o r  o r
1 . J .K . G a lb ra i th :  American C a p ita l is m . B oston , 1952,
p .  118.
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merely adds mare monopoly areas to the system. The
problem is analogous to the old. taxation questions
to what extent may a monopoly be forced through
pressure of countervailing power to absorb demands
made upon it, to what extent may these demands be
merely passed on to other sections of the community*
In tackling this question, we shali confine
ourselves simply to market power* There is every
reason to believe that in the modem age large
corporations exert a considerable power over and above
2that which they enjoy in the market; but, although 
for other purposes this is a very important problem, 
it will not be our concern here.
In considering the effect of countervailing power 
in market relationships, it is, perhaps, useful to 
distinguish between countervailing power originating 
outside the system from that involving two units 
within the system. For this purpose, wage-earners 
and consumers may be considered to be outside the 
system. By contrast, one firm purchasing the products 
of another may be looked upon as something internal 
to the system. The point of the distinction resides
2* cf. President Roosevelt, for example: HThe liberty of
democracy is not safe if the people tolerate the growth 
of private power to a point where it becomes stronger 
than their democratic State itself. w - Broadcast,
29 April, 1938.
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in the fact that an increase in the monopoly power 
of one unit in the system may involve a decrease in 
that of another such unit; whereas it would mean 
straining the use of language and the blurring of 
useful social distinctions to represent the reduction 
of market power exerted by a monopolist as a result 
of countervailing power by consumers, for example, as 
constituting an increase in the monopoly power of 
such consumers*
It is probably best, then, to approach our 
problem, in the first instance, in terms of the 
simpler case, viz. where the countervailing power 
is exerted from outside the system. Let us begin 
by considering the effect of the combination of labour 
on the monopoly power of employers* At its simplest, 
our problem is whether an increase in wages forced 
from a monopolist by trade union action is likely 
to be absorbed by the monopolist, thereby reducing his 
effective monopoly power, or whether it will be merely 
passed on to subsequent units of the productive and 
distributive structure.
Let us consider the problem in terns of our 
model of Chapter VII* How will an increase in wages 
forced by trade union action affect the monopoly power 
of a firm, as measured by that model? The first thing
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to  n o t ic e  i s  t h a t ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  an in c r e a s e  i n  w ages  
e s t a b l i s h e d  o v e r  a g iv e n  a r e a  by th e  c o u n t e r v a i l in g  
pow er o f  tr a d e  u n io n  o r g a n iz a t io n  w i l l  a f f e c t  th e  
p o s i t i o n  o f  e x i s t i n g  f i lm s  and p o t e n t i a l  newcom ers 
i n  th a t  a rea  a l i k e .  Thus, a s  a f i r s t  a p p ro x im a tio n , 
i t  w ould  seem  l i k e l y  th a t  th e  w a g e - in c r e a s e  w ou ld  be 
p a sse d  on in t o  th e  p r ic e  ch a rg ed  by th e  m o n o p o lis t ,  
s in c e  t h i s  w ould n o t  ren d er  th e  m o n o p o lis t  any more 
v u ln e r a b le  to  c o m p e t it io n  from  o u t s id e r s  th an  b e f o r e .  
H ow ever, th r e e  f a c t o r s  w h ich  work i n  th e  o p p o s ite  
d i r e c t io n  w i l l  ten d  to  m o d ify  t h i s  r e s u l t ,  a c c o r d in g  
to  th e  p a r t i c u la r  c ir c u m sta n c e s .
( l )  Where th e  w a g e - in c r e a s e  i s  n o t c o - e x t e n s iv e  w ith  
a l l  p ro d u cers  o r  p o t e n t i a l  p ro d u cers o f  th e  
commodity i n  q u e s t io n .
I n  f a c t ,  a w a g e -r is e  e n fo r c e d  by tra d e  u n io n  
a c t i o n  w i l l  v e r y  r a r e ly ,  i f  e v e r ,  a f f e c t  a l l  
p r o d u ce r s  and p o t e n t i a l  p ro d u cers  a l i k e .  Even when  
a w a g e - in c r e a s e  i s  fo r c e d  o v e r  a n a t io n a l  a r e a , i t  w i l l  
n o t n o rm a lly  be o p e r a t iv e  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  f o r e ig n  
p r o d u c e r s . C le a r ly ,  where a m o n o p o lis t  o r  group o f  
m o n o p o lis t s  h a s ,  so o n er  o r  l a t e r ,  to  m eet Mfo r e ig n *  
c o m p e t it io n  a s  p r ic e  r i s e s ,  th e r e  i s  a d e f i n i t e  l i m i t  
to  th e  e x t e n t  to  w h ich  an in c r e a s e  i n  w ages may be
(273)
incorporated into the price of the product.
This fact has become of considerable importance 
in business strategies in the era of monopoly 
capitalism. Firstly, it gives rise to those 
familiar situations where industries are highly 
monopolistic at home, in fierce competition abroad.
The inter-war period of competition between the 
higher-wage countries and Japanese manufacturers 
is very instructive in this respect. Certain 
subsidiary facets of international economic strategies 
are implicit in such a situation» Governments feel 
bound to support their monopolists in their struggle 
with foreign competitors; and this in turn leads 
to the whole range of restrictive trade practices, 
tariff walls and even subsidized dumping in the 
international sphere. These policies tend to be 
reinforced by the political and economic power of 
the monopolists vis-a-vis their Governments. In 
these terns we may explain a number of outstanding 
features of latterday capitalisms
(1) We get strong pressures to make the area of
monopolistic agreement wider and wider until 
it is nothing less than world-wide. The 
twentieth century has seen the growth of 
many international cartels, perhaps the Most
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h ig h ly  o rg an ized  and m ost p ow erfu l b e in g  th e  
ch em ica ls  t r iu m v ira te  -  I . C . I . ,  I .G . F arben  and 
Du P o n t.
(2) Where suoh agreem ent i s  n o t a t t a i n a b le ,  we tend  
to  g e t  a s i t u a t i o n  o f  d is c r im in a t in g  monopoly 
w ith  the  home m arket and th e  fo re ig n  m arket 
s e a le d  in to  w a te r t ig h t  com partm ents. Nazi 
Germany p ro b ab ly  ach iev ed  th e  z e n i th  o f  t h i s  
form  o f d is c r im in a t io n .  At a l l  e v e n ts ,  i t s  
e f f e c t iv e n e s s  and endurance depends upon 
G overnm ental su p p o r t, and t h i s  i n  tu r n  h in g e s , 
to  a la rg e  e x te n t ,  on th e  e x tra -m a rk e t power
o f m onopo lies .
(3) We ten d  to  g e t  th e  s h i f t i n g  o f in d u s t ry  from  
h ig h  wage to  low wage c o u n t r ie s ,  a s  when B r i t i s h  
c a p i t a l  sp o n so rs  co tto n -g o o d s  m anufactu re i n  
Bombay and Shanghai.
These phenomena do n o t ,  o f c o u rse , a r i s e  s o le ly  
o u t o f  a t te m p ts  to  f o r e s t a l l  r e d u c t io n  i n  monopoly 
power by th e  e x e rc is e  o f  c o u n te rv a i l in g  pow er. But 
th e y  do p ro v id e  esoape mechanisms i n  t h i s  d i r e c t io n ,  
and hence do s e t  d e f in i t e  l i m i t s  to  th e  degree i n  which 
t r a d e  u n io n  a c t io n ,  f o r  exam ple, may e f f e c t iv e ly  low er 
th e  monopoly power o f  m odem  b ig  b u s in e s s .
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Although these phenomena come out most sharply 
in the international sphere, they apply equally to 
areas within a nation. «Tust as lower-wage countries 
tend to put a brake upon the ability of firms to pass 
on wage-increases, so do lower-wage areas within a 
nation. Clearly, the power of a monopoly or group of 
monopolists on the one hand and the countervailing 
power of trade unions on the other will depend on 
the area over which each party exercises effective 
control.
(2) Where the elasticity of demand (consumers1
sensitivity) increases as relative price rises.
I t will often be the case, especially where 
expenditure on the product in question is a significant 
fraction of total income, that buyers will become more 
sensitive as the price of the one commodity rises in 
relation to other prices. Buyers will search more 
diligently for possible alternatives, and this must 
make i t  easier for new producers to establish 
themselves in the market. Thus, upward pressure on 
wages by trade unions may, for this reason, result in 
a squeezing of the monopoly power enjoyed in the 
particular industry, the full impact of the wage-rise 
not being passed on into price for fear of the easier 
conditions of entry which would result.
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(3) Where substitution between factors is possible.
In many oases substitution between factors is 
strictly limited by technical considerations. However 
there will be cases where substitution Is feasible.
At first sight, it might appear that the possibility 
of factor substitution would merely set a limit to 
the amount by which trade union action may force up 
wages, since if these were forced to the point where 
substitution on a considerable scale took place, 
unemployment would result and this would exercise a 
downward pressure on wages. In other words, it 
would be likely to reduce the bargaining power of 
the union* However, at any particular time a new 
producer (not being committed to a given plant and 
equipment) is in a much better position to undertake 
such substitution between factors. As a result, 
a new producer may be able to enter an industry on 
better terms if wages have risen* This fact may 
discourage existing firms from fully passing on a 
wage increase, thereby reducing the monopoly power 
which they effectively enjoy.
We may conclude then that It is impossible to 
say a priori just how far trade union action may be 
effective in reducing the degree of monopoly in any 
particular industry. In some cases, it is no doubt
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f a i r l y  h ig h .  I n  o t h e r s ,  i t  i s  p r o b a b ly  n e g l i g i b l e .
I t  w i l l  a l l  d ep en d  upon  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  m a ik e t  
c i r c u m s ta n c e s  o f  th e  i n d u s t r y  c o n c e rn e d .  To some 
e x t e n t ,  a l s o ,  i t  w i l l  d ep en d  u p o n  th e  e x t r a - m a r k e t  
p o w er w h ic h  f i r m s  c a n  e x e r t  to  th e  e n d  o f  g e t t i n g  
G overnm en t o r  o t h e r  o f f i c i a l  p r o t e c t i o n  i n  th e  fo rm  
o f  t a r i f f s  a n d  th e  l i k e .
W hat we c a n  s a y  f o r  c e r t a i n  i s  t h a t  th e  e x t e n t  
by  w h ic h  c o u n t e r v a i l i n g  pow er e x e r c i s e d  by t r a d e  
u n io n s  c a n  o f f s e t  m a rk e t m onopoly  p ow er i s  l i m i t e d .
I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  th e  e x t e n t  by  w h ic h  m onopoly  m a rg in s  
may be sq u e e z e d  b y  t r a d e  u n io n  p r e s s u r e  d ep en d s on  
th e  d e g re e  i n  w h ic h  one f i r m  o r  g ro u p  o f  f i r m s  may 
be f o r c e d  i n t o  a  m ore d is a d v a n ta g e o u s  p o s i t i o n  v i s - a -  
v i s  o t h e r  e x i s t i n g  f i r m s  o r  p o t e n t i a l  f i r m s .  I t  
f o l lo w s  t h a t  th e  m ore g e n e r a l  and u b i q u i t o u s  th e  
c o u n t e r v a i l i n g  p o w er e x e r t e d  by  t r a d e  u n io n s  th e  l e s s  
l i k e l y  i s  i t ,  o t h e r  t h i n g s  b e in g  e q u a l ,  to  be 
s u c c e s s f u l  i n  f o r c i n g  a  r e d u c t io n  i n  m onopoly  m a rg in s .  
T h u s, f o r  e x am p le ,, a  g e n e r a l  i n c r e a s e  i n  w a g e - r a te s  
r e d u c e s  th e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  f a c t o r  s u b s t i t u t i o n  
b e c a u se  c a p i t a l  good p r i c e s  w i l l  be a f f e c t e d  e q u a l ly  
w i th  l a b o u r  c o s t s .  I n d e e d ,  i t  i s  n o t  th e  p r im a ry  aim
o f  i n d i v i d u a l  t r a d e  u n io n s  to  sq u e ez e  th e  m a rg in s  o f
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1
th e  e m p lo y e rs  o f  t h e i r  m em bers i n  p a r t i c u l a r .  I t  
i s  o n ly  o f  m in o r  im p o r ta n c e  to  a  p a r t i c u l a r  u n io n  
w h e th e r  i t s  s u c c e s s f u l  wage dem ands a re  m et by  a  
r e d u c t io n  i n  th e  m a rg in s  o f  t h e i r  e m p lo y e rs  o r  by  th e  
a d d i t i o n a l  w a g e - c o s t s  b e in g  p a s s e d  on  to  th e  com m unity 
i n  g e n e r a l .  C e r t a i n l y  t h e r e  seem s to  be a  good d e a l  
o f  e v id e n c e  t h a t  a  l a r g e  p a r t  o f  th e  g a in s  o f  h ig h ly  
o rg a n iz e d  s e c t i o n s  o f  th e  w o rk e r s  i s  p a s s e d  th ro u g h  
th e  sy s te m , com ing to  r e s t  u pon  l e s s - p r o t e c t e d  s e c t i o n s ,  
e . g .  w h i t e - c o l l a r  w o rk e r s ,  s m a ll  b u s in e s s e s  and f i x e d  
incom e g ro u p s .
T h is  b r i n g s  u s  to  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  th e  e x e r c i s e  
o f  c o u n t e r v a i l i n g  pow er by  one b u s in e s s  a g a i n s t  th e  
m onopoly pow er o f  a n o th e r .  C l e a r l y ,  su c h  c o u n t e r v a i l i n g  
pow er may be e x e r t e d  e i t h e r  fro m  th e  s u p p ly  s id e  o r  
th e  demand s i d e .  On th e  s u p p ly  s i d e ,  an  i n c r e a s e  i n  
th e  p r i c e  o f  raw  m a t e r i a l s  f o r c e d  by  c o u n t e r v a i l i n g  
a c t i o n  by  s u p p l i e r s  w i l l  r e p r e s e n t ,  to  th e  b u s in e s s  
p u r c h a s in g  them , a n  a n a lo g o u s  s i t u a t i o n  to  t h a t  i n  
w h ich  a  wage r i s e  i s  f o r c e d  by t r a d e  u n io n  a c t i o n .
A g a in , i t  i s  im p o s s ib le  to  sa y  a  p r i o r i  how f a r  such  a  
r i s e  i n  m a t e r i a l s  p r i c e s  w i l l  be a b so rb e d  o r  p a s s e d  o n . 
H ow ever, t h e r e  i s  one im p o r ta n t  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h i s  c a se  
fro m  th e  c a s e  o f  a  w a g e - r i s e .  The o v e r a l l  d e g re e  o f  
m onopoly  w i l l  n o t  be d e c r e a s e d  i n  any  e v e n t .  I n s o f a r
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as the price rise is passed on to final consumers, 
there will be a net increase in the total degree of 
monopoly in the system. Insofar as the price 
increase is absorbed by the firms buying the materials 
the reduction in the monopoly power of these firms 
will be offset by the increased monopoly power of the 
suppliers of the materials. There is, in effect, 
a redistribution of monopoly power from one firm or 
group of firms to another*
On the demand side, when one business unit is  
buying from another, the effects are similar. Any 
increase in the monopsonistic power of the buyer may 
either be offset by a reduction in the monopoly power 
of the supplier or merely additive to i t .  In either 
event there will be na net reduction in the overall 
degree of monopoly* The overall monopoly power of 
business as a whole can. only be reduced from the 
demand side by the exercise of countervailing power 
by final consumers, that is at the exact level where 
the organisation of such power is  most difficult to 
maintain, especially over a long period.
Stigler has made this point strongly. He says: 
MNor is there any explanation, in Galbraith* s book or 
elsewhere, why bilateral oligopoly should in general
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eliminate, and not merely redistribute, monopoly 
2agains** He adds furthers *It is natural to ask
why the operation of the economy is imp roved when a
monoposonist or a set of oligopsonists arises and
shares the gains of a previously unhampered monopolist
2bor set of oligopolists*.* Indeed, the effect may
well be adverse to the balance of the economy,
especially where, for example, monapsonistic buyers
or monopolistic sellers use their power to squeeze
firms in fairly competitive industries* Over long 
effectiveperiods, the/monopoly power of such films may be 
forced below zero as a result* Thus, we may get 
a situation, such as in the United States during the 
1920's, in which monopoly profits are very high 
indeed, while a large proportion of businesses is 
subject to protracted losses*
Another point worth noticing is that, if two 
firms on opposite sides of the market are faced with 
the choice between struggling for the redistribution 
of monopoly gains between them and making their 
monopoly power additive in effect, there will be a 
powerful incentive for them to combine in the common 
interest, either by full vertical integration or some
2a. G*J. Stigleri *The Economist Flays with Blocs*,
Proceeding of the American Economic Association, 
American Economic Review, May, 1954, p. 13*
2b* loc*. cit*,, p. 9*
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agreement stopping short of actual integration.
Finally, Galbraith himself suggests that counter­
vailing power will not operate in a period of excess 
demand or in conditions of a seller’s market* because 
the power of buyer resistance will be small. This 
overlooks the fact that the very power of a monopolist 
lies in his ability to create for himself the conditions 
of a seller’s market. Moreover, one would have thought 
that the increased power of sellers in conditions of 
exaess demand would be matched by the increased power 
of the ultimate sellers, namely factors of production, 
especially labour.
Galbraith is undoubtedly correct that the power of 
exploitation increases in conditions of excess demand.
/JL*t
But this arises out of the factAthere is an overall 
bottleneck in the supply of means of production, which 
provides existing monopolists with more than normal 
protection against the encroachments of ’outsiders’*.
2. Changes in the Degree of Mo no-poly Over the Long-
Period
There has been a general inclination among 
economists to accept as a fact that the degree of 
monopoly has been steadily increasing over the last 50 
years or so, at least in the developed capitalist 
countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, 
Germany and Japan. This belief is based on two
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o u t s t a n d i n g  and g e n e r a l l y  a d m it te d  f e a t u r e s  o f  
r e c e n t  c a p i t a l i s t  d e v e lo p m e n ts
(1 )  On th e  one h a n d , we h ave  s e e n  th e  o a r r y in g  th ro u g h  
fro m  tim e  to  tim e  o f  g r e a t  m e rg e r  m ovem ents r e s u l t i n g  
i n  b u s in e s s  u n i t s  u n d e r  u n i t a r y  c o n t r o l  o f  an  
u n p r e c e d e n te d  s i z e  an d  s c a le  * A lo n g s id e  o f  t h i s ,  
t h e r e  h a s  d e v e lo p e d  a  com plex  sy s te m  o f  b u s in e s s  
t e c h n iq u e s ,  f a l l i n g  s h o r t  o f  f u l l  a m a lg a m a tio n , 
d e s ig n e d  to  t i e  b u s in e s s  u n i t s  more c l o s e l y  -  th e  
t r u s t ,  h o ld in g  com pany and  c a r t e l ,  s u b s i d i a r y  
s h a r e h o ld in g  and  p y ra m id in g ,  th e  i n t e r l o c k i n g  o f  
d i r e c t o r a t e s ,  and  so f o r t h *  O th e r  d e v ic e s ,  such  a s  
th e  t r a d e  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  h av e  d e v e lo p e d  f o r  th e  p u rp o se  
o f  r e g u l a t i n g  c o m p e t i t io n  b e tw e e n  in d e p e n d e n t  f i r m s
i n  th o s e  i n d u s t r i e s ,  u s u a l l y ,  w i th  l a r g e r  num bers o f  
f irm s *
(2 ) P a r a l l e l  w i th  th e s e  d e v e lo p m e n ts , t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  
a  re m a rk a b le  i n c r e a s e  i n  c e r t a i n  fo rm s  o f  m a rk e t 
i m p e r f e c t i o n  — a d v e r t i s i n g  a n d  a  w h o le  new ra n g e  o f  
s e l l i n g  d e v ic e s ,  p r o d u o t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,  t r a d e -  
m a rk in g , and  th e  l ik e *
H ow ever, a g a i n s t  th e s e  t r e n d s ,  c e r t a i n  
c o u n t e r a c t i n g  f a c t o r s  a re  g e n e r a l l y  conceded*  I n
p a r t i c u l a r ,  th e  eno rm ous a d v a n c e s  i n  t r a n s p o r t  and  
c o m m u n ic a tio n  h av e  r e s u l t e d  i n  lo w e r  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  
c o s t s  r e l a t i v e l y ,  o n  th e  one h a n d , a n d  b e t t e r  know ledge
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among both, b u y e rs  and s e l l e r s  on  th e  o th e r .  A ls o ,  
th e  d e ve lo p m e n t o f  mass p r o d u c t io n  te c h n iq u e s  have 
p r o b a b ly  b ro u g h t a b o u t a  c e r t a in  de g re e  o f  
s t a n d a r d iz a t io n  i n  s e c o n d a ry  go o d s , eve n  th o u g h  t h i s  
p ro c e s s  h a s , as  y e t ,  nowhere n e a r  a t t a in e d  th e  
p o s s ib le  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t .  N e v e r th e le s s ,  th e  
f e e l i n g  h a s  re m a in e d  t h a t ,  on b a la n c e , th e re  has  
been a d e f i n i t e  in c re a s e  i n  th e  degree  o f  m onopo ly  
s in c e  somewhere a ro u n d  th e  E ig h t i e s  o f  l a s t  c e n tu r y .
I n  p a r t ,  t h i s  i s  an  o p t i c a l  i l l u s i o n ,  so f a r  
as s t r a ig h t - o u t  m a rk e t p o w e r i s  c o n c e rn e d . The 
i l l u s i o n  d e r iv e s  fro m  th e  s iz e —d im e n s io n  o f  m o dem  
b u s in e s s .  H ow eve r, i n  many c a s e s , th e  g ro w th  o f  
la r g e - s c a le  in d u s t r y  has  re p re s e n te d  m e re ly  th e  
s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f ,  s a y , a n a t io n a l  m o nop o ly  f o r  a fe w  
l o c a l  m o n o p o lie s .  A ls o ,  a lth o u g h  b u s in e s s  has  g row n 
i n  s iz e ,  so h a s  th e  m a rk e t;  and s iz e ,  o f  i t s e l f ,  i s  
o n ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  r e la t i o n  to  th e  s iz e  o f  th e  m a rk e t.  
I n  A u s t r a l ia ,  f o r  e xa m p le , we do n o t  g e t  th e  same 
f e e l i n g  o f  s h e e r  s iz e  as i n  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s ,  
a l th o u g h  i n  many cases  th e  deg ree  o f  m onopo ly  i s  
h ig h e r  i n  A u s t r a l ia  th a n  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  because 
o f  th e  s m a lln e s s  o f  th e  m a rk e t com pared w i t h  econom ic  
le v e ls  o f  o u tp u t  r e q u ir e d  b y  m odem  p r o d u c t io n  
te c h n iq u e s .
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I n  p a s s in g ,  h o w e ve r, i t  s h o u ld  be s tre s s e d  a g a in  
t h a t  we a re  h e re  d e a l in g  w i t h  m a rk e t po w e r. I t  i s  
p r o b a b ly  t r u e  t h a t ,  so f a r  as e x t r a - m a r k e t  po w e r i s  
c o n c e rn e d , s iz e ,  o f  i t s e l f ,  i s  v e r y  im p o r ta n t .
F i n a l l y ,  we m ust ta k e  a c c o u n t o f  th e  d e ve lo p m e n t 
o f  c o u n t e r v a i l in g  p o w e r. We have seen t h a t  we m ust 
a l lo w  some e f f e c t  to  t h i s  f a c t o r .  N o t l e a s t  o f  
th e s e  e f f e o t s  w i l l  be th e  way i n  w h ic h  c o u n te r v a i l in g  
po w e r may r e - d i s t r i b u t e  m onopo ly  p o w e r. In d e e d , 
one w o u ld  e x p e c t t h a t  th e  g ro w th  o f  g r e a t  m onopo ly  
p o w e r i n  some s e c to rs  o f  th e  economy w o u ld  in v o lv e ,  
among o th e r  t h in g s ,  th e  r e d u c t io n  i n  th e  m a rk e t 
p o w e r o f  th e  more c o m p e t i t iv e  s e c to r s .  Thus, we 
may f i n d  t h a t  th e  w e ig h te d  ave ra g e  de g re e  o f  m onopo ly  
may be c o n s ta n t ,  w h i le  th e  m onopo ly  po w er o f  some 
s e c t io n s  i s  in c r e a s in g ,  t h a t  o f  o th e r s  i s  d e c re a s in g .
There a re  two f u r t h e r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  a s s e s s in g  
j u s t  how th e  o v e r a l l  de g re e  o f  m o n o p o ly  ha s  changed 
o r  i s  l i k e l y  to  change i n  th e  lo n g  p e r io d .  F i r s t l y ,  
th e re  i s  a d i s t i n c t i o n  be tw een  a s ta te  o f  g iv e n  
m o n o p o ly  p o w e r and th e  g ro w th  o f  m o nop o ly  p o w e r. 
C le a r ly ,  th e  m a rk e t pow er e x e r ta b le  b y  in d iv id u a l  
f i r m s  may be re d u o e d , as th e  r e s u l t  o f  a s t r u g g le  f o r  
p o s i t i o n  and s u r v iv a l  be tw een  r i v a l s ,  w h i le  a t  th e  same
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/the outcome is certain to result in a higher degree 
of monopoly* Just as an economy can guarantee itself 
higher consumption in the future by foregoing it 
now, so monopolists may not fully exploit the 
potentialities of their present position for the 
sake of a better position later on*
Secondly, insofar as the degree of monopoly power 
and of countervailing power - which may be exerted 
is a function of the level of output and of 
utilization, the overall degree of monopoly power 
will vary with long-period changes in these factors* 
Just to take one example, it is clear that long- 
period conditions of surplus labour, as in Britain 
throughout the period between the two world wars, 
will affect the countervailing power of trade unions* 
What makes the problem particularly intractable is 
the fact that, for the economy as a whole, the 
conditions of long-period levels of output and 
utilization, are almost certainly not independent 
of the degree of monopoly.
3* Cyclical Changes in the Degree of Monopoly
On the question of how the degree of monopoly 
varies with cyclical changes in the level of output, 
there have been greater differences of opinion among
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economists. The earliest discussion of this matter
was by Pigou who argued that the degree of monopoly
could be expected to rise in the slump relative to
the boom. He gave four reasons why producers would
be reluctant to reduce price in relation to cost
to the full extent during a slump;
(i) The mutual fear among producers of "spoiling
the market” which "means selling a thing in
bad times at such a price, and, therefore,
in such quantities, that in subsequent good
times the market is already stocked and
producers cannot benefit by the then good 
Ademand* "
(ii) The existence of "psychological friction" - 
the reluctance of business-men to consider 
bygones as bygones particularly in respect 
of prices paid for stocks of materials*
(iii) The influence on demand of expectations.
Reduction in price which engenders the belief 
that price will fall further may actually 
reduce current demand, and, hence, producers 
will be hesitant in cutting price to the 
extent required by the situation.
5. A*G* PIGOU; Industrial"FluetuationsT London 19^9. 
Ch. XIX.
4* op* cit.., p. 186.
( 287 )
(iv) The convenience of a stable selling price in 
some types of business w ill lead to the 
maintenance of a higher price relative to 
cost in the slump, a lower price relative 
to cost in the boom.
Harrod, by contrast, has held that the degree 
of monopoly will fa l l  during a slump because 
consumers, with lower real incomes, will become more 
sensitive to price and selective of quality* The 
reverse w ill hold true in the relative affluence of 
the boom. Thus, fim s will be faced with a more 
elastic demand curve in the slump, a less elastic 
demand curve in the boom* This effect Harrod 
elevates to the status of a "law”, namely nThe Law 
of Diminishing E lasticity  of Demand” which he te lls  
us "means that, as output as a whole increases and 
individuals become more affluent, their sensitiveness 
to price differences declines*
More recently, Kalecki has argued that, on 
balance, the degree of monopoly is  likely to rise 
during a slumpf* In the f i r s t  place, he argues, 
we may expect that transport costs will not fa l l  as 
much as the general level of prices in a slump and
5. R. Harrod, Trade Cycle, p* 21*
6. M. Kaleckis Studies in Economic Dynamios.
London, 1943, pp. 17-21*
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will not rise as much, in the boom. Hence, the 
degree of market imperfection will tend to move 
inversely with the level of output. Against this, 
however, must be placed the Harrod Effect which 
moves in the opposite direction.
However, he says; "Probably more important than
the effect of cyclical changes in market imperfection
upon jx Is the influence of ’tacit agreements * in a
deep slump which may be classified as changes in the
7
degree of oligopoly.” !Ehe basis of these "tacit 
agreements” is the financial deterioration of firms 
in a slump. Industry demand Is much less elastic 
than individual-firm demand. Price-cutting by all 
firms will lead to substantial reductions in margins 
without any great expansion of demand. Hence, 
producers will be reluctant to cut price and this 
reluctance, if  I t  is  general, amounts to a tacit 
agreement. Of course, in many cases firms will 
make firm agreements between themselves to avoid a 
common debacle.
I t  will be noticed that Kalecki’s position is 
broad enough to embrace the specific factors set out 
by Pigou. Moreover, as was pointed out in Chapter IV,
7• op. c i t . , p» 18
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the Harrod Effeot and the thesis that the degree of 
oligopoly rises in the slump are not necessarily 
inconsistent. In fact, the one may contribute to 
the other. The greater interdependence which derives 
from the increase in substitutability due to 
increased consumer sensitivity may serve to throw 
producers into each other* s arms, as it were.
As mentioned before, non-aggression pacts may well 
indicate a heightened threat of war, as when a firm’s 
rivals move oloser to it.
However, it is not sufficient to consider 
merely what firms would want to do in a slump; it is 
equally important to consider what they are able to 
do, in the way of protecting their margins. We have 
argued in Chapter VII that the ultimate sanction 
upon a firm’s ability to exploit a monopoly position 
comes from the threat of "outside" competition.
This sanction applies both to an individual firm 
acting unilaterally and to a group of firms acting 
in "tacit agreement", or in open agreement for that 
matter. Therefore, it is instructive to re-consider 
cyclical changes in the degree of monopoly in terms 
of our model of Chapter VII.
Changes in the facility with which outsiders 
may enter an industry will occur as a result of either
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changes in demand conditions which make the marketing 
(selling) task of the new producer harder or easier, 
or changes in cost conditions which put the new 
producer in a more or less advantageous position 
vis-a-vis existing producers, or changes in the 
degree of imperfection in the capital market which 
affect the ease with which the new producer may obtain 
capital, or, finally, changes in the degree of 
oligopolistic cohesion within the industry.
On the demand side, the Harrod Effect, insofar 
as it does operate, will serve to make entry easier 
for the outsider and will thereby tend to reduce the 
degree of monopoly. Whereas the effect of increased 
consumer sensitivity may be cancelled out, as between 
firms, by open or tacit oligopolistic action in the 
slump, the Harrod Effect will, other things being 
equal, tend to lower the ceiling at which it will be 
profitable for firms to maintain price by agreement. 
This is the ultimate sanction of increased consumer 
sensi tivity.
Against this effect on the demand side, however, 
must be placed the fact that, during a boom or upswing, 
demand will be expanding, whereas in a slump it will 
be stationary or contracting. With an expanding
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demand - with new buyers of the particular commodity 
coming into the market - the effect of consumer 
attachments will be weaker. In general, it is 
easier to f o m  consumer attachments than to change 
them. For this reason, the demand curve facing a. 
potential entrant may be, on balance, more elastic 
in the boom than in the slump.
On the cost side, there are a number of changes 
as between boom and slump which may alter the 
comparative ease of entry in the one direction or 
the other. Firstly, insofar as transportation 
costs are "sticky* in the slump, this will make it 
more difficult for "foreign" producers to deliver 
their products to the market. Also, where tariff 
or other protective devices are based on a flat 
money rate rather than on an ad valorum system, 
the degree of protection will rise relatively as 
price falls. On the other hand, where protection 
takes the form of fixed quotas, the relative degree 
of protection will fall as price and output within 
the industry contracts. In addition, if the prime 
costs of "foreign" producers fall more than those 
of "domestic" producers, this will make the danger 
from outside competition greater. In the extreme 
case of dumping, there may be no\ limit to the 
reduction in local monopoly power which might result.
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I n  th e  c a se  o f  d ir e c t  e n tr y  in to  th e  in d u s tr y  
by new p ro d u cers  th e r e  i s  a ls o  a number o f  f a c t o r s  
w h ich  may a f f e c t  th e  com p arative  e a se  o f  e n tr y  one 
way o r  th e  o th e r .  F i r s t l y ,  se v e r e  s e tb a c k s  i n  the  
o u tp u t o f  e x i s t i n g  p r o d u cers  may v i r t u a l l y  a b o l is h  
p r o t e c t io n  d e r iv in g  from  eco n o m ies o f  l a r g e - s c a l e .
H eal prim e c o s t s  o f  o p e r a t in g  a la r g e  p la n t  a t  low  
c a p a c ity  may r i s e  sh a r p ly  compared w ith  the c o s t  o f  
o p e r a t in g  a new, s m a l le r - s c  a le  p la n t .  A new p rod u cer  
w i l l ,  o f  c o u r s e , be r e lu c t a n t  to  commit h im s e lf  to  
a sm a ll p la n t  p erm an en tly  and t h i s  must cou n t a g a in s t  
th e  e a se  o f  e n tr y .  N e v e r t h e le s s ,  the scope f o r  
a mushrooming o f  s m a l l - s c a le  tem porary "backyard  
p ro d u ctio n "  i s  l i k e l y  to  be g r e a t e r  i n  the slum p.
T h is  ten d en cy  w i l l  be r e in fo r c e d  by the a v a i l a b i l i t y  
o f  p e r so n s  w ith  th e  n e c e s s a r y  "know-how" who may have  
been  d is p la c e d  by th e  g e n e r a l c o n tr a c t io n  o f  a c t i v i t y .
I f  the p r i c e s  o f  p r o d u cers  goods f a l l  mare th an  
th e  g e n e r a l  l e v e l  o f  p r i c e s ,  t h i s  w i l l  p u t th e  new 
p ro d u cer  a t  an a d v a n ta g e , in s o f a r  as th e r e  i s  scope  
f o r  s u b s t i t u t io n  betw een  la b o u r  and t h i s  lo w e r -p r ic e d  
c a p i t a l .  The o ld  p ro d u cer , on the o th e r  hand, i s  
n o t a b le  to  make t h i s  s u b s t i t u t io n ,  so lo n g  a s he i s  
com m itted  to  o ld  c a p i t a l  in v e s tm e n t . The b u y in g  up 
o f  bankrupted  p la n t s  " for  a song" may a ls o  o p e r a te  to
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make possible entry on more favourable terms.
Against this, however, must be set the fact that 
in the liquidity context of the slump and in the 
prevailing climate of expectation, i t  will be more 
difficult for a potential producer to obtain the 
necessary finance to enter upon production. This 
difficulty will be greater than that merely involved 
in the almost certain rise in interest rates. 
Moreover, the difficulty of raising finance will 
be considerably enhanced where existing producers 
have links, e.g. common directorates, with banking 
and other financial institutions, such that pressure 
can be brought to prevent new producers from 
obtaining capital*
The effect of a slump on the degree of 
Oligopolistic cohesion” will also depend on a 
variety of factors. A large amount of excess 
capacity and, perhaps, large stockpiles are a 
standing invitation to the individual firm to slash 
price unilaterally in an attempt to ”beat the gun.” 
This temptation will be greatly increased if  the 
firm is in liquidity difficulties. On the other 
hand, individual survival is probably best assured 
by firms entering into some agreement to stand or 
fall together. Adversity will, in many situations,
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serve to close the ranks, as It were* Moreover, 
the discipline which can be maintained in an industry 
will depend in part on the immediacy of the threat 
from "outsiders’*. Firms in more vulnerable 
positions in relation to outside competition will be 
unwilling to go all the way with those better 
protected* On the other hand, any easing of the 
threat from outside the group is likely to 
make agreement easier to maintain.
Over and above all these considerations, however 
is the influence of expectations. On the one hand, 
the existence of large amounts of excess capacity 
throughout an industry must tend to dampen the 
enthusiasm of a potential entrant. Firstly, it 
will make oligopolistic reactionAentry more probable. 
Secondly, It raises the threat of intern!cine warfare 
breaking out at some future time, if the slump is 
protracted. Generally, the whole matrix of 
expectation will work in this direction. In the 
boom, there will be a natural tendency for 
expectations to be framed on the basis of current 
boom conditions, and vice versa in the slump. In 
the depths of a depression, it will take a good deal 
of courage to prediot how long it will take before 
"good times” return, and to act upon the prediction.
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A f te r  a l l ,  th e  new p r o d u c e r  m u st com m it h im s e l f  to  
lo n g - te r m  c a p i t a l  in v e s tm e n t .
F i n a l l y ,  we m u st c o n s id e r  how c o u n t e r v a i l i n g  
pow er i s  l i k e l y  to  w ork  a s  b e tw ee n  boom and  s lum p .
I t .  i s  f a i r l y  c l e a r  t h a t  th e  c o u n t e r v a i l i n g  pow er 
e x e r t a b l e  by t r a d e  u n io n s  w i l l  f a l l  i n  th e  s lu m p , 
when unem ploym ent i s  s u b s t a n t i a l ,  a s  com pared  w i th  
th e  boom. As f a r  a s  consum er o r g a n i z a t i o n  i s  
c o n c e rn e d , t h i s  i s  p ro b a b ly  more e f f e c t i v e  i n  th e  
s lu m p , a l th o u g h  t h i s  i s  h a rd  to  d e c id e  a  p r i o r i . 
H ow ever, i t  w ou ld  seem t h a t  co n su m er a t t i t u d e s  w h ich  
fo rm  th e  b a s i s  o f  th e  H a rro d  E f f e c t  w i l l  t i p  th e  
s c a l e s  i n  f a v o u r  o f  more c r i t i c a l  p u r c h a s in g  i n  th e  
s lu m p . How c o u n t e r v a i l i n g  p ow er a s  b e tw ee n  b u s in e s s  
u n i t s  i s  c o n c e rn e d  w i l l  change i n  a  slum p i s  a l s o  a  
m oot q u e s t io n .  P r o b a b ly ,  th e  e f f e c t  o f  d e p re s s e d  
b u s in e s s  c o n d i t i o n s  w i l l  be to  i n c r e a s e  th e  pow er 
o f  th o s e  who h ave  i t ,  to  d e c r e a s e  t h a t  o f  th e  w e a k e r . 
To whom t h a t  h a s  s h a l l  be g iv e n .
How th e n  w o u ld  we e x p e c t  th e  a v e ra g e  d e g re e  o f  
m onopoly  to  v a ry  a s  b e tw ee n  boom and  slum p. C l e a r ly  
t h i s  w i l l  depend  on  how th e  v a r i e t y  o f  f a c t o r s  we 
h av e  c o n s id e r e d  b a la n c e  o u t .  Of c o u r s e ,  f o r  
i n d i v i d u a l  i n d u s t r i e s  t h i s  b a la n c in g  w i l l  be l e s s
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likely* Some industries will be subject to one set 
of influences, some to another. Henoe, we should 
expect that in some cases the degree of monopoly will 
be substantially increased, in others substantially 
reduced. Just how this will end in the average 
is a difficult question to answer in view of the 
variety of forces at work, although one is left with 
an impression that, on balance, one would expect the 
average to rise* Moreover, insofar as firms with a 
lower degree of monopoly are more likely to be forced 
out of production than those with a high degree of 
monopoly — in Chapter VII we showed that the barriers 
to the exit of firms is of the same order as the 
barriers to entry — one would expect the average to 
rise* To what extent this happens is likely to 
depend on the depth and duration of the slump* In a 
short, sharp slump, with few firms forced out of 
production, we may get a reduction in the average 
degree of monopoly. However, if the slump is at all 
protracted, the dropping out of firms with a low 
degree of monopoly in preference to those with a high 
degree of protection must tend to raise the average 
degree of monopoly, other things being equal.
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However the average may move, the distribution of 
monopoly power Is hardly less significant. We have 
already noticed that there would seem to be a reasonable 
presumption that, other things being equal., monopoly 
power is likely to increase during the slump in those 
sectors most protected, to decrease in the less 
protected areas. Hence, one would expect that the 
dispersion of degrees of monopoly as between industries 
would tend to increase In the slump as compared with 
the boom. However, insofar as It is likely to be the 
weakest firms of the less protected industries which 
will go to the wall in greatest number, this will tend 
to raise the average degree of monopoly in those 
less protected, industries* As a result, the dispersion 
of monopoly power between industries may fall on this 
account*
4. Some Figures
In Tables 9*1 and 9*2 are set out the shares of 
wages in value of production for Australian 
manufacturing Industry between 1910 and 1952-53 
and similar figures for the United States between 
1899 and 1939* Taking the share of wages in the 
value of production as a (rough) reciprocal index of 
the degree of monopoly, let us reconsider our 
argument in the light of these figures.
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The d a ta  o f  T a b le s  9 .1  and 9 .2  a re  g ra p h e d  i n  
F ig u re s  9 and 1 0 . The A u s t r a l ia n  f ig u r e s  a re  
p r o b a b ly  le s s  i n s t r u c t i v e  th a n  th e  A m e rica n  f o r  two 
re a s o n s . F i r s t l y ,  A u s t r a l ia  i s  a de pen den t economy 
and hence i s  more s u s c e p t ib le  to  th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  
" a r b i t r a r y *  f a c t o r s  im p in g in g  upon  i t  f ro m  o u ts id e .  
T a r i f f  p o l i c i e s  w i l l  a ls o  be o f  g r e a te r  s ig n i f ic a n c e  
f o r  a c o u n t r y  w h ic h  im p o r ts  a la r g e  p r o p o r t io n  o f  
i t s  m a n u fa c tu re d  goods re q u ire m e n ts .  S e c o n d ly , 
th e  A u s t r a l ia n  wage sys tem  i s  i n  some degree  a r b i t r a r y  
and w i l l  o n ly  r e f l e c t  m a rk e t c o n d i t io n s  w i t h i n  b ro a d  
l i m i t s .
N e v e r th e le s s ,  th e re  a re  a num ber o f  i n t e r e s t in g  
s i m i l a r i t i e s  b e tw e e n  th e  A u s t r a l ia n  and A m e rica n  d a ta ,  
as w e l l  as some im p o r ta n t  d i f f e r e n c e s .  I n  th e  f i r s t  
p la c e ,  b o th  show a d i s t i n c t  r i s e  i n  th e  sha re  o f  wages 
( f a l l  i n  th e  de g re e  o f  m o n o p o ly ) i n  th e  sh a rp  slump 
o f  1920—2 1 . A ls o ,  b o th  show a s t ro n g  downward movement 
i n  la b o u r * s  sha re  i n  th e  deep slum p o f  th e  e a r ly  
* t h i r t i e s .  T h is  i s  in d e e d  th e  te n d e n c y  one w o u ld
e x p e c t i n  te rm s  o f  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  d is c u s s io n  o f  
th e  p r e v io u s  s e c t io n .  M o re o v e r, b o th  s e r ie s  show a 
te n d e n c y  to  r i s e  i n  th e  weak boom c o n d i t io n s  a roun d  
1 9 3 7 . H ow eve r, t h i s  te n d e n c y  s h o u ld  be lo o k e d  a t  
as  a r e v e r s a l  o f  th e  d e e p ly  d e p re sse d  c o n d i t io n s  o f
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the immediately preceding period, rather than as an 
effect of an independent boonu Clearly, the way in 
which the degree of monopoly is likely to behave in 
a boom will depend on how it has faired in the preceding 
slump.
Perhaps the most striking dissimilarity between 
the two series is the fact that, though a rise in the 
share of labour occurred in both countries in the sharp 
slump of 1920-21, in the following period the 
Australian figures show a tendency for the 1920-21 
level to be maintained or increased at least until 
1926-27» whereas the American series falls steadily 
from the peak of 1921 to the depths of the depression 
in the early fthirties. The explanation of this
divergence of behaviour is almost certainly to be 
found in the different degree of maturity in the 
respective economies:
(1) The 1920*s were years of rapid expansion of 
Australian manufacturing industry, involving the 
establishment of many kinds of manufactures, new to 
Australia but established in the field of international 
competition* In such periods of establishment of new 
industries, the share of labour is likely to be high 
because firms will be earning small profits or even 
incurring losses in the formative stages, e*g* the
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sha re  o f  L a b o u r I n  v a lu e  added f o r  th e  c o t t o n  in d u s t r y  
was o v e r  100 p e r  c e n t th ro u g h o u t th e  fo r m a t iv e  y e a rs  
o f  th e  » tw e n t ie s .  P ro b a b ly  la g s  i n  th e  a d ju s tm e n t 
o f  t a r i f f  p o l i c i e s  a ls o  h e lp e d  to  r a is e  th e  sha re  
o f  la b o u r  i n  t h i s  p e r io d .
(2 )  By c o n t r a s t ,  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  was a m a tu re  
economy by th e  1 9 2 0 f s . There  i s  a ls o  a good d e a l 
o f  in d e p e n d e n t e v id e n c e  t h a t  th e  d e g re e  o f  m onopo ly  
ro s e  d u r in g  t h i s  p e r io d ,  b o th  as a r e s u l t  o f  m e rg e rs , 
th e  e s ta b l is h m e n t  o f  new in d u s t r ie s  on a m onopo ly  
b a s is ,  e . g .  a lu m in iu m , and th e  f lo w e r in g  o f  p ro d u c t  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,  a d v e r t i s in g ,  and o th e r  f a c e t s  o f  
m a rk e t im p e r fe c t io n .
A n o th e r  i n t e r e s t i n g  fe a tu r e  o f  th e  A u s t r a l ia n  
f i g u r e s  i s  th e  b e h a v io u r  o f  th e  s e r ie s  i n  th e  p e r io d  
a f t e r  W o rld  W ar I I .  D u r in g  th e  w a r th e  sha re  o f  
la b o u r  ro s e  to  re c o rd  le v e ls  u n d e r  th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  
p r ic e  and p r o f i t  c o n t r o ls .  I n  th e  p o s t -w a r  p e r io d ,  
th e  w a r t im e  l e v e l  o f  la b o u r *  s sha re  i n  v a lu e  added 
h a s  been m a in ta in e d .  T h is  c o u ld  be th e  outcom e o f  a 
num ber o f  in f lu e n c e s .  I n  th e  f i r s t  p la c e ,  th e  
p e r io d  was one o f  r a p id  e x p a n s io n  o f  m a n u fa c tu r in g  
i n t o  new f i e l d s  and , i n  t h i s  re s p e o t ,  re s e m b le s  th e  
p e r io d  f o l lo w in g  W o r ld  W ar I  w h ic h  we have a lre a d y  
d is c u s s e d . A ls o ,  i t  was a p e r io d  o f  b r im f u l  em ploym ent
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with very high levels of output and satisfactory- 
profits for industry generally. Maintenance of 
the high wartime level of labour’s share was no 
doubt assisted by the workings of the Arbitration 
system and, in particular, by automatic wage 
adjustments, in a period of satisfactory profits 
or better when employer resistance is likely to be 
at its lowest. In the background, we may also 
add as a factor the countervailing power of trade 
unions in a period of brimful employment.
In Figures 11 and 12 are photostat copies of 
graphs prepared by Steindl showing the movement 
of the share of wages in value added of 14 
American industries. These can illuminate our 
ideas derived from the average; they show a number 
of interesting characteristics in this respect. 
Firstly, in the short slump of 1920-21, there was 
a synchronous movement of all 14 industries in the 
same direction; the share of labour tended to rise 
in each case. Moreover, the downward trend of 
the 1920’s represented a fairly general pattern.
On the other hand, following the onset of the 
Great Depression in late 1929, we find individual 
industries moving in either direction, a trend 
which continued throughout the 'thirties. While 
firms tended to come together during the 1920’s,
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Figure 11 in particular shows a distinct tendency for 
industries to move apart in the thirties.
a serious limitation upon the use of empirical 
data relating to the movement of the degree of monopoly 
is that the figures are necessarily ex post. Insofar 
as the degree of monopoly may be both a cause and a 
consequence of changes in the level of output, we have 
an inherent difficulty of interpretation. There is 
no way of telling how the degree of monopoly would have 
moved had the degree of utilization and the level of 
output remained constant, A similar difficulty 
presents itself in the problem of determining how 
certain factors influence the distribution of 
monopoly power between business units. Thus, in a 
contraction of the level of output, certain firms will 
be forced out of the distribution and the sample 
becomes, at least in part, a selected one. Pirns 
do not drop out at random. What we would really 
like to know is how changes in certain variables 
would have affected the distribution of monopoly power 
between firms, other things remaining equal. It is 
an unfortunate fact about economic argument that it 
is very seldom that other things do remain equal.
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TABLE 9 .1
Share of Wages and Salaries in Value Added: 
Australian Manufacturing*
Year Year £ Year jf
1910 4 9 .6 1 9 2 4 -2 5 55*3 1 9 3 9 -4 0 5 1 .8
1911 5 1 .0 1 9 2 5 -2 6 5 5 .6 1 9 4 0 -4 1 53*5
1912 5 1 .7 1 9 2 6 -2 7 5 5 .8 1 9 4 1 -4 2 5 6 .9
1913 5 1 .6 1 9 2 7 -2 8 5 4 .6 1 9 4 2 -4 3 59*3
1914 51*2 1 9 2 8 -2 9 5 4 .3 1 9 4 3 -4 4 5 9 .2
1915 5 0 a 1 9 2 9 -3 0 5 4 .2 1 9 4 4 -4 5 5 7 .3
1916 5 0 .2 1 9 3 0 -3 1 5 2 .8 1 9 4 5 -4 6 58*4
1917 4 9 .4 1 9 3 1 -3 2 50*4 1 9 4 6 -4 7 58*3
1918 4 8 .2 1 9 3 2 -3 3 4 9 .8 1 9 4 7 -4 8 58*4
1 9 1 8 -1 9 4 9 .1 1 9 3 3 -3 4 4 9 .9 1 9 4 8 -4 9 5 9 .7
1 9 1 9 -2 0 4 9 .7 1 9 3 4 -3 5 50*7 1 9 4 9 -5 0 5 8 .3
1 9 2 0 -2 1 5 3 .3 1 9 3 5 -3 6 50*5 1 9 5 0 -5 1 5 8 .3
1 9 2 1 -2 2 5 2 .4 1 9 3 6 -3 7 5 0 .7 1 9 5 1 -5 2 59*8
1 9 2 2 -2 3 5 4 .0 1 9 3 7 -3 8 5 2 .0 1 9 5 2 -5 3 5 8 .7
1 9 2 3 -2 4 5 4 .7 1 9 3 8 -3 9 52*5
* Source; Commonwealth Statisticians Production Bulletins
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TABLE 9 .2
S h a re  o f  W ages i n  V alue  A dded: U. S . M a n u fa c tu r in g *
Y ear £
1899 44*3
1904 4 3 .7
1909 4 2 .2
19L4 4 3 .2
1919 4 2 .2
1921 4 5 .0
1923 4 3 .0
1925 4 0 .4
1927 3 9 .9
1929 3 6 .9
1931 3 6 .9
1933 3 6 .5
1935 3 9 .9
1937 4 1 .1
1939 3 7 .8
* Source*  J .  S t e i n d l ,  M a tu r i t y  and S t a g n a t io n  i n  
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MONOPOLY AND THE HATE OF INVESTMENT
(308)
X. MONOPOLY AND INVESTMENT: THE PROBLEM
1. Brief Historical Background
The problem of monopoly has been the concern 
of economists ever sinoe the beginnings of economics 
as a separate and self-contained discipline. Indeed, 
the very birth of economics was contemporary with the 
challenge by the new bourgeoisie to the economic 
philosophy of Mercantilism; and high among the 
deadly sins of Mercantilism was its encouragement 
and protection of monopolistic practices. The 
classical economists were virtually unanimous in 
their condemnation of monopoly, not only as a vehicle 
of exploitation, but also as a brake on economic 
progress. Adam Smith, for example, warned;
*By a perpetual monopoly all the other subjects 
of the State are taxed very absurdly in two 
different ways; first, by the high price of 
goods, which, in the case of free trade, they 
could buy much cheaper; and, secondly, by their 
total exclusion from a branch of business which 
it might be both convenient and profitable for 
many of them to carry on. "(1)
Around the middle of the nineteenth century, John
Stuart Mill was explaining that "to be protected
1* Wealth of Nations. Houtledge Ed., London, 1893, 
p. 593.
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against competition is  to be protected against
2
idleness, in mental dullness.”
Although Marx did not believe competition to 
be particularly beneficent, he was, on this subject, 
in closer concord than usual with the main stream of 
contemporary economic opinion. However, Marx went 
a good deal further than the classical economists 
in his assessment of the dangers of monopoly as a 
brake on cap ita list progress* On the one hand, he 
predicted, as one of the most significant features 
of capitalist development, that centralization of 
capital and concentration of production would 
develop as a fundamental trend which would ultimately 
destroy the liberal-competitive capitalism of the 
nineteenth century. In the long-run, this trend 
would play an important part in the eventual 
supercession of capitalism by socialism. For Marx, 
the growth of monopoly was in the nature of the 
hardening of capitalism1s arteries.
By the turn of the century, the development 
predicted by Marx was beginning to become evident, 
especially in Germany and the United States.
Although J«B* Clark in the United States could be
2. Principles. People*s Ed., London 1888, Book IV,
Ch* VII, p. 477.
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found reiterating that monopoly was "hostile to
improvement " and represented a "weakening of dynamic
3energy and a reduction of progress", the ever-cautious 
and astute Marshall was already tempering the 
traditionai view:
"For when the production is all in the hands of one person or company, the total expenses involved sire 
generally less than would have to he incurred if the 
same aggregate production were distributed among a 
multitude of comparatively small rival producers. 
They would have to struggle with one another for the 
attention of consumers, and would necessarily spend 
in the aggregate a great deal more on advertising in 
all its various forms than a single firm would; and 
they would be less able to avail themselves of the 
many various economies which result from production 
on a large scale. In particular they could not 
afford to spend as much on improving methods of 
production and the machinery used in it, as a single 
large firm which knew that it was certain to reap 
the whole benefit of any advance it made."(4)
The last sentence, in particular, puts the "novelty"
of the Schumpeterian position of some 50 years later
in rather a new light. By and large, however, this
approach remained exceptional in theory, if not in
practice; and the traditional pro-competition and
anti-monopoly attitudes continued to be dominant.
In the English tradition, attitudes were again 
thrown into the melting pot in the 1920* s, following
3. Essentials of Economic Theory, N.Y. 1907, pp. 366 and 
537*4* Principles. 8th Ed., London, 1938, p. 484.
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World War I. The British economy was then making 
heavy weather of ^recovery* from the war-time 
disruptions. This gave rise to two opposing views.
On the one hand, envious eyes were cast at the 
cartelized Germany and trustified TJ*S.A., Britain^ 
chief competitors* Britain was exhorted to emulate 
their example under the banner of "rationalization*.
On the other hand* there were many who believed 
Britain* s limping recovery to be due to monopolistic 
rigidities which had developed in the economic 
system and which frustrated the readjustments 
required to put the economy on its feet* Alongside 
this, there was a growing concern among academics, 
not confined to Britain, about the relevance of 
traditional value theory in a world of product- 
differentiation, advertising and high-pressure 
sale smanship*
At least within the academic halls, the victory 
went to traditional attitudes towards monopoly. The 
elaboration of the doctrine of imperfect or 
monopolistic competition not only underlined 
traditional criticisms of monopoly - restriction of 
output and higher prices — but also was at pains to 
stress the generality of the phenomena. Not a little 
of the blame for the economic shambles of the »thirties
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was allotted to monopoly.
Then aame the "Keynesian Revolution" ...
Prior to Keynes, investment was more or less 
assumed to take care of itself. The rate of interest 
was believed to balance the demand for investment 
funds (investment) with the supply of them (savings). 
Keynes repudiated this comfortable assumption and 
selected investment as the primary parameter of 
economic activity. Also, the distribution of income 
gained a new significance over and above that of 
mere economic justice. For the distribution of 
income was the main deteiminant of the consumption 
function which, together with the rate of investment, 
determined the level of Effective Demand and, hence, 
of economic activity.
It was natural, then, for economists to become 
more interested in the effects of the growth of 
monopolistic forms upon the inducement to invest and 
the distribution of income. The latter question 
appeared fairly straightforward and it was generally 
taken for granted that, other things being equal, 
monopoly skews the distribution of income in favour 
of the monopolists. However, the problem of the 
inducement to invest is a much more complex and 
slippery business* and a lively controversy has
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grown up around the question of to what extent 
monopoly inhibits or facilitates investment.
A typical post-Keynesian view of the matter 
was advanced by Hansen:
"We have noted that the approaching cessation of 
* population growth and the disappearance of new 
territory for settlement and exploitation may cut 
off a half or more of the investment outlets which 
we were wont to make in the past. We are, thus, 
compelled to fall back upon that measure of 
capital formation which is associated with the 
advance of technique and the rise of per capita 
output. But current institutional developments 
are restricting even this outlet. The growing 
power of trade-unions and trade associations, 
the development of monopolistic competition, of 
rivalry for the market through expensive 
persuasion and advertising, instead of through 
price competition, are factors which have rightly 
of late commanded much attention among economists. 
There is moreover, the tendency to block the 
advance of technical progress by the shelving of 
patents.
Under vigorous price competition, new cost- 
reducing techniques were compulsorily introduced 
even though the scrapping of obsolete but v m -  
depreciated machinery entailed a capital loss.
But under the monopoly principle of obsolescence 
new machines will not be introduced until the 
undepreciated value of the old machine will at 
least be covered by the economies of the new 
technique. Thus, progress is slowed down and 
the outlets for new capital formation, available 
under a more ruthless competitive society, are cut 
off. Capital losses which could not be avoided 
under rigorous price competition can be and are 
avoided under an economic system more closely 
integrated by intercorporate association and imperfect competition. If we are to save the one 
remaining outlet for private capital formation, 
deliberate action of a far bolder character than 
hitherto envisaged must be undertaken in order to 
make the price system and free enterprise 
sufficiently responsive to permit at least that
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measure of capital formation to which the rate 
of technological, progress had accustomed us in 
the past."(5)
The counter-attack against this view was led 
by Schumpeter. Schumpeter held that the view that 
monopoly inhibited investment in new technical 
processes was a coloured one and maintained that, if 
anything, possession of monopoly control over a 
market would encourage innovation. In particular, 
he argued:
(1) that technical progress depends on research
and, in the modem age, only very large 
businesses are able to provide research 
facilities on the scale required to sustain 
such progress;
(2) that long-period investment of the huge funds
nowadays required will only be undertaken 
by a firm which has a sufficiently secure 
place in the market as will assure it of 
reaping at least a substantial part of the 
benefits which it plans for;
(3) that a monopoly will scrap existing capital
equipment as soon as production with a new 
technique is less costly than with existing
5* Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles. New York, 1941, 
pp. 363-4*
6. Capitalism. Socialism and Democracy. London, 1943*
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equipment and* in this respect, the 
monopolist is in no different position from 
a socialist planning authority; and 
(4) that the argument that monopoly inhibits
technical innovation cuts across the argument, 
often advanced by the same people, that a 
large part of the unemployment of the »thirties 
was the result of the displacement of workers 
by machines — so-called "technological 
unemplo yment *.
A typical rejoinder to this Schumpeterian position 
is that of Maurice Dobbs
Schumpeter*s is Man argument which seems to ignore 
the extent to which monopolie s spend time and energy in entrenching an established position against the 
encroachment of rival innovations and in resisting 
the intrusion of enterprising newcomers on to the 
field - to ignore the fact that consideration of the 
unfavourable effect of new methods on the value of 
capital sunk in older methods will (during the length 
of life of the old plant) exercise an influence, and 
a retarding influence, under monopoly, which it 7
could not do under conditions of atomistic competitiony
And so the debate has gone on.
It will be the argument of the following section 
that, in large part, the reason for the inconclusive ness 
of the debate is that a number of distinctly different 
problems have become entwined in the argument and that
M. Dobb: Studies in the Development of Capitalism, 
London, 1946, p* 325.
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a necessary pre—condition fijr a solution Is to sort 
them out* A different answer will be obtained, 
according as we ask the question from one point of 
vi©w or the other*
2. Elements of the Problem
Prior to Keynes, economists were concerned with 
the effects of monopoly from three main paints of views
(1) The effect of monopoly upon the internal
efficiency of business under three principal 
headss
(a) slackness and conservatism in
management;
(b) adaptability to technical change; and
(c) adaptability to changes in demand
conditions or to structural changes 
in the economy*
(2) The general efficiency of the economy in
allocating resources which has been held 
to be distorted by monopoly- (This is the 
special problem of the "welfare* economists*)
(3) The exploitation of the consumer, looked at
as a matter of economic Justice*
All these aspects of the monopoly problem are 
fundamentally concerned with the best use of given 
resources, a matter with which pre-Keynesian economics
was primarily concerned.
However, with the acceptance of the Keynesian 
position, these problems become secondary to that 
of determination of aggregate output. We are 
immediately faced with the Keynesian paradox* 
inefficient use of resources may increase aggregate 
output. As Keynes himself says: ”*To dig holes in
the ground*, paid for out of savings, will increase, 
not only employment, but the read national dividend
Q
of useful goods and services.” Once this position 
is ao cep ted, the effects of monopoly will be looked 
at from two different angles:
(4) the effect on investment considered as an
income-generating phenomenon; and
(5) the effect on the distribution of income looked
at, not so much from a point of economic 
justice, but as a primary determinant of the 
consumption function, and also as a 
determinant of the funds available to non­
monopoly businesses for the purpose of 
investment»
These latter two sets of problems are quite distinct 
from the first three, and demand a different approach. 
During the course of the controversy about the
(317)
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effects of monopoly on Investment, these two kinds 
of problem have not been clearly delineated* Much 
post-Keynesian discussion about the relation of 
monopoly to the investment process has mixed up the 
basic Keynesian conception of investment as an 
income-gene rating element with questions of 
efficiency and the allocation of given resources, the 
major preoccupation of pre-Keynesian economists.
Two factors seem to account for this confusions-
(1) Investment in the Keynesian system is taken
as an independent variable, something given 
from outside the system. Although later 
attempts to close the system have brought 
in induced investment as a dependent 
variable, autonomous investment - and in 
particular the rate of technical innovation - 
has remained outside the system. Because 
economists have tended to regard investment 
as data and have not systematically attempted 
to study the determinants of investment 
decisions, there seems to have been a natural 
tendency to approach the question along 
traditional, i.e. pre-Keynesian, lines.
(2) This tendency has been reinforced in virtue of
the fact that both sets of problems, viz. the
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efficient use of resources and the sufficient 
generation of income by investment, have 
certain factors in common. In particular, 
technical innovation is a concern of both 
efficiency and income-generation. Likewise, 
it is easy to slip from consideration of the 
effect of monopoly on the distribution of 
income as a basic determinant of the 
consumption function into the question of 
high prices and consumer exploitation.
The basic purpose of this Part is, then, to try 
and sort out the factors which are relevant from the 
point of income-generation. Questions of efficient 
use of resources are important but separate, and 
must be kept separate if we are to put our questions 
in the right form.
Looked at from another angle, we could say 
that problems of efficiency and allocation of 
resources is the special problem of a full employment 
economy. The problem of income-generation is the 
problem of the economy with a chronic tendency 
towards underemployment. As it happens, the former 
problem tends to loom larger at the present day. 
Indeed, there are economists wha believe that the 
problem of income-generation, has been solved once
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and for all. Governments, with the aid of 
economists no doubt, can fix all that. But however 
much one may be sceptical about this — especially 
if the priming effeots of armament production were 
to taper off — the fact still remains that a general 
theory should be able to provide answers appropriate 
to both types of situation. Economists of all 
people should not easily forget the era of the "new 
capitalism" of the 1920* s with its promise of 
endless vistas of progress and prosperity. At all 
events, in the following pages we shall be concerned 
with the effects of monopoly on investment looked at 
as an income-generating phenomenon. If the future 
should prove this to have been an unnecessary 
pursuit, the world will have much to be thankful for.
Finally, there is one further distinction which 
it is essential to make. There is a fundamental 
difference between monopoly taken as a growing 
process and monopoly taken as a given structural 
situation. According as we are dealing with the one 
situation or the other, our answer about the effect 
of monopoly on investment may be quite different.
It may well be that the growth of monopoly will 
involve substantial investment outlays. For example,
the growth of monopoly in an industry brought about
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by amalgamation or merger of a number of existing 
films may involve considerable technical 
reorganization of production, with considerable 
investment expenditures associated with it* In 
fact, historically, great periods of amalgamation 
»rd merger in the United States have been associated 
with high levels of investment, e.g. in the period 
1898-1903 and in the nine teen-twenties* It is, of
course, difficult to separate cause and effect here; 
but it seems likely that the process of amalgamation 
and merger contributed to the investment outlays in 
those periods.
On the other hand, the process of growth of 
monopoly power may serve to damp down investment 
expenditures. Insofar as an increased degree of 
monopoly brings with it a restriction of output or, 
at least, a check to the rate of expansion of output 
in the particular industry, this may tend to reduce 
investment outlays below what they would have been 
in the absence of the increase in monopoly power.
At all events, these processes tend to be 
of a once-far-all character and, usually, to be 
irreversible. They will not be our concern here. 
Rather, we are interested in the effects of a given
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s t a t e  o f monopoly power upon the r a te  o f in v e s tm e n t. 
T h is , by c o n t r a s t ,  r e p r e s e n ts  a c o n tin u in g  in f lu e n c e .
3. The D is t r ib u t io n  o f Income
One oonsequence o f monopoly i s ,  o f c o u rse , to  
skew the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f income i n  fa v o u r  o f  th o se  
s e c t io n s  en jo y in g  th e  monopoly power. The in c re a s e d  
p ro p o r t io n  o f  income a c c ru in g  to  th e se  s e c t io n s  w i l l  
u s u a l ly  be a t  th e  expense o f wage and s a la r y  
e a rn e r s  and th e  inoomes o f  n o n -m o n o p o lis tic  b u s in e s s e s .  
I n  g e n e ra l ,  th e n , we shou ld  ex p ec t t h i s  to  r e s u l t  i n  
g r e a t e r  sav in g s  and a co rre sp o n d in g  lo w erin g  o f the  
consum ption f u n c t io n ,  so t h a t  a g r e a t e r  r a t e  o f 
in v e s tm e n t w i l l  be re q u ire d  to  s u s ta in  a g iv en  r a te  
o f  economic grow th . T h is i s  a v e ry  im p o rta n t f a c e t  
o f  monopoly, b u t one w ith  w hich we a re  n o t p r im a r i ly  
concerned  h e re .
However, i t  would seem f a i r l y  c e r t a i n  t h a t ,  a t
l e a s t  to  some e x te n t ,  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f income w i l l
a f f e o t  th e  inducem ent to  i n v e s t .  F o r exam ple,
re d u c t io n  i n  th e  incom es o f  more c o m p e titiv e  b u s in e s s e s
i n  fa v o u r  o f m onopolies may le av e  the  fo rm er w ith
an ac u te  and c o n tin u in g  sh o r ta g e  o f  in v e s t ib l e  fu n d s .
To th e  e x te n t  to  w hich d i s t r i b u t i v e  r e la t io n s h ip s  do
a f f e c t  in v e s tm e n t o u t la y s ,  we a re  bound to  tak e  t h i s
in to  acco u n t when c o n s id e r in g  th e  e f f e c t  o f monopoly 
on in v e s tm e n t.
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X I. THE EFFECT OF MONOPOLY ON THE RATE OF INVESTMENT
1 .  In v e s tm e n t  i n  C o s t - r e d u c in g  I n n o v a t io n s
I n  th e  c o n t r o v e r s y  w h ic h  h a s  grow n up a ro u n d  th e
q u e s t io n  o f  how m onopoly  a f f e c t s  th e  r a t e  o f  in v e s tm e n t
%
p e rh a p s  th e  g r e a t e s t  e m p h a s is  h a s  b e e n  p la c e d  upon  
th e  e f f e c t s  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  c o s t - r e d u c i n g  in n o v a t io n s .  
T h is  i s  no d o u b t due to  th e  f a c t ,  m e n tio n e d  i n  th e  
p r e v io u s  c h a p t e r ,  t h a t  i t  i s  h e re  t h a t  we f i n d  a 
d i r e c t  a s s o c i a t i o n  w i th  q u e s t io n s  o f  e f f i c i e n c y  and 
p r o d u c t i v i t y *  F o r  u s ,  h o w e v e r, th e s e  a r e  s e c o n d a ry  
m a t t e r s .  We a r e  h e re  c o n c e rn e d  w i th  th e  p ro b le m  fro m  
th e  p o i n t  o f  v iew  o f  th e  in c o m e - g e n e r a t in g  c o n se q u e n c e s  
o f  t e c h n i c a l  p r o g r e s s .
As o u t l i n e d  i n  th e  p r e v io u s  c h a p t e r ,  t h e r e  h a s  
b e e n  a  d i s t i n c t  c le a v a g e  o f  o p in io n  a b o u t  th e  e f f e c t  
o f  m onopoly  o n  t e c h n i c a l  i n n o v a t io n -  On th e  one 
h a n d , i t  i s  h e ld  t h a t  m onopoly  w i l l  i n h i b i t  such  
in v e s tm e n t .  A m onopoly  i s  i n  a  p o s i t i o n  to  p r o t e c t  
e x i s t i n g  c a p i t a l  v a lu e s .  T h e r e fo r e ,  i t  w i l l  n o t  
i n t r o d u c e  a n  in n o v a t i o n  u n l e s s  su ch  in v e s tm e n t  r e d u c e s  
oo s t  to  a n  e x t e n t  t h a t  th e  s a v in g s  made a r e  a t  l e a s t  
e q u a l  to  th e  c a p i t a l  c o s t  ( i n t e r e s t  + a m o r t i z a t i o n )
(324)
of the new technique. Hence, the introduction of 
cost-reducing innovations will be delayed by 
monopolists until a sufficient degree of amortization 
of existing capital values has been achieved.
Innovations are then financed primarily from 
amortization funds released from depreciation of 
existing capital equipment. And, of course, this is 
not net investment.
Hansen has been one of the chief protagonists 
for this viewpoint. Äs we noticed in Chapter 10,
he says: "Under vigorous price competition, new
cost-reducing techniques were compulsorily introduced
uh-even though the scrapping of obsolete but/depreelated 
machinery entailed a capital loss. But under the 
monopoly principle of obsolescence new machines will 
not be introduced until the undepreciated value of 
the old machine will at least be covered by the 
economies of the new technique. Thus, progress is 
slowed down and outlets for new capital fomation 
available under a more ruthless competitive society 
are cut off. Capital losses which could not be 
avoided under rigorous price competition can be and are 
avoided under an economic system more closely integrated
by i n t e ro o rp o ra te  a s s o c i a t i o n  and im p e r fe c t  
c o m p e t it io n ,
Now i t  i s  e a s y  to  r e fu te  t h i s  argument on a  
p u r e ly  fo rm a l l e v e l ,  to  show th a t  th e  m o n o p o lis t  
i s  fa c e d  w ith  th e  same c a lc u l a t io n s  a s  a c o m p e t it iv e  
f ir m  o r  s o c i a l i s t  management; and a number o f  
e c o n o m is ts  have ta k en  th e  tr o u b le  to  do s o . Thus, 
A u stin  R obinson p u ts  th e  m a tte r  a s  f o l lo w s :
"We m ust now e n q u ire  w h eth er  a m onopoly may be 
e x p e c te d  to  adopt im provem ents o f  tec h n iq u e  a s  
r a p id ly  a s  w i l l  com p etin g  f ir m s .  . . .  L et u s  
s t a r t  by c o n s id e r in g  i n  what c o n d it io n s  a f irm  
i s  o r d in a r i ly  p rep ared  to  s u b s t i t u t e  new equipm ent 
f o r  o ld .  I t  p a y s  i t  to  do so o n ly  when t o t a l  
c o s t  o f  th e  r e q u ir e d  o u tp u t w ith  th e  new equipm ent, 
in c lu d in g  a s u f f i c i e n t  r e tu r n  on th e  c a p i t a l  
in v e s t e d ,  i s  l e s s  th an  prim e c o s t  w ith  th e  o ld  
eq u ip m en t. The o ld  equipm ent i s  th e r e  i n  any 
c a s e ,  w h eth er  i t  e a r n s  any r e tu r n  o r  non e. I f  
prim e c o s t  w ith  th e  o ld  equipm ent i s  l e s s  than  
t o t a l  c o s t  w ith  th e  new, th e  a d d it io n a l  p r o f i t s  
earn ed  through  p u t t in g  i n  th e  new equipm ent w i l l  
be l e s s  th an  s u f f i c i e n t  to  pay th e  i n t e r e s t  on  
th e  ex tra , o a p i t a l  in v e s t e d  i n  i t .  . . .  So f a r  
a s  th e y  are  con cern ed  w ith  th e s e  c o n s id e r a t io n s ,  
th e  a c t io n s  o f  p la n t s  owned by m o n o p o lie s  and by 
com p etin g  f ir m s  may be e x p e c te d  to  be i d e n t i c a l . w(2)
Schum peter p r e s e n t s  a s im i la r  argum ent. Thus, 
he sa y s :
"A nother d o c tr in e  h a s  c r y s t a l l i z e d  in t o  a s lo g a n ,  
v i z . ,  th a t  i n  th e  e r a  o f  b ig  b u s in e s s  th e  
m ain ten an ce o f  th e  v a lu e  o f  e x i s t i n g  in v e s tm e n t -
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1 . F i s c a l  P o l i c y  and B u s in e s s  C y o le s , p .
2 . E .A .G . R ob in son , M onopoly. C . U . P . , 1 9 4 1 , pp . 1 1 3 -4 .
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c o n s e r v a t io n  o f  c a p i t a l  -  becom es th e  c h i e f  aim  
o f  e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  a c t i v i t y  and b id s  f a i r  to  
p u t  a  s to p  to  a l l  c o s t - r e d u c i n g  im p ro v e m e n t.
H ence th e  c a p i t a l i s t  o r d e r  becom es in c o m p a t ib le  
w i th  p r o g r e s s . " (3 )
B u t ,  he  g o e s  o n :
MC o n se rv in g  c a p i t a l  v a lu e s  i s  th e  same th in g  a s  
c o n s e r v in g  p r o f i t s .  M odem  th e o r y  te n d s  i n  
f a c t  to  u s e  th e  c o n c e p t  P r e s e n t  N et V alue o f  
A s s e ts  (= c a p i t a l ,  v a lu e s )  i n  p la c e  o f  th e  c o n c e p t 
o f  p r o f i t s .  B o th  a s s e t  v a lu e s  and p r o f i t s  a r e  
o f  c o u rs e  n o t  b e in g  s im p ly  c o n s e rv e d  b u t  
m ax im ized . • . .  A l l  t h a t  p r i v a t e  m anagem ent 
t r i e s  to  do i s  to  m ax im ize  th e  p r e s e n t  n e t  v a lu e  
o f  t o t a l  a s s e t s  w h io h  i s  e q u a l  to  th e  d is c o u n te d  
v a lu e  o f  e x p e c te d  n e t  r e t u r n s .  T h is  am ounts to  
s a y in g  t h a t  i t  w i l l  a lw a y s  a d o p t a  new m ethod 
o f  p r o d u c t io n  w h ic h  i t  b e l i e v e s  w i l l  y i e l d  a  
l a r g e r  s tr e a m  o f  f u t u r e  incom e p e r  u n i t  o f  th e  
c o r r e s p o n d in g  s t r e a m  o f  f u t u r e  o u t l a y ,  b o th  
d is c o u n te d  to  th e  p r e s e n t ,  t h a n  d o e s  th e  m ethod 
a c t u a l l y  i n  u s e .  The v a lu e  o f  p a s t  in v e s tm e n t ,  
w h e th e r  o r  n o t  p a r a l l e l e d  by  a  bonded  d e b t  t h a t  
h a s  to  be a m o r t iz e d ,  d o e s  n o t  e n t e r  a t  a l l  
e x c e p t  i n  th e  se n se  a n d  to  th e  e x t e n t  t h a t  i t  
w o u ld  a l s o  h av e  to  e n t e r  i n t o  th e  c a l c u l a t i o n  
u n d e r ly in g  th e  d e c i s i o n s  o f  a  s o c i a l i s t  
m anagem ent. So f a r  a s  th e  u se  o f  th e  o ld  
m a c h in e s  s a v e s  f u t u r e  c o s t s  a s  com pared  w i th  
th e  im m e d ia te  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  th e  new m e th o d s , 
th e  r e m a in d e r  o f  t h e i r  s e r v i c e  v a lu e  i s  o f  c o u rs e  
a n  e le m e n t o f  th e  d e c i s i o n  f o r  b o th  th e  
c a p i t a l i s t  and  th e  s o c i a l i s t  m an ag er; o th e r w is e  
b y g o n e s  a r e  b y g o n e s  f o r  b o th  o f  them  and any  
a t t e m p t  to  c o n s e rv e  th e  v a lu e  o f  p a s t  in v e s tm e n t  
w o u ld  c o n f l i o t  a s  much w i th  th e  r u l e s  f o l lo w in g  
f ro m  th e  p r o f i t  m o tiv e  a s  i t  w ou ld  c o n f l i c t  w i th  
th e  r u l e s  s e t  f o r  th e  b e h a v io u r  o f  th e  s o c i a l i s t  
m a n a g e r .w(4 )
3 . C a p i t a l i s m ,  S o c ia l i s m  and D em ocracy . 2nd . E d . ,
p p . 9 6 -9 7 .
4 . o p . c i t . , p p . 9 6 -9 7 .
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The a rg u m e n t p u t  fo rw a rd  by  H o b in so n  and 
S ch u m p e te r i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  f o r m a l ly  c o r r e c t .  H ow ever, 
i t  i s  o n ly  c o r r e c t  s u b j e c t  to  some v e ry  w e ig h ty  
c e t e r i s  -p a r ib u s  c o n d i t i o n s ;  and  to  a c c e p t  i t  a s  i t  
s t a n d s  w ou ld  be h ig h ly  m is le a d in g .
One im p o r ta n t  e x c e p t io n ,  w h ic h  R o b in so n  
a ck n o w le d g es  b u t  S ch u m p ete r d o e s  n o t ,  s u g g e s t s  i t s e l f  
a t  o n c e . I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  many c o s t - r e d u c i n g  
in n o v a t io n s  d ep en d  f o r  t h e i r  e f f i c a c y  upon  l a r g e -  
s c a le  o u t p u t .  F o r  e x a m p le , th e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  
r o t a r y  p r e s s e s  f o r  f l a t b e d s  by  a  p r i n t e r  o n ly  becom es 
econom ic i f  th e y  o an  be em ployed  i n  th e  p r o d u c t io n  
o f  l a r g e  o u t p u t s .  I t  i s  e a s y  to  t h in k  o f  a  h o s t  o f  
su c h  e x a m p le s . Now i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t ,  i f  an  
i n n o v a t i o n  r e q u i r e s  an  e x p a n s io n  o f  o u tp u t  f o r  i t s  
p r o f i t a b l e  em p loym en t, th e  a t t i t u d e  o f  a m o n o p o lis t  
o r  o l i g o p o l i s t  to  i t s  i n t r o d u c t i o n  w i l l  be d i s t i n c t l y  
d i f f e r e n t  fro m  th e  a t t i t u d e  o f  a  c o m p e t i t iv e  f i r m .
A c o m p e t i t iv e  f i r m  may ex p an d  o u tp u t  a t  th e  ex p en se  
o f  c o m p e t i t o r s :  a  m o n o p o lis t  c a n n o t ,  a t  l e a s t  w i th o u t
a  f i e r c e  s t r u g g l e  w i th  i t s  a t t e n d a n t  l o s s e s .  C l e a r l y  
a  m o n o p o lis t  o r  sm a ll  g ro u p  o f  m o n o p o l i s t s  w i l l  be 
l e s s  e n t h u s i a s t i c  a b o u t  u s in g  th e  p r i c e  w eapon to  
e x p an d  o u tp u t  to  th e  d e g re e  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  th e  econom ic
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employm ent o f  th e  in n o v a t io n  than  w i l l  a c o m p e t it iv e  
f ir m . I n  s h o r t ,  m arg in a l r ev e n u e , w h ich  must be 
b a la n ced  a g a in s t  the c o s t  o f  th e  in n o v a t io n , w i l l  be 
lo w e r  f o r  th e  m o n o p o lis t  th an  f o r  th e  c o m p e t it iv e  f ir m .
But l e t  u s  r e tu r n  to  th e  g e n e r a l c a se  where an 
in n o v a t io n  r e d u c e s  c o s t  in d e p e n d e n tly  o f  any c o n t in g e n t  
in c r e a s e  i n  o u tp u t . I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  lo o k e d  a t  from  a 
s t a t i c  s ta n d p o in t ,  R obinson  and Schum peter are  
l o g i o a l l y  o o r r e c t .  H owever, i t  i s  s u r p r is in g  th a t  
Schum peter o f  a l l  p e o p le  sh o u ld  ch oose  to  r e s t  h i s  
c a se  on th e s e  s t a t i c  c o n s id e r a t io n s .  For th e  one 
th in g  he h a s  been  a t  p a in s  to  s t r e s s  th rou gh ou t h i s  
eoonom ic w r i t in g s  i s  th a t  i t  i s  new f ir m s  and new 
p 270d u c ts  (o r  new v a r ia n t s  o f  th e  o ld )  w h ich  are th e  
v e h ic l e  o f  in n o v a t io n  and t e c h n ic a l  p r o g r e s s .
W hereas under c o m p e t it io n  th e r e  i s  more o r  l e s s  
freedom  f o r  new fi2mis o r  new p r o d u cts  to  ca p tu re  th e  
ma27k e t  r e q u ir e d  f o r  econom ic o p e r a t io n , under m onopoly  
th e r e  i s  n o t;  o th e r w is e  th e  s i t u a t i o n  w ould n o t  
rem ain  one o f  m onopoly f o r  lo n g .  Once we adm it th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  new f ir m s  e n te r in g  the in d u s tr y ,  th e  
argum ent o f  R obinson and Schum peter f a l l s  to  th e  
ground. F or a new f ir m  w i l l  be in t e r e s t e d  n o t o n ly  
i n  in n o v a t io n s  w h ich  red u ce  t o t a l  c o s t  below  e x i s t i n g
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finns' prime costs, but is able to consider entry 
into the field so long as total cost falls below the 
going price, which is quite a different thing. By 
offering price competition, such new firms can force 
existing firms to re-equip or go out of business.
This ability to force innovation under a competitive 
regime is greatly enhanced when the innovation, as is 
often the case, also involves an improvement in the 
product, as well as reducing the cost of producing it . 
New firms are not concerned at all with existing 
oapital values, since they have no capital invested 
in the field. Thus, they can inflict capital losses 
on existing firms which those firms would not incur 
voluntarily, if they were able to control innovation 
as can the monopolistic firm.
This distinction between the behaviour of 
monopolistic and competitive firms is even more clearly 
demonstrated when we consider innovations which are 
purely capital-saving. Clearly, i t  will never pay an
existing firm to invest in purely capital-saving 
innovations which merely replace equipment already 
in use. By contrast, a new firm will be indifferent 
as to whether an invention be capital-saving or 
labour-saving. Both will reduce total cost below the
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g o in g  p r i c e .
I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  n o t i c e  how S ch u m p e te r 
s h i f t e d  h i s  a rg u m en t to  a v o id  th e s e  i m p l i c a t i o n s .
He d o e s  n o t ,  i t  w i l l  be r e c a l l e d ,  sa y  i n  so many w o rd s  
t h a t  th e  in d u c e m e n t to  i n v e s t  i n  c o s t —r e d u c in g  
in n o v a t io n s  w i l l  be th e  same f o r  a  m onopoly  a s  f o r  
a  c o m p e t i t iv e  f i z m .  R a th e r ,  he  a rg u e s  t h a t  i t  w i l l  
be th e  same f o r  a  m o n o p o lis t  a s  f o r  a s o c i a l i s t  
m anagem en t. S c h u m p e te r i s  c o r r e c t  i n  t h i s  c la im ,  
sa v e  f o r  th e  e x c e p t io n  n o t i c e d  e a r l i e r  w here  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  a  new te c h n iq u e  i s  c o n t in g e n t  upon  
a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  o u t p u t .  H ow ever, th e  f a c t  i s  t h a t  
a  s o c i a l i s t  econom y w i l l  n o t  re p ro d u c e  th e  c o n d i t i o n s  
o f  a c o m p e t i t iv e  econom y i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t .  U n d er 
s o c i a l i s m  i t  w i l l  a l s o  be th e  c a se  t h a t  in n o v a t io n  
w i l l  o n ly  become w o r th w h ile  w hen th e  t o t a l  c o s t  w i th  
th e  new te c h n iq u e  i s  lo w e r  th a n  p rim e  c o s t  w i th  
e x i s t i n g  e q u ip m e n t. I t  w i l l  n o t  p a y  a  s o c i a l i s t  
m anagem ent to  s c r a p  w o rk in g  e q u ip m en t o th e r w i s e .  
C e r t a i n l y  a  s o c i a l i s t  a u t h o r i t y  w ould  n o t  s e t  up new 
p l a n t s  so a s  to  f o r c e  s c r a p p in g  o f  e q u ip m en t u se d  by 
e x i s t i n g  p l a n t s ,  u n l e s s  t h i s  c o n d i t i o n  i s  f u l f i l l e d .  
N or w i l l  i t  p a y  to  s c ra p  e x i s t i n g  e q u ip m e n t i n  th e  
f a c e  o f  a  p u r e l y  c a p i t a l - s a v i n g  in n o v a t i o n .  I n  th e s e  
r e s p e c t s  th e  p o s i t i o n  o f  s o c i a l i s t  m anagem ent i s
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the same as for a monopolist. Moreover, it is 
easy to see the reason for this. In both cases 
property values are vested in one or a few hands 
which are able to protect them. But under 
competition the property used in the industry is 
diffused, lots of films owning a small part of it.
So long as a competitive firm, or potentially 
competitive firm, finds it profitable to invest in 
a particular innovation, it is unconcerned with what 
happens to the capital values vested in other people. 
It is quite prepared to inflict capital losses on 
others. Neither a monopolist nor a socialist 
management will take this individualist attitude.
They must clearly ooncem themselves with the total 
effects of their action.
Prom the point of view of conserving resources, 
monopoly is in this respect superior to competition, 
whioh may destroy existing capital before it ceases 
to be socially useful. But this very superiority 
is inimical to the development of the economy once 
we look at the matter from the point of view of 
investment as an income-generating phenomenon. 
Misdirection of resources and the destruction of
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still socially useful equipment does provide investment 
outlets under competition, although in a socially 
inefficient way. Monopoly on the other hand tends 
to conserve resources more, but in the very act of 
doing so it reduces investment outlets and hence tends 
to be a depressive influence on the rate of growth.
This sort of paradox will crop up time and time again 
in these pagess it is a contradiction, not of logic, 
but of capitalism. Perhaps this is best illustrated 
from Schumpeter*s argument. On the one hand, he 
alleges, critics of monopoly accuse it of sabotaging 
economic progress; on the other hand, they accuse 
technical progress of creating "technological 
unemployment.M He says; "Incidentally, it should be 
noticed that the kind of restrictive practice under 
discussion, granted that it exists to a significant 
extent, would not be without compensatory effects on 
social welfare. In fact, the same critics who talk 
about sabotage of progress at the same time emphasize 
the social losses incident to the pace of capitalist 
progress, particularly the unemployment which that 
pace entails and which slower advance might mitigate 
to some extent. Well, is technological progress too 
quick or too slow for them? They had better make up
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t h e i r  m in d s .”
The a n sw e r i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h a t  t e c h n i c a l  
p r o g r e s s  may be b o th  to o  q u ic k  and  to o  s lo w . I t  may 
be to o  q u ic k  i n  th e  s e n s e  t h a t  i t  w a s te s  econom ic  
r e s o u r c e s  w h ic h  h av e  a  s o c i a l  u s e f u l n e s s .  A t th e  
same t im e ,  i t  may be to o  slow  i n  t h a t  i t  d o e s  n o t  
p r o v id e  s u f f i c i e n t  in v e s tm e n t  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  to  f u l l y  
em ploy a v a i l a b l e  p r o d u c t iv e  r e s o u r c e s .  T here  i s  
no l o g i o a l  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  h e r e !
F i n a l l y ,  t h e r e  i s  one f u r t h e r  p o i n t  a b o u t th e  
e f f e c t  o f  m onopoly  upon  in v e s tm e n t  i n  i n n o v a t i o n s .  
I n s o f a r  a s  th e  g ro w th  o f  m onopoly  i s  a cco m p an ied  by 
a  te n d e n c y  f o r  th e  e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  f u n c t i o n  to  p a s s  
fro m  th e  h a n d s  o f  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  i n t o  th e  h a n d s  o f  
f i n a n c i e r s ,  i . e .  i n s o f a r  a s  a n  e r a  o f  m onopoly  a l s o  
becom es an  e r a  o f  F i n a n z k a p i t a l , th e  i n c e n t i v e  to  
i n v e s t  i n  r i s k y  in n o v a t io n s  i s  l i k e l y  to  be i n h i b i t e d .  
The f e a r  o f  l o s s  i s  l i k e l y  to  b e a r  more h e a v i ly  w i th  
f i n a n c i e r s  and b a n k e r s  th a n  th e  p r o s p e c t  o f  s u p e r ­
p r o f i t s .  The s a f e  and p r e s e n t  m onopoly  i s  l i k e l y  
to  be p r e f e r r e d  to  th e  r i s k y  p o t e n t i a l  o n e . And 
once  th e  new v e n tu r e  i s  fo r e s w o rn ,  a  good d e a l  o f  
e n e rg y  and  r e s o u r c e s  a r e  l i k e l y  to  go i n t o  th e  
p r e v e n t io n  o f  i n t e r l o p e r s  e n t e r i n g  th e  f i e l d .
5 *  C a p i t a l i s m ,  S o c ia l i s m  and D em ocracy , p .  9 7 n .
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2. The Widening of Capital
Over the last twenty years a great deal of 
attention has been directed to the effects of 
oligopoly upon price formation. The significance 
of the problem arises out of the fact that* generally 
speaking*, oligopolists will be deterred from pursuing 
a policy of price-competition because they are 
acutely aware that price moves by themselves are 
likely to be matched by rivals* thus bringing to 
nullity the benefits which it was hoped to gain from 
the reduction in price. It is surprising therefore 
that so little attention has been given the problem 
of analogous attitudes of monopolists and oligopolists 
towards investment decisions.
The situation in respect of investment decisions 
is in many ways similar to that in respect of price- 
output decisions* but is probably of much greater 
significance for the economy as a whole. Monopoly and 
oligopoly become significant in the investment process 
beoause of the two-edged nature of investment. On the 
one hand* investment immediately increases income. On 
the other* it "permanently” increases productive 
capacity. There are two aspects to the increase in 
income. First* it is temporary: unless the investment
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is followed by further doses, income will drop back 
to its  previous level. Secondly, the income effect 
is diffused throughout the economy. A given piece 
of investment means only a very small increment of 
income to the particular industry making the investment. 
But whereas the income effect of investment is 
temporary and diffused, the increase in capacity 
resulting from the investment is more or less permanent 
and is specific to the particular industry undertaking it . 
This is one of the large paradoxes of the capitalist 
process.
I t is true, of course, that the income effect is 
diffused and temporary for competitive firms and 
industries, as i t  is for monopolies. But under 
competition the capacity effect i s also diffused I 
The addition to total industry capacity which will 
result from the investment plans of any one firm or 
potential firm will not be significantly great.
Therefore, if  all firms act on this assumption and 
proceed with their investment plans on this basis, 
the resulting expansion of income may well be sufficient 
to justify the investment outlays. However, even if 
the worst comes to the worst and i t  turns out ex post 
that the expansion of income has not been sufficient 
to employ total capacity - both old and new - the 
expanding fim  has the knowledge that a good deal of
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the capital loss involved will fa ll upon competitors. 
Indeed, i t  will usually he marginal firms which will 
take the brunt of the capital loss; and these firms 
are unlikely to be the ones which are making additions 
to oapacity. In short, under competitive conditions, 
if  capital losses are to result from investment, they 
can, from the point of view of the individual firm 
contemplating the investment, be inflicted upon other 
firms.
But under conditions of monopoly or oligopoly the 
position is quite different. By contrast, additions 
to capacity will loom large compared with the resulting 
increment of income. Redundant equipment will be left 
on the firms1 very own doorsteps; and i t  will be very 
difficult to pass the baby onto rivals. In Chapter 
VII, I demonstrated that the barriers to the exit of 
marginal firms are of exactly the same order as the 
barrier to the entry of new firms - including the 
economies of scale enjoyed by the established firms. 
Moreover, the greater the barrier to new firms, the 
greater the degree of monopoly. Hence, the greater 
the degree of monopoly, the less prospect there is for 
new firms to inflict capital losses on existing firms 
and for existing firms to inflict them on their rivals. 
In greater or lesser degree, these losses, if  they
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eventuate, must be borne by existing firms themselves.
Domar has given an excellent hypothetical 
illustration of how this is likely to work out in 
practice. "We may imagine," he says, "representatives 
of our big business, perhaps together with those from 
big labor, sitting around a table. All prospective 
investments are placed on a platter and passed around. 
The representative of General Motors might, for 
example, find all of them splendid, all with the 
exception of Kaiser-Frazer1s new plan for expansion.
He takes this one projeot off and passes the platter on. 
Pennsylvania Railroad has no objection to Kaiser-Frazer 
and to all other such projects, but i t  might decide to 
veto the St. Lawrence waterway. Its views are 
seconded by United Mine Workers whose behaviour is 
undistinguishable from that of their business 
associates at the table* The platter moves on. Real 
estate interests think that i t  was a great pity that 
Kaiser-Frazer and the St. Lawrence were taken off the 
platter; those were fine projects to achieve prosperity 
and raise the American standard of living. The 
construction of a plant for prefabricated houses, 
however, is a different matter* That will destroy 
existing real estate values. And so i t  goes. By the 
time the platter completes its  trip around the table
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i t  i s  p e r f e c t l y  em p ty ; a l l  p r o j e c t s  h ave  b e e n  v e to e d  
by  one o r  o t h e r  p a r t i c i p a n t .  -And th e r e  g o e s  o u r  
p r o s p e r i t y .
I n  a n o th e r  c o n t e x t ,  Domar h a s  g iv e n  a  r e a l  
exam ple  o f  t h i s  p r o c e s s  a t  w o rk . He p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t :
"The r e c e n t  p u b l i c a t i o n  by  th e  A m erican  I r o n  and 
S t e e l  I n s t i t u t e ,  B ack g ro u n d  M emoranda on  S t e e l  
C a p a c i ty « i s  a n  e x c e l l e n t  d e m o n s tr a t io n  o f  t h i s  
p o i n t .  Hie p u rp o s e  o f  t h i s  memorandum i s  to  show 
t h a t  th e  c o u n tr y  p o s s e s s e s  s u f f i c i e n t  s t e e l  
c a p a c i t y ,  b o th  r e l a t i v e  to  th e  p e a k  (p e a c e t im e )  
y e a r  o f  1 9 2 9 , and  to  th e  p e a k  dem ands o f  th e  m ost 
im p o r ta n t  u s e r s  o f  s t e e l  ta k e n  i n d i v i d u a l l y .
And th e  o n ly  g ro w th  a d m it te d  i n t o  th e s e  
p r o g n o s t i c a t i o n s  w as th e  g ro w th  o f  p o p u la t i o n .
I f  a  s u f f i c i e n t  num ber o f  o u r  i n d u s t r i e s  make 
t h e i r  p l a n s  a lo n g  th e s e  l i n e s ,  we w i l l  end  up w i th  
some f i f t e e n  o r  more m i l l i o n  u n e m p lo y e d .M( 7)
The r e a s o n  f o r  th e  a t t i t u d e  o f  U n i te d  S t a t e s  
S t e e l  i s  made q u i t e  e x p l i c i t  i n  a s ta te m e n t  b e fo r e  
th e  S p e c ia l  C om m ittee  to  S tu d y  P ro b le m s o f  A m erican  
S m all B u s in e s s  by  W a l te r  R e u th e r ,  P r e s i d e n t  o f  th e  
U n i te d  A u to m o b ile  W o rk ers  o f  A m e ric a , to  th e  e f f e c t  
t h a t  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  th e  s t e e l  i n d u s t r y  b e l i e v e d
6 . E .D . Domar: " In v e s tm e n t ,  L o s s e s ,  and  M o n o p o l ie s ," 
In co m e . Em ploym ent and P u b l i c  P o l i c y :  E s s a y s  i n  
H onor o f  A lv in  H. H a n se n . New Y ork , 1 9 4 8 , p .  52.
7 . E*D. Domar: "The P ro b le m  o f  C a p i t a l  A c c u m u la tio n ,"  
A m erican  Econom ic R ev iew , D ecem ber 1 9 4 8 , p .  786.
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that ntheir ohanoes of achieving full employment were
too’ risky to justify the capital investment in steel-
0
making which full employment will require. "
This fear of productive capacity is one of the 
most striking features of latter-day capitalism.
Although throughout the 1930*s American business was 
unable to find any substantial avenues for profitable 
expansion, American productive capacity was roughly 
doubled in the 5 years of World War II, when the 
growth of income was assured from outside the system, 
as it were.
3. The "Anarchy" of Competitive Production
We have just seen how the diffusion of the 
capacity effect of investment under conditions of 
competition is more conducive to investment than the 
more concentrated capaoity effect which we get under 
conditions of monopoly and oligopoly. But even if 
monopolies went ahead with their investment plans, 
ignoring the possibility of income growth falling short 
of that required to profitably employ the newly-created
capacity, their rate of expansion of investment would
*
8. "One Hundred Million Tons of Steel," statement by 
Walter P. Reuther, Hearings of the Steel Sub­
committee of the Special Committee to Study Problems 
of Amerioan Small Business. TT.S. Senate, July 21,
1947.
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p ro b a b ly  f a l l  s h o r t  o f  t h a t  o f  c o m p e t i t iv e  f i r m s  i n  
o th e r w is e  s i m i l a r  c o n d i t i o n s .  T h is  i s  due to  th e  
f a c t  t h a t  u n d e r  a  c o m p e t i t iv e  reg im e  in v e s tm e n t  
d e c i s i o n s  a r e  a l s o  d i f f u s e d .  T h is  d i f f u s i o n  o f  
in v e s tm e n t  d e c i s i o n s  make i t  a lm o s t  c e r t a i n  t h a t  
c o m p e t i t iv e  f i r m s  w i l l  o v e r s h o o t  th e  in v e s tm e n t  
t a r g e t  f o r  any  e n v is a g e d  r a t e  o f  e x p a n s io n .  T h is  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  a  c o m p e t i t iv e  econom y h a s  b e e n  
c a l l e d  by M arx th e  " a n a rc h y  o f  c a p i t a l i s t  p r o d u c t i o n ,"  
a te rm  w h ic h  b r i n g s  o u t  a n  a s p e c t  o f  c o m p e t i t iv e  
p r o d u c t io n  w h ic h  i s  r e c o g n iz e d ,  b u t  n o t  s t r e s s e d ,  by 
a ca d em ic  e c o n o m is ts .
U nder c o n d i t i o n s  o f  c o m p e t i t iv e  p r o d u c t io n ,  th e  
c o o r d i n a t i o n  o f  p r o d u c t io n  p l a n s  i s  a c h ie v e d  by th e  
m a rk e t  m echanism  ex. p o s t , a s  c o n t r a s t e d  w i th  th e  
e x  a n te  c o o r d i n a t i o n  w h ic h  w ou ld  be p o s s i b l e  u n d e r  a 
p la n n e d  econom y. C o n s id e r  a n  a t o m i s t i c  i n d u s t r y  
f a c e d  w i t h  a n  e x p a n d in g  dem and. Demand b e g in s  to  
p r e s s  a g a i n s t  c a p a c i t y ;  an d  e a c h  f i r m  h a s  th e  
i n c e n t i v e  to  ex p an d  i t s  c a p a c i t y .  T h is  i s ,  in d e e d ,  
th e  i n d i c a t i o n  o f  th e  m a rk e t .  M o re o v e r, new f i r m s  
a r e  l i k e l y  to  be a t t r a c t e d  i n t o  th e  i n d u s t r y ,  a s  p r i c e  
t e n d s  to  r i s e  to  r a t i o n  s a l e s .
B u t a c o n s id e r a b le  p e r io d  m u st e la p s e  b e tw ee n
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th e  d e c i s i o n  to  ex p an d  c a p a c i ty  and th e  b r i n g in g  o f  th e  
f i n a l  p r o d u c t  to  m a rk e t .  U nder c o m p e t i t iv e  c o n d i t i o n s  
t h e r e  i s  no m echanism  by w h ic h  th e  t o t a l  p la n n e d  
e x p a n s io n  o f  c a p a c i ty  may be e q u i l i b r a t e d  w i th  th e  
l o n g - p e r i o d ,  s a y  f u l l  em ploym en t, r e q u i r e m e n ts  o f  th e  
i n d u s t r y .  A t l e a s t  t h e r e  i s  no m echanism  e x  a n t e .
T hus, u n d e r  c o m p e t i t iv e  c o n d i t i o n s  th e  a g g re g a te  o f  
a l l  i n d e p e n d e n t ly  p la n n e d  a d d i t i o n s  to  c a p a c i t y  w i l l  
o f t e n  be g r e a t e r  th a n  t h a t  r e q u i r e d  on  an y  l o n g - p e r i o d  
c a l c u l a t i o n .  I n d e e d ,  t h i s  o v e r - s h o o t in g  o f  th e  t a r g e t  
i s  a lm o s t  i n e v i t a b l e  f o r  c o m p e t i t iv e  i n d u s t r i e s  f a c i n g  
a  r a p i d l y  e x p a n d in g  dem and, a s  f o r  exam ple  d u r in g  a  
s t r o n g  u p sw in g  o f  th e  t r a d e  c y c l e .  The f a c t  t h a t  
o v e r - p r o v i s i o n  o f  c a p a c i t y  i s  b e in g  made d o e s  n o t  
become a p p a r e n t  u n t i l  th e  f i n a l  go o d s b e g in  to  s a t u r a t e  
th e  m a rk e t*  By t h i s  t im e ,  f u r t h e r  in v e s tm e n t  i s  
p r o b a b ly  u n d e r  w ay. I t  i s  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  t h a t  th e  
s to c k  m a rk e t  b e g in s  to  p a n ic .
I t  s h o u ld  be s t r e s s e d  t h a t  we a re  c o n c e rn e d  h e r e ,  
n o t  w i th  e x c e s s iv e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  c a p a c i ty  w h ic h  r e s u l t s  
fro m  a  f a i l u r e  o f  E f f e c t i v e  Demand, b u t  w i th  p r o v i s i o n  
o f  c a p a c i t y  o v e r  and  above w h a t w ou ld  be r e q u i r e d  a t ,  s a y ,  
a  f u l l  em ploym ent l e v e l  o f  o u tp u t .  J o h n  S tr a c h e y  c i t e s  
an  exam ple  o f  t h i s  f ro m  a  New D e a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n  i n t o  th e
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boot and shoe industry in the United States. It was 
found that, as a result of the expansion of capacity 
of the • twenties which continued into the early 
’thirties, capacity in that industry was three times 
that required upon the basis of need, abstracting
9altogether from effective demand. This is probably 
an extreme case; but it is oertain that competitive 
industries do tend to over—provide capacity in this 
way, in greater or lesser degree. Necessarily, a 
substantial proportion of capacity which is created 
from time to time will run to waste*
From our point of view, there are two aspects to 
this matter. From the point of view of the best 
use of resources, once again we find that monopoly 
is probably superior to competition. Monopolists 
and oligopolists will have a much better idea of 
total industry requirements and of the investment plans 
which are under way at any given time. They can 
"plan" ahead more effectively. Also, their industries 
are not so much at the mercy of "outsiders*. As a 
result they can take a broad, "planning" view of 
investment. And monopolists and their spokesmen have 
not been slow to point this out. Indeed, a sort of
9. John Strachey: The Nature of Capitalist Crisis.
London, 1935, pp. 291-2.
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Guild Capitalism under the hegemony of monopolies has 
often been advanced as an alternative to State Socialism. 
Certainly, the notion was basic to the Corporate State 
ideology of Fascism.
On the other hand, i t  is  clear that too much 
investment is  preferable, from the point of view of 
the growth of the economy, to too l i t t l e .  Although 
some of this investment w ill run to waste, i t  will 
serve to l i f t  the economy to a level to which i t  might 
not otherwise have attained. In this respect, over­
investment is  in the same category as pyramid-building, 
gold-mining and digging holes. Via the ratchet effect 
upon consumption, such over-investment may well result 
in a permanently higher level of activity than would 
have o therwise obtained.
4» Rationalization of Capacity Requirements
Another factor which tends to reduce the amount 
of capital investment in an industry as the degree of 
monopoly rises is  the reduction in excess capacity 
which often occurs as an industry becomes more integrated. 
Here we are not comparing monopoly with an idealized 
perfect competition in which excess capacity is  
impossible, but rather with the more usual (outside 
of certain standardized primary products) form of
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imperfect competition in which, there may be a large 
number of snail firms — e.g. Job printing - but 
where the market is far from perfect in the technical 
sense •
In an imperfect market where consumer attachment 
is important, firms will carry a reserve of capacity 
with which to meet unexpected increases in demand or 
to expand output permanently if the opportunity 
presents itself. Moreover, most firms produce a 
number of products or perform a number of different 
but related services* Equipment must be provided 
to produce each preduct or service, even where the 
particular demand may be well below technical 
capacity* It is easy to think of examples.
Every Job printer must possess a linotype, every 
small engineer a certain range of lathes, milling 
machines, and so on; yet each of these machines 
may be required for only a fraction of total working 
time.
Clearly, then, as small independent producers 
are merged into larger units, the total amount of 
excess capacity required in the industry is 
substantially reduced. Demands upon individual 
firms will be higher and also more stable - in 
virtue of the law of large numbers. Consequently,
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a closer approximation to full running may be achieved. 
M i excellent example of this trend is given by Austin 
Robinson in his book, Monopoly.^ -0 Judge Gary found 
that, when the United States Steel Corporation was 
formed, 50 per cent less capital was required than 
was carried by the merging films when working as 
independents. This is probably an exceptional case, 
but i t  does illustrate an important tendency in the 
latter stages of the growth of monopoly. The 
significance of the reduction in capital requirements 
as a result of merger and amalgamation is also attested 
by the olamour by United Kingdom industrialists after 
World War I for the rationalization of industry*
A nearer approach to full running and consequent 
reduction in capital costs are not the least important 
gains which would follow from "rationalization. n
To give a complete picture, i t  should be stressed 
that this tendency is only likely to operate in the 
later stages of monopoly growth. In the formative 
stages the reverse may hold true; the earlier 
stages of monopolistic strategies may involve increases 
in excess capacity. In this respect, the position is 
analogous to that of oligopolistic price formation.
10. p* 116.
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I n  th e  fo r m a t iv e  p e r io d ,  when f i r m s  a re  s t r u g g l in g  f o r  
p o s i t i o n  and e x p a n s io n , p r ic e  w a rs  and c u t - t h r o a t  
c o m p e t i t io n  may w e l l  r e s u l t  i n  lo w e r  p r ic e s .  L a t e r ,  
when th e  s u c c e s s fu l f i r m s  become e n tre n c h e d , h ig h e r  
p r ic e s  a re  a lm o s t c e r t a in  to  be le v ie d ,  A c t u a l l y ,  
th e  c o n n e c t io n  i s  r a t h e r  more th a n  m e re ly  a n a lo g o u s , 
f o r  e xce ss  c a p a c i t y  i s  an  e s s e n t ia l  e le m e n t o f  p r ic e  
w a r fa r e ,
The g r e a t  p e r io d s  o f  c a p i t a l i s t  e x p a n s io n  have 
a lm o s t a lw a y s  been a s s o c ia te d  w i t h  in v e s tm e n t i n  
h e a v i ly  c a p i t a l - u s in g  d e v e lo p m e n t*  A n y th in g  w h ic h  
te n d s  t o  re duce  th e  c a p i t a l  re q u ire m e n ts  o f  i n d u s t r y  
g e n e r a l ly  m us t te n d  to  damp down c a p i t a l i s m r s in h e r e n t  
a b i l i t y  to  expand ,
5 . The G ro w th  o f  th e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  S e c to r
D u r in g  th e  l a s t  20 y e a rs  o r  s o , e c o n o m is ts  have 
come to  re c o g n iz e  th e  c o n n e c t io n  be tw een  m o nop o ly  and 
th e  g ro w th  o f  s e l l i n g  c o s ts ,  a d v e r t is in g ,  th e  
d u p l i c a t io n  o f  d i s t r i b u t i v e  o u t l e t s ,  and so o n . The 
re a s o n  f o r  t h i s  c o r r e la t io n  b e tw e e n  m onopo ly  and 
d i s t r i b u t i v e  c o s t s  i s  n o t  f a r  to  see k* U n d e r 
m o nop o ly  c o n d i t io n s ,  an e x p a n s io n  o f  o u tp u t  b y  a f i r m  
ca n , i n  gene m l ,  o n ly  be a c h ie v e d  b y  a s u b s t a n t ia l  
r e d u c t io n  i n  p r ic e .  M o re o v e r, i n  th e  more g e n e ra l
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aase of oligopoly, even this avenue of expansion is 
limited, since a price-cut Is almost certain to be 
followed by rivals, with whom any expansion of demand 
has got to be shared» Under these conditions, price- 
competition tends to be superseded by methods of 
non-price-competition. A huge superstructure of 
selling expenditure, advertising, one—brand 
distributive outlets, and the like Is erected above 
the productive structure. Of course, the purpose 
is not only to provide an offensive weapon to replace 
price-competition. Equally i t  has a defensive 
significance In the protection of established positions 
from outside competition.
An idea of the importance of these trends in 
quantitative terms has been given by the Twentieth 
Century Fund on the basis of Its report, Does 
Distribution Cost Too Much? The Fund has pointed out 
that:
distribution - not production -  Is now the great 
frontier of the American business system. 
Distribution takes 59 cents of the consumers dollar 
as compared with only 41 cents for production 
processes. Workers in distribution increased nine 
times between 1870 and 1930, while the population 
increased only three times. ”(11)
11. Circular letter to economics teachers from the
Twentieth Century Fund, 9 May 1941* Quoted from 
Sweezy*s Theory of Capitalist Development, p. 282.
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Of course, this trend cannot be wholly ascribed to 
monopolistic practices; but assuredly a large part 
of it can be. Certainly it represents an enormous 
change in the structure of the economy.
The important point of this for our discussion 
is that distribution and service industries usually 
require a much lower rate of investment in capital 
equipment - with the possible exception of 
transportation - than do industries engaged in 
production. Hence, the larger the sector of the 
economy which is represented by this type of business 
activity, the less the demand for investment funds. 
Certainly distributive industries are likely to 
provide much less scope for investment in technical 
innovation than productive industries.
This conclusion goes in the opposite direction to
that of Paul Sweezy, who suggests that the growth of
the distribution sector offers an additional outlet
12for investment. This may be so in the formative
stages; but, since there is a limit to the size 
which this sector may reach in relation to production, 
it must sooner or later constitute a dampening factor 
on the economy as a whole. Consider an economy which 
requires a net investment of 10 per cent of income to 
maintain a steady rate of growth at full employment.
12. op. cit., pp. 278-85.
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If there is a large sector of such economy, for 
example the distributive sector, which requires only 
5 per cent net capital formation in relation to 
income to sustain an equilibrium growth consistent 
with the overall rate of growth, then this would mean 
that a rate higher than 10 per cent must be sustained 
in the productive sectors, if  the overall investment 
requirement is to be forthcoming.
6• The Distribution of Income
Monopoly will tend to skew the distribution of 
income in favour of the monopolists. Insofar as 
this raises the propensity to save, this will increase 
the rate of investment required to maintain any 
pre-determined rate of growth. However, we are not 
concerned here with this aspect of the matter. Rather 
we are concerned how changes in the distribution of 
income resulting from monopoly directly affect 
the inducement to invest. There seem to be two ways 
in which such changes may affect the rate of investment.
Firstly, insofar as the gain of income by the 
monopoly sector is at the expense of consumers 
(particularly wage and salary earners), this will tend 
to depress the rate of growth of consumption and 
hence the rate of investment, via the acceleration 
principle.
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Secondly, the skewing of income distribution in 
favour of the monopoly sector may be at the expense 
of other business units, in particular the smaller 
and more competitive businesses* This may react 
unfavourably upon investment in three ways:
(1) profits which are more or less permanently low
or losses which are protracted will tend to 
reduce the enthusiasm for investment of those 
firms suffering them;
(2) reduction in the share of income accruing to
the non-monopolistic business sector will 
reduce internal accumulation in that sector 
and hence reduce the funds available in that 
sector for investment purposes; and
(3) this reduction in internal accumulation will,
in itself, make it more difficult for 
businesses to borrow from outside the sector 
for investment purposes.
Steindl has worked over these aspects of the 
inducement to invest at some length; and they play 
a basic part in his model of the investment process.
13. <T. Steindl: Maturity and Stagnation in American 
Capitalism. Oxford, 1952.
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While one feels that he makes them carry a weight 
which is far too heavy for them alone, these elements 
are hound to play a not unimportant part in a more 
general and comprehensive theory of investment and 
of growth.
7. Conclusion
In these pages I have attempted systematically 
to set out the main ways in which monopoly may affect 
the inducement to invest. A good deal of further 
theoretical and empirical investigation is clearly 
yet to he done, before really firm answers may he 
expected* In particular, we need a general theory 
of investment* Investment must he brought into the 
theoretical system, not introduced from outside as 
data.
Even at this stage, however, certain presumptions 
seem apparent, if the foregoing argument is valid. 
Firstly, monopoly is probably superior to competition 
so far as the best direction of a given use of 
resources is concerned. Secondly, it would appear 
on a number of important counts to be inferior to 
competition in providing, of its own accord, the 
necessary investment to maintain a high rate of growth.
( 552)
In particular, i t  seems to be lacking in inherent 
ability  to provide investment outlets sufficient to 
l i f t  the economy from a low level of activity*
This indeed seems to be the most striking feature 
of the 1930»s. I t  required preparation for war, 
and finally  war i ts e lf ,  to l i f t  the world economy 
from the doldrums of the »thirties.
We may feel that the problem of internal income
generation is  no longer a serious one, and applaud
monopoly for i ts  seeming superiority in the use of
resources. We may feel that Governments are now
able to guarantee income generation, from outside the
system as i t  were. However, i t  should not be easily
forgotten that, h istorically , the only periods of
sustained fu ll employment or near fu ll employment
under capitalism have been associated with high
levels of aimaments expenditure. These have the
o f
inestimable advantage from the point of view^business 
in terests that (a) they cannot be over-produced, and 
(b) they are a form of investment which does not 
come into competition with existing capital. On 
both counts they can obtain the unqualified approval 
of the cap ita list class and, in particular, the 
monopoly interests among i t  who are usually most 
strongly entrenched in the basic industries which
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b e n e f i t  m o st d i r e c t l y  fro m  arm am en ts b u i ld i n g .
W h e th e r  su c h  a p p ro v a l  w ou ld  be fo r th c o m in g  f o r  
a l t e r n a t i v e  fo rm s  o f  G overnm ent e x p e n d i tu r e  on  th e  
r e q u i r e d  s c a l e ,  e . g .  i n  h o u s in g ,  s c h o o ls ,  h o s p i t a l s  
and  d i r e c t  e f f o r t  to  r a i s e  th e  l i v i n g  s t a n d a r d s  o f  
th e  u n d e r - p r i v i l e g e d  p e o p le s  th e  w o r ld  o v e r ,  i s  y e t
to  be d e m o n s tr a te d
(i)
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